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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s engagement with the 
political thought of Thomas Hobbes and Hobbism. This involves tracing Hobbes’s French 
reception in the first half of the eighteenth century amongst authors with whom Rousseau was 
familiar, thereby elucidating the context in which he responded to Hobbesian ideas and 
arguments. When situated in this context, many of the difficulties in understanding Rousseau’s 
engagement with Hobbes are overcome, and the deeply polemical character of the engagement 
is revealed. In particular, Rousseau’s state of nature theory sought to collapse the prevalent 
bifurcation between Pufendorfian sociability and Hobbesian Epicureanism in order to show that 
Hobbes’s natural law critics were in fact no better than Hobbes; a line of argument that 
Rousseau also pursued in the Social Contract. In addition, Rousseau’s invocation of Hobbes 
was intended to support his republican critique of doux commerce theory, by revealing that the 
modern defenders of commercial society rested their theories on a Hobbesian picture of man’s 
natural condition. This picture closely resembled the neo-Augustinian account of man’s post-
lapsarian state, and by rejecting this Augustinian-Hobbesian depiction of man Rousseau was 
able to offer a vision of a well-ordered republic for men who were yet to be corrupted by the 
onset of luxury and entrenched relations of inequality. In examining Rousseau’s engagement not 
just with Hobbes, but also with natural law, republican and Augustinian contexts, an original 
interpretation of his political thought is advanced throughout the thesis. This interpretation 
stresses the importance and interplay of three themes, the problematical relationship between 
which often leads to much confusion in the scholarly literature on Rousseau: first, nature 
understood as a normative standard; second, free will as an inalienable gift of nature; and, third 
and finally, the role of the passions in general and of amour-propre in particular. 
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A Note on Sources and Translations 
 
All references to Rousseau are given to standard English and French editions where both are 
available. The following abbreviations are used throughout, in each case given by volume and 
page number (e.g. CW1:3/ OC2:4): 
 
CW  The Collected Writings of Rousseau, series ed. C. Kelly & R.D. Masters, in 13 vols. 
(Hanover, NH, 1990-2010). 
OC Œuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Pléiade edition, dir. B. Gagnebin & M. 
Raymond, in 5 vols. (Paris, 1959-1995). 
CC Correspondance complète de Jean Jacques Rousseau, ed. R.A. Leigh, in 52 vols. 
(Geneva, 1965-1971; Oxford, 1972-1977). 
 
All references to Hobbes’s De Cive are given to both English and French translations followed 
by page number, with the following abbreviations (e.g. Cam.5/ Par.6): 
 
Cam. On the Citizen, ed. & trans. R. Tuck & M. Silverthorne (Cambridge, 1998). 
Par. Le Citoyen ou les Fondements de la Politique, trans. S. Sorbière (Paris, 1982). 
 
Original chapter and section numbers are also given to De Cive but it is worth noting that 
Sorbière’s French translation occasionally deviates from these. References to Hobbes’s other 
works are given either to individual editions or to The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of 
Malmesbury, ed. W. Molesworth, in 10 vols. (London, 1839-1845), given by volume and page 
number (e.g. EW7:8). 
Throughout the thesis both original French sources and English translations have been 
consulted where available. Where suitable, references are given to scholarly English translations 
of primary sources. Where these have been either unavailable or inadequate the translations 
provided are my own and the original is provided in a footnote for consultation. When quoting 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century English works I have refrained from modernising the 
original spelling and punctuation myself, unless this has been updated in the modern edition 
cited.  
Occasionally I have felt it necessary to alter the English translation or preserve the 
original French term. Most notably, both amour de soi-même and amour-propre are sometimes 
translated into English as self-love, but given the importance that Rousseau (even if not his 
contemporaries) attached to the distinction between these two varieties of self-love I have 
retained the French terms. Similarly, I have standardised all translations of amour de la patrie to 
‘love of fatherland’. 
The original publication date of modern primary sources is given in square brackets in 
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the footnote the first time the work is referenced, if the date is not mentioned in the body of the 
text. On some occasions explanatory footnotes have been used for this purpose. Suggested 
composition dates for works unpublished in the author’s lifetime are only provided where 
relevant.  
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Introduction 
 
In a word, I see no tolerable medium between the most austere democracy and the 
most perfect Hobbism
1
 
 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was inclined to view problems between extremes and nowhere was this 
more evident than in his political thought. Five years after having published the Social Contract, 
Rousseau offered this observation on the problem of politics; a problem that he thought 
comparable to the squaring of the circle in geometry. Either put man above the law by making 
the sovereign a mortal God, or place the law above man guided only by the celestial voice of the 
general will. These were the two extremes that Rousseau posited as being the only tolerable 
solution: either the most austere democracy, such as he proposed, or the most perfect Hobbism.
2
 
Much as Thomas Hobbes’s geometrical solution to the squaring of the circle was widely 
rejected,
3
 so too Rousseau would reject Hobbes’s solution to the problem of politics. That 
Rousseau viewed the problem in such starkly dichotomous terms, however, provides the point 
of departure for this thesis. 
This thesis analyses Rousseau’s engagement both with the political theory of Hobbes 
and with Hobbes’s ideas as they were received in eighteenth-century French thought. As the 
quote from Rousseau suggests, his target was often as much Hobbism as it was Hobbes’s ideas 
themselves, and it is well to note from the outset that these two targets were not one and the 
same; indeed the picture of Hobbism with which Rousseau worked frequently misrepresented 
the nuances of Hobbes’s thought. At times Rousseau appears to have engaged directly with 
Hobbes’s work; on other occasions he attacked what he took to be the pervasive influence of 
Hobbesian ideas on the political thought of his day; whilst at his most polemical he even 
attempted to subvert the prevalent understanding of Hobbism in order to criticise his 
contemporaries. Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbes and Hobbism is a multi-faceted one and 
all of these elements have to be kept in mind if one wants to understand the relationship 
between the two thinkers.   
Rousseau engaged with both Hobbism and Hobbes’s ideas in a number of different 
contexts and for a variety of reasons, the nature and bearing of which this thesis seeks to 
uncover and evaluate. There are many different perspectives from which the relationship 
between the two thinkers can be explored, thus the place of Hobbes (or Hobbism) within the 
thesis is best understood as a thematic one. The challenge for anyone writing on Rousseau is 
                                                 
1
  ‘En un mot, je ne vois point de milieu supportable entre le plus austère Démocratie et le hobbisme le 
plus parfait’, ‘Rousseau à Mirabeau, le 26 juillet 1767’, CC33:240. 
2
  Judith Shklar is one of the only commentators to argue that this either/ or choice represented ‘a genuine 
conflict between ideals’ for Rousseau, Men and Citizens, p. 133. The importance of either/ or choices and 
rejection of partial solutions in Rousseau’s thought more generally is well brought out by Cassirer, The 
Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pp. 69-70.  
3
  See Jesseph, Squaring the Circle. 
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that of justifying why another contribution to the abundant literature on such a seminal thinker 
is required. In this case the justification rests primarily on providing a comprehensive 
examination of Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbes that surpasses the confines of existing 
scholarship.
4
 Yet what emerges from this approach is an original interpretation of Rousseau’s 
political philosophy that stresses and interweaves aspects of his thought that are frequently 
understated or neglected. By way of introduction, then, the rationale for further analysing the 
relationship between Hobbes and Rousseau is first discussed, before providing an outline of the 
structure of the thesis. An overview of the interpretation of Rousseau’s political thought to be 
advanced is then sketched, and finally some methodological issues concerning the approach to 
be pursued are addressed. 
 
Hobbes and Rousseau 
 
The idea that the relationship between Hobbes and Rousseau is in need of further examination 
may seem somewhat surprising. Comparisons between the two thinkers recur throughout 
Rousseau scholarship, as well as being common place amongst more general studies in the 
history of political thought. It is thus well to survey some of the most prominent characteristics 
of the extant scholarship in order to reveal where there remains further scope for analysis. For 
brevity’s sake, what follows is confined to developments in the literature since the middle of the 
twentieth century. The sample of studies considered is selective, yet it is one that represents 
some of the most important trends in shaping the way that the relationship between the two 
thinkers is now understood. 
Around the middle of the twentieth century a number of important studies advanced 
distinctively Hobbesian readings of Rousseau. According to Leo Strauss, for example, Rousseau 
was greatly indebted to Hobbes, deferring to his acceptance of the authority of modern natural 
science and attack on classical natural law. Rousseau only deviated from Hobbes because he 
fully appreciated the implications of his predecessor’s premises, thus it was on truly Hobbesian 
principles that Rousseau originated the first crisis of modern thought by abandoning nature, or 
human nature, as a basis of right. On Strauss’s reading, Rousseau struggled with his ancient and 
modern leanings but finally succumbed to a modern and Hobbesian tradition of political thought 
and natural right.
5
 The most thorough examination of Rousseau’s relationship with this modern 
tradition remains Robert Derathé’s seminal study, first published in 1950. Whilst recognising 
that Rousseau set out many of his ideas against Hobbes, some of Derathé’s most original 
contributions were in arguing for Hobbes’s influence on Rousseau. Perhaps most notably, 
Derathé maintained that Rousseau’s psychology of man was inspired by Hobbes’s.
6
 In much the 
                                                 
4
  Throughout the thesis remarks concerning Rousseau scholarship are limited to the literature published 
in English and French. 
5
  Strauss, Natural Right and History, especially pp. 266-274. 
6
  Derathé, Rousseau et la Science Politique, pp. 109-110, 137-141. 
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same spirit, Georges Davy argued that Hobbes set down the very foundations for the Social 
Contract and, for Bertrand de Jouvenel, the influence was so profound that Rousseau’s theory 
could be described as ‘Hobbism turned inside out’.
7
 Characteristic of many of the studies of this 
period, then, was an attempt to show that Rousseau’s thought was really very Hobbesian, or at 
least a lot more so than he would have willingly admitted. 
In many respects it is Strauss’s influence that looms large over much Anglo-American 
contemporary scholarship on the relationship between the two thinkers, where Hobbes is more 
generally taken to represent a distinctively modern tradition of political thought in contrast to a 
classical tradition that is often represented by Plato. Arthur Melzer thus reads Rousseau through 
the dichotomy of Plato or Hobbes and even suggests that Rousseau’s intention was to reconcile 
the two.
8
 Conversely, David Lay Williams has recently argued forcefully for the influence of 
Plato over Hobbes in order to dispel Hobbesian readings of Rousseau (which he claims were 
prominent for the best part of the twentieth century), yet his study is still structured around the 
Straussian dichotomy.
9
 To be sure, this dichotomy at times proves instructive for understanding 
Rousseau’s thought, not least because the Straussian reading of Hobbes – irrespective of 
whether or not it does Hobbes’s thought any justice – shares some important resemblances with 
the ways in which Hobbes’s ideas were read and discussed in much eighteenth-century French 
thought. Williams’s study is invaluable for those interested in the relationship between Hobbes 
and Rousseau because it convincingly challenges at least one prevalent line of interpretation. 
Nonetheless, Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbesian ideas cannot be reduced to the question of 
Plato or Hobbes, since this engagement permeated many other debates in which Plato and 
Platonism were not the antitheses of Hobbes and Hobbism. 
Even if not Straussian in influence, most of the seminal literature on Hobbes and 
Rousseau has adopted a predominantly a-historical approach, conducting purely philosophical 
analyses of some of the two thinkers’ key ideas, such as the state of nature, the social contract 
and sovereignty.
10
 These are precisely the topics where there is evidence that Rousseau was 
influenced by Hobbes, yet there is a marked absence of historically nuanced readings of the 
ways in which Rousseau employed and refuted the ideas that he associated with Hobbes. Given 
this, it is perhaps unsurprising that it has been historians associated with the Cambridge 
approach to the history of ideas who have recently led the way in calling for more scholarship 
examining the two thinkers. Quentin Skinner signalled that insufficient research has been 
                                                 
7
  Davy, Hobbes et Rousseau, p. 14; Jouvenel, ‘An Essay on Rousseau’s Politics’, p. 124. For other 
notable contributions in a similar vein see Taylor, ‘Rousseau’s Debt to Hobbes’; Winch, ‘Man and Society 
in Hobbes and Rousseau’. 
8
  Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, p. 115. 
9
  Williams, Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment, especially pp. xv-xxx, 27-59. 
10
  For a typical sample see Mandle, ‘Rousseauian Constructivism’; Trachtenberg, ‘Subject and citizen’; 
Steinberg, ‘Hobbes, Rousseau and the State’. It should be pointed out that this characterisation is far more 
reflective of Anglo-American than French scholarship. In addition to Derathé’s aforementioned study, see 
especially Goldschmidt, Anthropologie et Politique, and Bernardi, La Fabrique des Concepts, neither of 
which are primarily concerned with Rousseau’s relationship to Hobbes but both of which consider 
Hobbes’s influence within a much broader intellectual context. 
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directed towards Rousseau’s reading of De Cive,
11
 and Richard Tuck is currently reassessing the 
relationship between Hobbes and Rousseau in some depth. Building on the comments that he 
first made in his Rights of War and Peace,
12
 Tuck presented six lectures at Boston University 
that form a version of his forthcoming book on Hobbes and Rousseau. It is worth noting that 
this will provide the first book-length study dedicated to the relationship between the two 
thinkers since the collection of essays published in 1988 by Howard Cell and James 
MacAdam.
13
 Tuck’s scholarship is, from a historical perspective, much more adequately 
informed than most of the extant literature. Yet the Rousseau that emerges from his study 
remains a figure greatly indebted to Hobbes. Tuck’s project is largely concerned with revealing 
the affinities between Hobbes and Rousseau, in part so that he can defend Hobbes from some of 
Rousseau’s most pressing criticisms. Indeed Tuck’s approach may well be viewed as one that 
uses Rousseau to better understand Hobbes, whereas the approach to be pursued presently is 
quite the reverse, to use Hobbes to better understand Rousseau. 
It is also well to stress at this stage that the scholarship focusing on Hobbes’s and 
Rousseau’s respective theories of the state of nature, social contract and sovereignty, does not 
come close to exhausting the broader philosophical interest in examining the ideas of the two 
thinkers together. For instance, the importance for both of unity as a political concept and the 
ways in which their political theories appealed to men’s passions remain subjects on which both 
thinkers offer an array of philosophical insights that appear all the more challenging when 
viewed in juxtaposition to one another. Both historically and philosophically, then, there 
remains scope for further investigation. 
This thesis seeks to redress the two central shortcomings – historical and 
philosophical – in the extant scholarship and, in doing so, proposes answers to some of the 
seminal problems that arise when considering Hobbes and Rousseau together. The most general 
problem has never been satisfactorily resolved. That is, if Rousseau was so Hobbesian then why 
did he repeatedly set out his ideas in opposition to Hobbes? Was he just unaware of his Hobbism 
or did he seek to conceal it? In short, as Tuck succinctly puts it, what exactly did Rousseau think 
he was doing?
14
 In seeking to answer this question it is well to proceed by first assessing the 
extent to which Rousseau was influenced by Hobbes or Hobbism, before proceeding to examine 
the philosophical differences and affinities between the two thinkers in greater depth later in the 
thesis. 
The first chapter sets out the intellectual context by surveying the French reception of 
                                                 
11
  Skinner, ‘Surveying the Foundations’, p. 256. In much of the Anglo-American literature it is assumed 
that Rousseau read Leviathan, or that what knowledge he had of Hobbes’s works is unimportant for 
analysis of the two thinkers. 
12
  Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, pp. 197-207. 
13
  In the preface to the collection the authors claimed that theirs was the first book-length study of the 
two thinkers and invited further research of a similar depth, yet this invite has largely gone unanswered. 
See Cell & Macadam, Rousseau’s Response to Hobbes, p. vii. 
14
  For the most explicit statement of this recurrent theme see Tuck, ‘Pitié’, Lectures, p. 25. See also 
Glaziou, Hobbes en France, p. 234. 
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Hobbes during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Rather than providing a 
comprehensive exploration of Hobbes’s reception, analysis is focused on those thinkers who 
may plausibly be thought to have influenced Rousseau’s interpretation of Hobbes. Attacks on 
Hobbes increased as the eighteenth century progressed and his reputation underwent a marked 
deterioration during this period, even though many of his ideas appear to have diffused into the 
thought of the time. If anything this serves only to obfuscate questions regarding Hobbes’s 
influence on Rousseau, for it was frequently an indirect one, indicating why it is just as 
important to focus on eighteenth-century Hobbism as it is on Hobbes’s texts themselves. 
Accordingly, the focus of subsequent chapters does not always fall on ascertaining direct 
influence but rather on considering how Hobbesian ideas framed the issues that Rousseau 
confronted in his political writings. 
The second and third chapters build on the historical reception of Hobbes’s ideas and, in 
particular, their opposition to modern natural law theories. Chapter Two examines Rousseau’s 
state of nature theory and reveals how he attempted to use Hobbes’s odious reputation for 
polemical purposes in order to discredit his adversaries. Against the natural law theorists, 
Rousseau sought to collapse the prevalent bifurcation between Pufendorfian sociability and 
Hobbesian Epicureanism; and against the doux commerce theorists he endeavoured to show that 
those who defended commercial society actually rested their defences on Hobbesian premises 
regarding man’s nature. In important respects, then, Rousseau’s aims were polemical, yet in this 
context he advanced two of his key principles in opposition to Hobbes: man’s free will and 
man’s natural goodness. These principles would animate Rousseau’s philosophy and are crucial 
for understanding his political thought, especially as it is by considering these that some of the 
most significant philosophical distinctions between Hobbes and Rousseau are disclosed. 
The third chapter assesses the extent to which Rousseau’s political thought was aimed at 
overcoming problems of a fundamentally Hobbesian nature. At times Rousseau appears to have 
accepted that political society had to be justified against, and remedy the deficiencies within, 
Hobbes’s account of the state of nature. Certain affinities between their political philosophies 
are thus evident, most notably concerning the need for an absolute and incontestable sovereign, 
and the challenges that religion poses to political unity. Yet much of Rousseau’s political 
thought was set out against both Hobbes and his critics in the natural law tradition. Rousseau 
considered that his predecessors in this tradition had only offered illegitimate justifications of 
the social order, which involved man alienating his God-given free will. To preserve man’s 
freedom in the social pact Rousseau radically inverted the Hobbesian account of sovereignty – 
so often used to justify the submission of the people – by directing it towards republican 
conclusions. Rousseau aimed to make the law sovereign, yet this should not be mistaken for the 
positivism and conventionalism that was to become associated with Hobbes’s philosophy. 
Instead, to distance himself from the likes of Hobbes and Pufendorf, Rousseau insisted that a 
legitimate social order must be in accordance with nature as a transcendent normative standard. 
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The fourth and fifth chapters build on the historical examination of Rousseau’s 
engagement with Hobbes to tease out the broader philosophical interest in comparing their 
political thought. Chapter Four reveals the importance that both thinkers placed on ordering the 
passions to preserve the unity of the body politic. Rousseau’s theory of the passions is well 
understood in relation to the tradition of French neo-Augustinianism, and in many respects the 
Augustinian account of man’s post-lapsarian state resembled the Hobbesian depiction of the 
state of nature. In each case, man’s individualistic passions were inflamed and political 
institutions would have to turn such passions to good use if peace was ever to be secured. 
Rousseau, however, rejected the post-lapsarian account of man’s nature and instead argued that 
well-ordered republican institutions could cultivate man’s uncorrupted passions by channelling 
them towards love of fatherland. Hobbes and Rousseau both appreciated the importance of 
appealing to man’s passions, but their contrasting accounts of man’s nature entailed that the 
passion central to their respective theories differed. For Hobbes, above all else, it was man’s fear 
that needed to be rightly ordered in the commonwealth; for Rousseau, it was man’s love. 
Analysis of the passions to which the two thinkers respectively appealed, then, serves to show 
how the political possibilities that they each pursued were largely shaped by their competing 
accounts of human nature.  
In opposition to Hobbes’s account of sovereignty, Rousseau insisted that the law must 
be placed above man, leading him to develop a classically republican form of modern 
sovereignty. The fifth chapter completes the interpretation of Rousseau’s political thought and 
inquires as to whether or not it should serve as inspiration for contemporary political theorists. 
More specifically, the chapter challenges the manner in which republicanism has been revived 
in much contemporary political philosophy by examining important aspects of the tradition 
upon which its proponents draw. This involves re-evaluating the precise nature of the challenge 
that Hobbes supposedly posed to republicans, as well as exploring the relatively neglected 
context of French republicanism around the middle of the eighteenth century. In doing so a very 
different picture of rival liberal and republican traditions to that which prevails in much 
contemporary scholarship is adumbrated. 
This thesis resists the temptation to categorise Rousseau simply as either a Hobbesian or 
an anti-Hobbesian thinker; the relationship between the two thinkers is far more nuanced than 
that. Rousseau often grappled with problems of a Hobbesian nature, sometimes leading him to 
positions that resembled Hobbes’s theory and sometimes to positions set out in direct opposition 
to it. More often than not, Rousseau’s comments on Hobbes were critical, but in many cases the 
opposition reflected his polemical ends as much as it did any deep philosophical disagreement. 
Indeed, from a philosophical perspective, the interpretation of Rousseau advanced throughout 
this thesis is better characterised by the significance it attaches to three themes that are central to 
his political thought, all of which are well elucidated by way of comparison with Hobbes. 
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Nature, free will and the passions 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to understand Rousseau in his historical context; that is, how 
he assimilated, transformed and disavowed the various traditions of thought and prevailing 
interpretations of Hobbes with which he worked. Yet the thesis also develops a distinctive 
interpretation of Rousseau as a thinker who attempted to develop a coherent political philosophy. 
What makes the reading advanced here original is the emphasis placed on the interplay of three 
themes within Rousseau’s thought: the role of nature as a normative standard, the centrality and 
significance of free will, and the importance of cultivating men’s passions in the body politic. 
The relationship between these aspects of Rousseau’s thought often appears contradictory, thus 
this thesis endeavours to show how they may be rendered coherent and in doing so aims to 
dispel some prominent misinterpretations of Rousseau. At this stage a preliminary outline of the 
main features of this interpretation may be sketched with respect to each of the three themes. 
One way of reading Rousseau, popularised by Strauss amongst others, is of his having 
abandoned any attempt to find a basis for political right in nature or in human nature.
15
 Given 
that Rousseau provided a historicised account of the state of nature and development of society, 
in which man’s constitution was irrevocably altered, there is some justification for concluding 
that nature could not have provided a normative basis for his political thought. Nonetheless, 
Rousseau also insisted that his writings were united by an adherence to the principle of man’s 
natural goodness, which one would expect to carry important implications for his political 
thought. Arthur Melzer has provided the most comprehensive exploration of this principle, yet 
he finds no reference to natural goodness in Rousseau’s Social Contract, which he claims was 
instead argued from Hobbesian self-preservation.
16
 Laurence D. Cooper has examined 
Rousseau’s understanding of nature in greater depth. Cooper maintains that nature supplied a 
regulative normative standard for Rousseau, yet he also argues that the life of a citizen in a well-
ordered republic does not conform to this standard.
17
 Even amongst those who have taken the 
role of nature in Rousseau’s work seriously, then, it still appears in tension with important 
aspects of his political thought. By contrast, this thesis argues not only that nature supplies a 
transcendent normative standard throughout Rousseau’s philosophy, but also that a well-ordered 
republic meets his criteria for being in accordance with this standard. 
To be sure, Rousseau sometimes referred to nature in a purely descriptive sense, such as 
when he presented his account of natural man and the state of nature. Yet he also referred to 
nature in a normative sense, referring to man’s inalienable gifts of nature and arguing that what 
                                                 
15
  In addition to Strauss (referenced above), see Crocker, Rousseau’s Social Contract, p. 91; Shklar, Men 
and Citizens, p. 38; Plattner, Rousseau’s State of Nature, p. 110; Horowitz, Rousseau, Nature, and History, 
p. 81; Rapaczynski, Nature and Politics, pp. 277-278; Manent, History of Liberalism, p. 78; Schneewind, 
The Invention of Autonomy, p. 473. 
16
  Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, p. 115. Although see Cohen, who argues that Rousseau’s ideal 
political state is only compatible with man’s nature if man is naturally good, Rousseau, pp. 127-130. 
17
  Cooper, Rousseau, Nature and the Problem of the Good Life, pp. 48-50. 
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is just and right is so by the nature of things. Rousseau’s principle of natural goodness was set 
out against Augustinian and Hobbesian accounts of man, which he thought depicted man as 
naturally evil. In opposition to these accounts of man’s post-lapsarian state, Rousseau argued 
that man is naturally good and that his corruption is only occasioned by the development of 
certain types of social relations. For man’s life to be in accordance with nature, on the reading 
advanced presently, his inalienable gifts of nature would have to be preserved and he would 
have to enjoy a harmonious and ordered existence free from the contradictions of the social 
system that render man’s life miserable. This standard is thus indeterminate; it is met both in the 
pre-agricultural societies that Rousseau described as the ‘best for man’,
18
 and could equally be 
met in a well-ordered republic with institutions capable of forestalling man’s corruption. 
Rousseau’s account of nature as a transcendent normative standard informed his 
principles of political right and served to distance them from the conventionalism and 
positivism often associated with Hobbes. Similarly, the theme of free will is well understood in 
contradistinction to Hobbes’s materialism. Indeed one reason why it is of interest to examine the 
two thinkers together is the way in which their opposing positions on free will unfold 
throughout their political thought and shape their arguments for the different types of social 
order that they sought to legitimise. That Hobbes was a materialist and did not believe in free 
will is uncontroversial. Those who talk of free will, he remarked in Leviathan, do no more than 
abuse speech with their insignificant words; ‘words… without meaning; that is to say Absurd.’
19
 
Rousseau was a dualist and did believe in free will; what is more, his political thought makes 
little sense without recourse to the concept. This is more controversial and warrants some 
justification given that the importance of free will throughout his corpus has often been 
neglected. Some have denied that Rousseau believed in free will, others have concluded that his 
views on free will were ambiguous or could at least be studied in isolation from the rest of his 
thought, and even on the occasions where the importance of free will has been admitted, its 
implications for the rest of his philosophy have not been fully extrapolated. 
Rousseau considered Emile to be the most important of his works,
20
 central to which 
was the ‘Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar’, which he deemed to be ‘the best and most 
useful Writing in the century during which [he] published it.’
21
 In the ‘Profession of Faith’, the 
Savoyard Vicar argues forcefully for man’s free will, which is the most developed discussion of 
the subject within Rousseau’s œuvre. As the argument was placed in the mouthpiece of the vicar, 
some commentators have concluded that Rousseau was thereby distancing himself from the 
ideas expressed. Famously, Roger Masters claimed that as the ‘Profession of Faith’ is not 
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  Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men (hereafter Second 
Discourse) [1755], CW3:48/ OC3:170-171.  
19
  Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], p. 34. 
20
  Rousseau, Rousseau, Judge of Jean Jacques: Dialogues, CW1:23/ OC1:687; The Confessions of J.-J. 
Rousseau, CW5:475, 480/ OC1:568, 573. Rousseau’s autobiographical works were all published 
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21
  Rousseau, Letter to Christophe de Beaumont [dated 1762, published 1763], CW9:46-47/ OC4:960. 
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Rousseau’s own voice then it can be detached from the rest of his thought.
22
 This interpretation 
would be justified if Rousseau had anywhere indicated that the ideas of the Savoyard Vicar 
diverged significantly from his own, yet, to the contrary, he repeatedly confirmed that the 
‘Profession of Faith’ did actually represent his own views.
23
  
If the ‘Profession of Faith’ had been the only occasion on which Rousseau discussed the 
subject of free will then there might be the slightest cause for questioning the sincerity of his 
belief. However, this is not the case, and other confirmations of Rousseau’s position can be 
found throughout his work, most notably in his defence of Emile against the Archbishop 
Christophe de Beaumont, where Rousseau claimed that the ‘Profession of Faith’ was written ‘to 
combat modern materialism’ and affirmed his metaphysical dualism and belief in free will.
24
 
There is, however, one piece of evidence indicating that Rousseau was not always committed to 
a belief in free will. In an early fragment that was never published, he wrote ‘I have no idea if 
the acts of my will are in my own power or if they follow an outside impetus, and I care very 
little about knowing that… Therefore, I have no wish at all to speak here about this 
metaphysical and moral Freedom.’
25
 This fragment likely dates from around 1750-51 and the 
indecision could simply be a result of him not having fully formed his views at that early 
stage.
26
 Moreover, by the time of his first developed discussion of free will in the Second 
Discourse, Rousseau spoke explicitly of freedom being a metaphysical and moral capacity,
27
 in 
the exact terms that he had been sceptical of in the earlier fragment, suggesting that he was by 
then committed on the very problem over which he had previously remained undecided.  
Even amongst commentators who do not dispute Rousseau’s belief in free will, the 
relationship between free will and his political philosophy remains relatively unappreciated. For 
instance, in the preface to his recent and otherwise excellent study of Rousseau’s theory of 
freedom, Matthew Simpson claims that the problem of free will was deliberately set aside in the 
Social Contract.
28
 By contrast, the present interpretation aims to show that the only form of 
contract that Rousseau deemed legitimate would have to respect man’s free will in the social 
order. To be sure, not all scholars have overlooked the importance of free will in Rousseau’s 
thought, the most notable exception here being Patrick Riley’s seminal work on the general 
will.
29
 Yet Riley identifies significant tensions between Rousseau’s proposals for cultivating the 
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29
  Riley’s position is comprehensively expounded in the chapter on Rousseau in his Will and Political 
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citizens’ wills by way of their passions and free will understood in terms of autonomy.
30
 The 
challenge remains, then, to demonstrate how the cultivation of man’s passions in political 
society could be consistent with respecting his free will. Such a challenge can only be met by 
firmly dispelling the proto-Kantian readings of Rousseau, which is all the more necessary given 
that amongst those commentators who have taken the role of free will seriously, there has been a 
tendency to associate the concept with a Kantian notion of autonomy.
31
 
Much as the proto-Kantian readings of Rousseau serve to obscure from understanding 
his conception of free will, so too they fail to account for the role that he accorded to the 
passions and their relationship with reason. For Rousseau, reason and the passions were not in 
perpetual conflict with one another, thus the role of reason was not to master or overcome the 
passions, but simply to order them and prevent them from conflicting with one another. In this 
respect his understanding of the relationship between reason and the passions was closer to 
Hobbes’s and later Hume’s than it was to Kant’s. Indeed, where Rousseau’s ideas on nature and 
free will may profitably be understood in opposition to Hobbes’s, the importance he accorded to 
the passions in human understanding and maintaining political order has many affinities with 
Hobbes. 
This thesis stresses the importance that both Hobbes and Rousseau placed on ordering 
the passions to secure political unity. In particular, attention is focused on Rousseau’s account of 
amour-propre and its relationship to the neo-Augustinian tradition of moral thought, in which 
corrupt amour-propre characterised man’s post-lapsarian state. In the Second Discourse 
Rousseau recounted a secularised version of the Augustinian story of man’s fall, with Original 
Sin recast in terms of the development of entrenched relations of inequality and the onset of 
luxury. In this state man’s amour-propre was inflamed and rendered in constant opposition to 
his primitive amour de soi-même; the disorder of the passions in modern society proved to be a 
principal cause of human misery. However, if a well-ordered republic could be based on man’s 
pre-lapsarian passions then amour-propre could be rendered positive and brought into harmony 
with man’s amour de soi-même. Rousseau’s republican vision entailed ordering the passions in 
such a way as to prevent the contradictions in man’s existence from developing. The 
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interpretation of Rousseau’s political thought advanced throughout this thesis, then, shows how 
his vision of a well-ordered republic was based on cultivating man’s pre-lapsarian passions, 
whilst respecting and generalising man’s inalienable gifts of nature – his life and free will – in 
order to render the life of the virtuous citizen in accordance with nature as a normative standard.  
 
The assumption of coherence and the availability of Hobbes’s texts 
 
It now seems incumbent upon most studies within the broad scope of intellectual history to 
reserve at least a few words justifying the methodological approach to be pursued, and this 
might seem all the more necessary given that the present study balances both historical and 
philosophical concerns. However, this need not prove a source of tension. A variety of 
arguments and claims are advanced, some philosophical, some historical and some a mix of the 
two. It is well to be conscious of which type of claim is being made and to ensure that the 
evidence adduced in support of it is appropriate, but this should not deter one from making 
different types of claim that require different types of justification. 
 The intention presently is to keep the methodological remarks as minimal as possible, 
for there is a problem with being too prescriptive when it comes to these issues. One cannot 
assume that a thinker either intended their writings to influence a specific political controversy 
of the time or that they sought to contribute timeless solutions to questions of perennial interest. 
These are both hypotheses that need to be tested against the available evidence, both textual and 
contextual. Rather than prescribing methods and principles of interpretation, it is best to be 
conscious of the scope of the claims that one is making, and if the end product is a work that 
avoids the methodological pitfalls forewarned by others, then, methodologically speaking, it is a 
success, even if it proposes no methodology of its own. No doubt methodological assumptions 
are made throughout but it is hoped that in most cases these will prove uncontroversial, 
otherwise some justification is provided. 
There are, however, two problems that merit some preliminary attention, one regarding 
the interpretation of Rousseau to be advanced and the other regarding his relationship with 
Hobbes. The approach pursued in this thesis takes seriously the idea that Rousseau intended his 
works to present something of a coherent whole. In doing so one has to be wary of the dangers 
associated with imposing ‘a mythology of coherence’ onto past thinkers’ writings, which could 
serve to distort the changing and sometimes contradictory ideas that a thinker may have 
developed over time.
32
 In the case of Rousseau, however, there is at least a prima facie 
justification for assuming coherence.  
As early as 1753, Rousseau wrote of having developed a ‘sad and great System, [based 
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Understanding’, p. 39 
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on] a sincere examination of the nature of man, his faculties, and his destiny’.
33
 In 1762, he 
maintained that his first two discourses and Emile ‘are inseparable and together form the same 
whole’,
34
 and he likewise deemed that the Social Contract and Emile together comprised a 
complete whole.
35
 When defending the latter two works, he similarly claimed to ‘have written 
on various subjects, but always with the same principles: always with the same morality, the 
same belief, the same maxims, and if you will the same opinions.’
36
 Towards the end of his life, 
Rousseau had the character of the Frenchman in the Dialogues reiterate that his writings ‘were 
things that were profoundly thought out, forming a coherent system which might not be true but 
which offered nothing contradictory.’
37
 Rousseau went so far as to claim that even if his words 
appear contradictory, this was only due to the limitations of language and that no such 
contradiction was to be found in his ideas.
38
 To be sure, Rousseau admitted that he was a man of 
paradox, but for him the choice was between being a paradoxical or a prejudicial thinker. To be 
paradoxical was simply to go against prevailing opinions and he insisted that anyone who thinks 
for himself cannot avoid paradox.
39
 That Rousseau thought his ideas coherent, of course, is not 
evidence that they actually were so, and the present interpretation does not shy away from 
exposing some of the tensions that are to be found within his corpus. Nonetheless, in attempting 
to reveal the general coherence between his ideas, one simply takes Rousseau at his own word. 
The second problem to consider presently bears on the historical claims to be advanced 
regarding Hobbes’s influence on Rousseau. Rousseau never referenced Hobbes by anything 
more than name, so to know which texts of Hobbes he read, if any, is a matter of some 
conjecture. Rousseau’s correspondence from his time spent in England confirms that he had 
barely any knowledge of English,
40
 therefore it is worth detailing the editions of Hobbes’s work 
that would have been available in both French and Latin.
41
 Rousseau only began learning Latin 
towards the end of the 1730s, which he retrospectively described as ‘my most painful study, and 
one in which I have never made great progress’.
42
 Although he would later become fluent 
enough to at least read Latin, where both Latin and French editions of the same work were 
available it is more than likely that he would have opted for the latter. 
Translations of two of Hobbes’s works circulated in French during the mid-eighteenth 
century. The most famous was Samuel Sorbière’s seminal translation of De Cive, published in 
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Amsterdam in 1649.
43
 François du Verdus also translated the work, with two editions appearing 
in Paris in 1660 and a third in 1665, although these circulated less widely than Sorbière’s 
version. De Corpore Politico, the second part of the Elements of Law, was translated into 
French and appeared in editions published in 1652 and 1653.
44
 Although the translation has long 
been attributed to Sorbière, Noel Malcolm has examined the many problems with this 
attribution and instead suggests that it might have been conducted by the Englishman John 
Davies. Even so, the full details of the translation and place of publication remain uncertain.  
By far the most popular of Hobbes’s works across Europe was De Cive, second to 
which was the Opera Philosophica, a collection of Hobbes’s Latin works arranged by Johan 
Blaeu and published in Amsterdam in 1688. This included the Latin Leviathan, De Cive, De 
Corpore, De Homine, as well as some of Hobbes’s other works on mathematics and physics. 
Yves Glaziou’s analysis of thirty-eight private eighteenth-century French libraries indicates that 
De Cive was the most widely read, with fourteen holding it in French, and ten holding it in Latin. 
Thirteen possessed the Opera Philosophica, and six held the French translation of De Corpore 
Politico. 
Little is known of Rousseau’s personal library but the foregoing details suggest that De 
Cive would have been the most readily available of Hobbes’s works, probably in Sorbière’s 
French translation.
45
 That Rousseau was familiar with De Cive may be attested by examining 
certain passages from the Second Discourse, which strongly suggest that he studied the work, 
his references being too precise to be attributed to intermediary sources.
46
 Indeed it appears to 
only be with De Cive that a conclusive case can be made in support of Rousseau having read 
Hobbes at all.
47
 There is also some evidence indicating that Rousseau continued reading Hobbes 
throughout the 1750s, as his opinion towards Hobbes seems to have changed and in some 
respects become more positive between the publication of the Second Discourse and the Social 
Contract. This has been argued elsewhere and the present thesis supports those findings.
48
  
The evidence examined in this thesis indicates that Rousseau’s understanding of Hobbes 
could have been developed from as little as a reading of De Cive and knowledge of the most 
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familiar references to Hobbes proliferating the thought of his time. For this reason De Cive is 
cited as the principal work of Hobbes at least throughout the first three chapters (where the 
discussion is at its most historical) and Hobbes’s other works are only referenced where 
Rousseau could not have gained the relevant knowledge from De Cive alone. On each of these 
occasions it is at least as plausible that the aspects of Hobbes’s thought in question were derived 
via intermediaries and the relevant sources are indicated. It is with these sources and their 
influence in shaping the French reception of Hobbes that the thesis begins. 
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The French Reception of Thomas Hobbes 
 
No one argues with greater rigour or reason. Take care not to go beyond his first principles, if 
you do not wish to follow him everywhere he cares to lead you.
1
 
 
There is little doubt that Rousseau was concerned with the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. That 
is, at least, if one takes the criticisms that permeate some of Rousseau’s most important works – 
the Second Discourse, Social Contract and Emile – at face value. By contrast, the received 
opinion is that Hobbes was not a particularly important point of reference or inspiration for most 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century French authors, and it has even been argued that 
between Pierre Bayle and Rousseau no major French thinker engaged with Hobbes’s thought in 
any depth.
2
 Given this, it is perhaps not all that surprising that scholarship examining the 
relationship between Hobbes and Rousseau has frequently been conducted at a predominantly 
theoretical and a-historical level, with little regard to how others had responded to Hobbes prior 
to Rousseau. 
Whilst taking such an approach may be of some philosophical interest, it offers a less 
nuanced understanding of the place that Hobbes occupied in Rousseau’s thought. To make 
inroads into the latter problem it is necessary to have some idea of the context in which 
Rousseau read Hobbes and give an impression as to exactly what Hobbism (or Hobbisme) 
entailed in eighteenth-century France and Geneva. To ascertain this it is well to examine the 
manner in which Hobbes’s reputation and ideas were characterised throughout the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century, shaping the context in which Rousseau would then 
address them. 
It is important to consider the development of Hobbes’s ideas in the French context in 
order to show that Rousseau did not respond to Hobbes in an intellectual vacuum. Rousseau was 
both writing in an ongoing intellectual tradition in which Hobbes’s ideas were used with varying 
degrees of accuracy, and had also read some of Hobbes’s work himself and was never one for 
accepting received opinion. Both aspects of this relationship need to be kept in view if one is to 
attempt to address the perplexity that Richard Tuck highlights: that of exactly what Rousseau 
thought he was doing by engaging with Hobbes.
3
 
Rousseau persistently worked with and developed prevailing interpretations of Hobbes, 
sometimes following them and on other occasions either rejecting or inverting them. Hobbes’s 
name carried great polemical and rhetorical weight in the eighteenth century, perhaps surpassed 
only by that of Spinoza, and the two were often presented together as the most subversive of all 
philosophers.
4
 The response to such thinkers, more often than not, was to authoritatively dismiss 
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their principles without great analysis, rather than engaging in the detailed critique that their 
writings deserved. Any credible thinker sought to avoid the charge of Hobbism, and when such 
an accusation surfaced it could occasion great controversy. Protestations against Hobbism, 
however, often concealed the influence of, or affinities with, Hobbes that pervaded much of the 
thought of the time, some of which appear to have only been recognised, or at least were only 
exposed, by Rousseau. 
It is tempting to dismiss aspects of Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes as being naive 
misrepresentations of his predecessor’s thought. Yet viewed through the context of eighteenth-
century French discussions of Hobbes, Rousseau is revealed as one of his most sophisticated 
commentators. However, the Hobbes in question was as much the one characterised by Bayle 
and Barbeyrac, or Montesquieu and Diderot, as it was simply the author of De Cive and 
Leviathan as he is read today. 
In general, the reception history of Hobbes has attracted considerable attention in recent 
years, yet the focus of this research has predominantly been on charting how his ideas were 
received in England and relatively less scholarship has been directed towards the European and 
especially French reception of his thought.
5
 The immediate impact of Hobbes’s work in France 
is well documented and it is worth summarising this briefly in order to provide some 
background for the present study. Most notably, through an examination of his correspondence 
during the mid-seventeenth century, Quentin Skinner has provided evidence of the intimate 
intellectual contacts that Hobbes developed with many members of Marin Mersenne’s circle. 
Skinner accords Hobbes a prominent place in an important phase of the Scientific Revolution in 
France, as, in comparison to England, Hobbes’s works were there met with an enthusiastic 
response. It is well to draw attention to the focus of Hobbes’s reputation at the time, which 
celebrated his attempts to provide mechanistic explanations for every type of phenomenon, 
whilst there was relatively less interest in the political dimensions of his thought.
6
 To be sure, 
Hobbes was also recognised as an authority in political philosophy. Samuel Sorbière, for 
example, eulogised Hobbes as ‘the father of politics and its leading expert’;
7
 an opinion echoed 
by François de Verdus, for whom Hobbes was alone in having ‘taught the true, good political 
philosophy’.
8
 Yet whilst such thinkers sometimes deferred to his political principles, it was 
Hobbes’s mechanistic and geometrical explanations that occasioned the greatest discussion and 
acclamation. This impression of Hobbes is worth noting since it differs in crucial respects from 
that which would emerge amongst Hobbes’s later French readers. Indeed there is little evidence 
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of this scientific reception having extended into the eighteenth century and, as Noel Malcolm 
observes, ‘outside the immediate circle of Hobbes’s friends and admirers, his reputation as a 
writer on non-political and non-theological matters was in something of a decline from the mid-
1650s onwards.’
9
 
Even where the reception of Hobbes’s thought in eighteenth-century France has been 
examined, little consideration has been given to how this reception affected and influenced the 
ways in which Rousseau criticised and adopted the ideas he associated with Hobbes.
10
 The 
purpose of the present chapter, then, is by no means to provide a comprehensive survey of all 
the references, both explicit and implicit, to Hobbes that can be identified in French works 
during the first half of the eighteenth century.
11
 Rather, the intention is to offer something that is 
strikingly absent from the existing scholarship, that is, a contextual background for reading 
Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbes. 
Such a study must be somewhat selective, thus the focus rests on those thinkers who 
there is good reason to believe might have influenced both Rousseau’s reading of Hobbes and 
the ways in which he framed his discussion of Hobbesian ideas. The authors and works 
concentrated on are either ones that Rousseau discussed or referenced explicitly, ones where his 
work reveals a strong familiarity with the ideas in question, or works that were so well 
disseminated in eighteenth-century France that it would seem improbable that Rousseau was not 
acquainted with them. Whilst other theorists and works are kept in mind, claims concerning 
Rousseau’s reading of Hobbes will be all the stronger to the extent that conjecture can be 
avoided over the intellectual context in which they belong. 
The picture that emerges is an eclectic one and no attempt is made to weave a grand 
narrative into the French reception of Hobbes. Instead various threads are illuminated that 
characterise Hobbes’s reputation in different ways, some of which are taken up and some 
neglected by each commentator in turn. Those threads that lead to Rousseau provide the focus 
and the aim is to do no more than indicate the probable influences and contexts that shaped the 
intellectual milieu in which Rousseau wrote about Hobbes. For this reason thinkers are treated 
thematically rather than simply chronologically, thus sections on Bayle and Malebranche are 
treated separately due to the very different ways in which they discussed Hobbes’s ideas, despite 
the contemporary overlap of their writings. Although the main interest is in Hobbes’s reception 
in the eighteenth century, this was in part shaped by those writing before the turn of the century, 
hence works from the late seventeenth century are discussed where their influence can be 
recognised as extending well into the following century. 
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A brief word is necessary here on what is meant by the ‘French’ reception of Hobbes. 
The focus is on French as a language and therefore those works originally written in French are 
of primary concern, although those translated and published in French editions are also 
considered. This approach evades the difficulties that would occur were, for instance, a simply 
geographical approach to national context pursued. The problem of identifying in which 
national context a citizen of Geneva, writing in France and being published in Amsterdam 
should be located can thus be conveniently avoided. Of course, it should be remembered that at 
a time when the language of scholarly treatises was shifting from Latin to local vernaculars, 
many French theorists were fluent in Latin, if not in other European languages, and so had a 
much wider array of sources available to them than only those written in French. Such caveats 
are considered throughout, yet, these withstanding, it remains possible to identify a distinctively 
French reception of Hobbes’s thought. 
 
Nicole, Bayle and the moral–political emphasis 
 
Pierre Bayle’s article ‘Hobbes’ in his Historical and Critical Dictionary would seem an obvious 
place to start for examining the reception of Hobbes’s thought in eighteenth-century France. It 
proved to be one of the principal sources for many discussions of Hobbes’s philosophy 
thereafter and was perhaps the most influential point of reference for many writers – sometimes, 
it would appear, even more so than Hobbes’s works themselves. Bayle was greatly admired by 
the philosophes and the Dictionary had a profound effect on the development of French thought 
in the eighteenth century, becoming the most widely held book in private French libraries.
12
 
Rousseau is known to have bought a copy.
13
 
Whereas Hobbes’s French friends in the middle of the seventeenth century had been 
most interested in his mechanistic and scientific explanations, after Bayle it would be the more 
overtly political and moral aspects of his thought that received the greatest attention. To be sure, 
Hobbes’s political ideas had been discussed and employed prior to Bayle, but it was only 
following his article that Hobbes was thought about in predominantly political terms. In France, 
Hobbes’s political thought had not proved as inflammatory as in England and was often invoked 
in support of absolutist theories.
14
 Hobbes’s account of the foundation of society was frequently 
treated in isolation from his materialist premises, thus French Cartesians such as Jacques du 
Roure and Pierre-Sylvain Regis were able to adopt Hobbesian ideas of self-preservation 
detached from his underlying philosophical principles.
15
 
Hobbes’s depiction of man in the state of nature – overrun by passions that drive him 
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into conflict with others – was an appealing one for many neo-Augustinians as it provided a 
political story compatible with man’s post-lapsarian state. In this context the most important 
discussion of Hobbes’s political theory in France prior to Bayle was provided by Pierre Nicole, 
which is worth examining due to the extent to which Bayle was influenced by Nicole and would 
reproduce his quasi-Hobbesian theory in the Dictionary.
16
  
Although he would have been opposed to Hobbes’s materialism, Nicole’s Moral Essays 
reveal that he was not so averse to adopting a Hobbesian theory of the origin of society. In ‘Of 
Charity and of amour-propre’, Nicole averred that men are in a state of war with one another, 
alluding to Hobbes: 
and if he who said that they are born into a state of war, and that each man is naturally enemy 
of all other men, had only wanted to represent by his words the disposition of men’s hearts 
each towards the others, without claiming to make it pass as legitimate and just, he would 
have said a thing also in conformity with truth and experience, as that which he maintains is 
contrary to reason and to justice.
17
 
 
The amour-propre of other men is in constant opposition to all of one’s own desires, and the 
only qualification that Nicole added to Hobbes’s account was to stress that this state is contrary 
to both reason and justice. It is only men’s unruly passions that disturb the order of society, thus 
the only means by which peace can be secured is by regulating those passions.
18
 For Nicole, this 
consisted in rightly directing man’s amour-propre, which takes care to ‘disguise itself by 
covering the passions with a veil of justice.’
19
 
At this stage it is worth noting that the idea that Hobbes founded all justice or society on 
amour-propre, which recurred in criticisms of his thought, was little more than a literal reading 
for his French audience. In the first chapter of De Cive Hobbes claimed that all societies are a 
product of self-love, which in Samuel Sorbière’s seminal French edition was translated as all 
societies ‘sont contractées par l’amour-propre’.20 
Nicole was concerned to eschew the idea that amour-propre was the source of all justice 
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and he further insisted that it was diametrically opposed to charity or true virtue,
21
 yet it 
remained in man’s interest to suppress the hostile elements of this negative passion. When 
brought into accordance with reason, amour-propre would imitate charity perfectly; men would 
seek the love of others to satisfy their own amour-propre and this would provide the source of 
all civility.
22
 In short, men would regulate the unsocial manifestations of amour-propre for the 
sake of their enlightened amour-propre. Nicole, like Hobbes, claimed that it would be in men’s 
interest to moderate their violent passions by placing themselves under the direction of civil 
laws. Just as Nicole’s account of the state of war echoed Hobbes’s, so too, in proposing a 
remedy for this state, he told a very Hobbesian story, affirming that the ‘fear of death is thus the 
first bond of civil society, and the first brake on amour-propre’.
23
 Moreover, the original spring 
of all forms of government – of which successive monarchy was advocated – was the choice of 
the people, yet once the constitution has been set the people retained no rights to change it and 
therefore it would never be lawful to rebel against the sovereign or engage in civil war.
24
 
In Nicole’s thought there is a conceptual and moral gulf between virtue and amour-
propre, yet as far as each leads men to observe the civil laws and procure peace there is no 
discernible difference; ultimately only God would be able to distinguish between the two.
25
 
Hobbes had given men self-interested reasons to submit unreservedly to the civil sovereign and 
obey the laws, underwritten by a portrayal of the deplorable state of their existence if they failed 
to do so. Nicole’s Augustinian pessimism regarding human nature led him to embrace the 
Hobbesian account of the origin of civil society. Bayle, in turn, would adopt Hobbes’s and 
Nicole’s pessimism and thus address Hobbes’s thought in much the same context.  
In Bayle’s earliest major work, the Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet, 
Hobbes is not mentioned once; indeed Bayle may not have even been familiar with Hobbes’s 
writings in any depth at the time.
26
 Nevertheless, the work proves revealing when considering 
Bayle’s philosophical affinities with Hobbes and indicates why he would later become 
interested in the overtly political aspects of Hobbes’s thought. 
Central to Bayle’s argument was the claim that it is civil laws rather than religion that 
upholds the social order, which led him famously to contend that a society of atheists could exist 
perfectly well. In his defence of toleration, Bayle maintained that it is not men’s religious 
persuasions that lead them to observe the laws of society but rather their fear of breaking those 
laws and their interest in obeying them. Bayle employed a plethora of different arguments in 
support of this position, yet a recurrent theme was that man’s state without civil laws would be a 
miserable one in which conflict would arise, and that this is just as true of a Christian society as 
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it is of any other: 
For the greatest number remain so engaged in vice that if human laws did not impose order, 
all societies of Christians would soon be destroyed. And I am certain that, absent a continual 
miracle, a city like Paris would be reduced in two weeks to the saddest condition in the 
world, if no other remedy were used against vice than the remonstrances of preachers and 
confessors.
27
 
 
Man’s condition is one where an infinite number of illusions and prejudices subsist and 
Christians are equally unable to avoid the disorders into which all other men fall. This is a 
wretched state, where the passions of ambition, avarice, envy, and the sources of all vice are to 
be found everywhere.
28
 Man’s condition without civil laws resembles the Hobbesian state of 
nature, one in which nothing, not even religion, can preserve order and peace. Bayle’s aim was 
not as much to portray man’s condition without laws as miserable, as it was to demonstrate that 
it is civil laws and not religion that preserve the social order, thus he stressed that ‘religion is not 
a brake capable of restraining our passions.’
29
 
Although there is no reference to Hobbes in his discussion, Bayle would later deploy 
similar arguments in his Dictionary claiming that ‘Man is wicked and miserable… [and] history 
is nothing but the crimes and misfortunes of the human race.’
30
 As a descriptive device, 
Hobbes’s account of the state of war proved accurate and Bayle explicitly endorsed this 
depiction of man’s natural state: 
In this state of nature man was a wolf to man; everything belonged to the first who had it; no 
one was the master of anything except by force. In order to get out of this abyss each agreed 
to give up his rights to the whole so that he would be given the ownership of some part. 
They entered into agreements; war ceased.
31
 
 
Man’s condition could only be remedied by civil laws and not religion. In fact religion often 
undermined the social order by providing reasons that would motivate men to fight one another 
even when it was contrary to their interest in maintaining peace. Bayle elucidated this argument 
at length in his Philosophical Commentary, where he stressed that the disorders and 
disturbances occasioned by religion are only due to intolerance and the denial of liberty of 
conscience on the part of religious authorities.
32
 Liberty of conscience was of paramount 
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importance for Bayle, as he held as a fundamental principle that ‘whatever is done against the 
Dictates of Conscience is a Sin’.
33
  
Whilst Bayle would not agree about the extent to which Hobbes granted the sovereign 
control over the externals of religion,
34
 the similarities with Hobbes extended beyond the 
depiction of man’s unruly state without civil laws, overrun by violent passions that were often 
further inflamed by religion. Bayle was at his most Hobbesian, whether consciously or not, 
when he proposed his remedy for man’s condition, arguing for the autonomy of the political 
realm and maintaining that the sovereign must assert authority over the challenges of 
ecclesiastical influence from which intolerance and rebellion arise to threaten the state.
35
 Bayle 
granted the sovereign an essential and inalienable right to enact laws for the preservation of 
society and insisted that any opinions that tend ‘to the Disturbance of the State, and the 
endangering [of] the Sovereign’s Authority’ should in no way be tolerated. This meant that on 
purely civil grounds the sovereign need not tolerate those, such as members of the Church of 
Rome, who would attempt to hold a tyrannical rule over the consciences of men; rather 
toleration should be extended only to all those who endorsed liberty of conscience.
36
 
Returning to his Various Thoughts, Bayle’s Hobbism is never explicit; indeed it may well 
have been mediated via Nicole’s Moral Essays, which Bayle considered a ‘masterpiece’ and the 
influence of which is evident throughout the work.
37
 For Bayle, as for Nicole, people deceive 
themselves when they think that all their praiseworthy actions are motivated by love of God, as 
they are usually performed from more selfish principles.
38
 Nonetheless, man’s sinful amour-
propre could be turned to good use and lead men to perform all the virtues, even providing 
sufficient motive for atheists to perform religious duties.
39
 
Bayle would later stress that the virtuous actions of atheists proceed only from their 
amour-propre, whereas Christians may perform them from love of God, yet at the same time he 
stated, again echoing Nicole, that it was an incontestable maxim that ‘the fear and the love of 
the Divinity are not always the most active principles motivating the actions of men.’
40
 Bayle 
developed this argument further than Nicole would have been willing to entertain, ultimately 
declaring that if amour-propre rather than love of God could motivate the appearance of virtue, 
then there was no reason why a society of atheists would not be able to subsist just as well as a 
society of pagans or, implicitly, even Christians:  
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I will not hesitate to say that if one wants to know my conjecture concerning what a society 
of atheists would be like in regard to morals and civil actions, it would be very much like a 
society of pagans. It is true that very severe laws would be necessary there, ones very well 
executed with a view to the punishment of criminals. But are they not necessary 
everywhere? …One can say without being a ranter that human justice constitutes the virtue 
of the majority of the world, for when it relaxes the check on a given sin, few persons keep 
themselves from it.
41
 
 
At every turn, Bayle argued that pagan societies were at least as successful as Christian ones in 
preserving the social order and that rarely does religion motivate men to observe the civil laws 
beyond the force that those laws generate in and as of themselves. Justice must be thought about 
in terms of the social rather than the religious order, thus there was no reason why atheists 
should not be tolerated. Particular differences about the role of religion in society aside then, 
both Hobbes and Bayle were in general agreement that the influence of separate ecclesiastical 
powers would only ever serve to undermine the authority of the civil sovereign, and that the 
‘virtue of a subject is comprehended wholly in obedience to the laws of the commonwealth.’
42
 
Even if Bayle’s Hobbism was less than explicit in his earlier works, there is a continuity 
of interest that runs throughout his thought, which provides the context for the discussion of 
Hobbes that is to be found in his Dictionary. Turning to that article now, there are several 
elements worth highlighting. The first is the positive light in which Hobbes is presented. Bayle 
introduced Hobbes as ‘one of the greatest minds of the seventeenth century,’ a man who loved 
his country and was loyal to his king.
43
 Of De Cive, he wrote that despite taking some things too 
far, the ‘fundamentals of politics had never previously been analysed so well’ and Bayle quoted 
Descartes to support his claim that Hobbes was more skilled as a moralist than in physics or 
metaphysics, thus clearing the way for the moral and political emphasis that would follow.
44
 
Bayle’s article is not unreservedly positive, yet the most interesting aspects are those where 
Hobbes is praised and the similarities between Hobbes and Bayle are revealed. 
Bayle’s positive portrayal was, in part, an attempt to defend Hobbes from the charge of 
atheism. Bayle insisted that it is ‘undeniable that no accusation has been more seriously abused 
than that of atheism’, a comment that could be applied as equally to his own treatment as to that 
of Hobbes.
45
 In defending Hobbes, Bayle’s account further discloses the affinities that he 
perceived them to have shared. Despite having been thought an atheist, Bayle asserted that 
Hobbes believed ‘that there is a God who is the origin of all things but who ought not to be 
circumscribed within the sphere of our narrow reason.’ Bayle here offered a sceptical 
interpretation of Hobbes’s religious beliefs, presenting them as closer to fideism than atheism. 
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This, however, was not the thrust of Bayle’s article, for even if Hobbes was taken to be an 
atheist, anyone who knew him would confirm that he both valued and loved virtue, of which his 
works proved further testimony.
46
 Atheism was not only a false accusation to level at Hobbes, 
but it was irrelevant to the issue of his virtue and love for his country. 
Bayle’s article is especially interesting as it was quite unique, at least in French 
commentaries of the time, in placing Hobbes’s thought in its historical context.
47
 Both De Cive 
and Leviathan are set against the political controversies of seventeenth-century England, and in 
this context Bayle stressed that the central message of Leviathan was the importance of seeking 
peace: 
The précis of this work is that without peace there is no safety in a state, and that peace 
cannot exist without command, nor command without arms; and that arms are worth nothing 
if they are not in the hands of one person; and that fear of arms cannot bring peace to those 
who are motivated to fight one another through an evil more terrible than death, that is to 
say: through dissension over matters that are necessary for salvation.
48
 
 
It is well to remember that no French edition of Leviathan existed in the eighteenth century and, 
although the Latin version would have been available, Bayle’s article proved a principal source 
for many discussions of the work and its author. Apart from being a fairly accurate overview of 
the central message of Leviathan, the passage is of note for at least two other reasons. Hobbes 
was quite rightly taken to be a supporter of monarchy, and when Bayle claimed that he thought 
that arms have to be in the hands of ‘one person’, there is little to suggest anything other than a 
natural reading was intended. For Hobbes, of course, the ‘one person’ was a single moral body, 
namely the sovereign, yet this need not be a single individual. Whether or not Bayle recognised 
this would be difficult to prove either way; nevertheless, the monarchical misassumption that 
Hobbes’s sovereign had to be one individual person would become commonplace in eighteenth-
century French references to Hobbes, and Bayle’s article was quite possibly of some influence 
in shaping this view. 
The other reason that the passage is of interest is that it once again reflects concerns 
from Bayle’s earliest works by signalling that the use of religion is frequently opposed to peace 
as it motivates those to fight by promising rewards in an afterlife. Whilst Bayle would not grant 
the sovereign as much power over religion as Hobbes might have, he did support Hobbes as far 
as he claimed that the power of the church only served to undermine the civil power – and with 
it peace and security – and therefore must not possess independent authority. Bayle was unique 
in defending Hobbes on this issue at the time, and it is a matter of some irony that when 
Rousseau later invoked Hobbes in his discussion of civil religion as ‘the only one who correctly 
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saw the evil and the remedy’, he did so in direct opposition to Bayle.
49
  
A final point to highlight in Bayle’s article is that he not only set Hobbes’s thought in 
the context of the political controversies of the English Civil War, but also those between 
republicans and monarchists. Bayle traced this theme throughout Hobbes’s writings, beginning 
with his translation of Thucydides in which he claimed that Hobbes sought to illustrate the 
‘disorders and confusions of democratic government’. In this he was opposed to ‘the works of 
the Greeks and Romans in which anti-monarchical theories abound, and where there are many 
examples of the love of liberty.’
50
 Bayle viewed republicanism in contradistinction to 
monarchy,
51
 and although this element of Hobbes’s thought would be neglected by many 
eighteenth-century French commentators, Rousseau followed Bayle in reading Hobbes as 
someone who wrote against the claims of all republics.
52
 
Bayle’s article provides an apt starting point for considering Hobbes’s eighteenth-
century French reception, yet to understand how Bayle’s concerns with Hobbes were shaped it 
is important to consider the article in the wider context of his thought. Bayle’s was certainly not 
the first to focus predominantly on Hobbes’s political thought, his most significant forerunner 
being Nicole and, in many respects, Bayle presents a progression of Nicole’s theory. Yet there 
were good reasons why, with Bayle, the political and moral dimensions of Hobbes’s thought 
took centre stage, for, like Hobbes, Bayle sought to identify a distinctively political realm free 
from the influence of religious authorities.  
Even though Bayle did not discuss Hobbes’s state of nature theory in detail in his 
Dictionary article, his other writings reveal him to have endorsed Hobbes’s depiction of man’s 
state without civil laws and account of the passions that give rise to conflict. Bayle was by no 
means unique in doing so, Nicole having stated that as a descriptive device Hobbes’s account 
was accurate even if it should not be taken as morally acceptable. It is well to highlight that at 
the turn of the eighteenth century Hobbes’s state of nature theory, which would frequently be 
contested following Barbeyrac and Montesquieu, was not subjected to significant criticism by 
many of his French readers. 
Bayle’s interest in Hobbes was primarily political, thus he evaded Hobbes’s 
metaphysical arguments and mechanistic philosophy with a dismissive quote from Descartes 
and this would in turn characterise much of Hobbes’s eighteenth-century reception. There are, 
of course, other important considerations that would lead to the predominantly political 
emphasis of this reception, not least that the French translation of De Cive was the most readily 
available of his works. Yet this emphasis was also due to the contingent interests that Bayle (and 
Nicole before him) shared with Hobbes, which shaped the account of his influential Dictionary 
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entry. At the turn of the eighteenth century, however, this political emphasis remained far from 
ubiquitous and an important counterpoint can be found in the writings of Nicolas Malebranche. 
 
Malebranche’s critique of Hobbes 
 
There is reason to think that Malebranche all but neglected Hobbes, since his references are 
fleeting and reveal no great depth of engagement with Hobbes’s work.
53
 Moreover, 
Malebranche’s thought was frequently neglected or rejected by the French philosophes, who 
were generally more indebted to Locke. Yet, as Patrick Riley has been foremost in showing, 
Rousseau was greatly influenced by Malebranche,
54
 and the criticisms that Malebranche 
levelled at Hobbes foreshadow those that Rousseau would later employ against his materialist 
contemporaries.  
Whereas commentators like Nicole and Bayle focused principally on the political and 
moral aspects of Hobbes’s thought, Malebranche’s criticisms also stemmed from 
epistemological, metaphysical and theological concerns. There are three general areas of 
Hobbes’s philosophy that Malebranche attacked: his materialism, what now might be termed as 
his positivism, and his alleged founding of justice on amour-propre. Malebranche’s references 
thus reveal him to have been concerned with aspects of Hobbes’s thought that were in decline 
towards the end of the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century in France. For this 
reason his remarks are of added interest as they go some way to bridging Hobbes’s initial 
readers’ focus on his scientific and natural philosophy, with the emphasis on his more overtly 
political thought that characterised the French reception in the first half of the eighteenth century. 
Where Hobbes’s immediate reception in France was positive, Malebranche’s opinion 
was unreservedly negative; where the Mersenne circle had applauded Hobbes’s mechanistic 
philosophy, it was this that Malebranche found most objectionable. Malebranche strongly 
opposed the empiricism and materialism that he viewed Hobbes and Locke as sharing. Both 
Hobbes and Locke dissolved the distinction between ideas and the perceptions that we have of 
them. Whereas perceptions might differ between individuals or might be deceptive – or, in short, 
are subjective – ideas are eternal and immutable and to neglect this was to commit the most 
dangerous of errors.
55
 Malebranche elucidated the nature of this danger in a letter to François de 
Fénelon where he reiterated his objections against Hobbes and Locke, claiming that if ideas are 
not distinguished from our perceptions then Pyrrhonism would be established and there would 
be neither truth nor falsity, justice nor injustice, science nor morality.
56
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 34 
For Malebranche, moral ideas could not arise from perception alone, thus empiricism 
would fail to give an account of moral necessity. To reduce all phenomena to properties of 
matter in motion was to explain everything in physical terms, effacing the moral realm 
associated with the mind as a distinct entity. Malebranche’s radical dualism consisted of mind 
and matter having little effect on one another,
57
 whereas Hobbes’s materialism collapsed the 
very distinction that Malebranche thought so essential. If human action followed from empirical 
perceptions then there would be no real distinction between perceiving and willing. For 
Malebranche, a dualistic account of mind and matter was therefore necessary to preserve man’s 
freedom and in turn all morality. This is a theme that Rousseau would later adopt throughout his 
attacks on the materialist philosophy of his contemporaries, objecting that they had failed to 
comprehend the respective properties of mind and matter, and invoking a Plato or a Samuel 
Clarke to refute their reliance on Locke’s metaphysics: 
Then explaining to them the distinction between the two substances, he would have proven 
to them by the very properties of matter that, whatever Locke may say about it, the 
supposition of matter thinking is a genuine absurdity.
58
 
 
As Rousseau recognised, the materialism of the philosophes owed a great deal to Locke, who in 
eighteenth-century France was frequently read as a materialist, a determinist and an opponent of 
free will.
59
 This reading of Locke, however, was actually quite Hobbesian. Voltaire even praised 
Hobbes for anticipating Locke’s argument that God could communicate thought to matter; an 
argument that Voltaire thought revealed the sophistry behind the philosophy of Clarke and 
Malebranche.
60
 Although he only explicitly attacked Locke’s influence, it is quite possible that 
Rousseau followed Malebranche in thinking that Hobbes and Locke shared equally erroneous 
accounts of the properties of mind and matter. Moreover, criticism of Hobbes’s materialism was 
not confined to Malebranche and it is well to note that Clarke’s A Demonstration of the Being 
and Attributes of God, which was translated into French in 1717, was set out directly against the 
doctrines and followers of Hobbes and Spinoza.
61
 Like Malebranche, Clarke charged Hobbes 
                                                                                                                                               
letter and commentary see Riley, The General Will Before Rousseau, p. 125. 
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  Indeed God provided the only connection: what man wills only serves as the occasion for God to bring 
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occasionalism was driven by the need to provide a response to the mind-body problem, see Nadler, 
‘Occasionalism’, pp. 6-22. 
58
  Rousseau, Letter to Franquières, CW8:261/ OC4:1135-1136. Rousseau also invoked the authority of 
the ‘illustrious Clarke’ in the ‘Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar’, Emile, CW13:429/ OC4:570. It 
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between Clarke’s proofs for the existence of God and those expressed by the Vicar, see Masters, 
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support Rousseau’s arguments against materialism. The reference is in a passage where Rousseau claimed 
that reading Clarke would enlighten the world from ‘materialism of every kind’, and the reference in the 
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  Hutchison, Locke in France, pp. 160-201. 
60
  ‘Voltaire to Jean Baptiste Nicolas Formont, c. 15 August 1733’, Voltaire’s Correspondence, pp. 127-
128. 
61
  Hobbes and Spinoza were also attacked together along similar grounds in the second dialogue of 
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with having confused the properties of mind and matter and having rested his philosophy on 
that prodigiously absurd Supposition, that All Matter, as Matter, is indued not only with 
Figure and a Capacity of Motion, but also with an actual Sense of Perception; and wants 
only the Organs and Memory of Animals, to express its Sensation.
62
 
 
For Clarke, it was the very confusion of mind and matter that led Hobbes and Spinoza to reject 
freedom of the will.
63
 Accordingly, such materialism was subversive of all morality as people 
could not be held responsible for their actions, for ‘to Act necessarily, is really and properly not 
to Act at all, but only to be Acted upon.’
64
 The attack on Hobbes’s materialism was also taken 
up by the German Gottfried Leibniz, who produced arguably his most important work in 
French.
65
 The Theodicy, written to counter the arguments of Pierre Bayle, revealed a great debt 
to Malebranche, and Leibniz criticised Hobbes along the same lines by attempting to combat his 
materialism which would eliminate all freedom: 
After all, I think that one must not reproach any but the adherents of Hobbes and Spinoza 
with destroying freedom and contingency… Hobbes made everything material and 
subjected it to mathematical laws alone
66
 
 
In an appendix to the work, Leibniz considered at greater length Hobbes’s ideas concerning 
liberty and necessity, providing a summary and commentary on the debate between Hobbes and 
Bishop Bramhall, and warning against the implications of Hobbes’s theory for justice and 
morality.
67
 However, his opposition to Hobbes was qualified, especially in comparison with 
Malebranche’s. Leibniz considered that Hobbes’s works merited being studied as they ‘usually 
contain something good and ingenious’,
68
 and he had once written to Hobbes that ‘I shall, God 
willing, always publically declare, that I know of no other writer who has philosophized as 
precisely, as clearly, and as elegantly as you have’;
69
 a promise that he would repeatedly fail to 
keep. Despite the differences between their own theories of freedom, Leibniz and Malebranche 
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  Clarke, Demonstration [1705], p. 93. 
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64
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could neither create nor destroy matter, Letter to Franquières, CW8:266/ OC4:1142; Julie, or the New 
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  The influence of Leibniz’s Theodicy on Rousseau is most evident in his debate with Voltaire over 
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  Leibniz, Theodicy [1710], p. 348; see also pp. 159-161, 234. 
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   Leibniz, ‘Reflexions on the Work that Mr. Hobbes Published in England on ‘Freedom, Necessity and 
Chance’’, Theodicy, pp. 393-404. 
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  Leibniz, ‘Reflexions’, p. 393. 
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  ‘Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to Hobbes, 23 July 1670’, in Hobbes, Correspondence, p. 720. The letter 
never reached Hobbes. 
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were nonetheless in agreement regarding their opposition to Hobbes’s materialism, and 
similarly they both took issue with his political theory and account of natural law. 
As Riley has argued, whilst not a political philosopher per se, Malebranche’s work was 
full of half-political notions that thinkers such as Diderot and Rousseau would later develop and 
employ,
70
 and it is worth stressing how quickly Malebranche himself moved to derive political 
and moral implications from his metaphysical (and theological) premises. In his final work, 
Malebranche once again aligned Hobbes and Locke, objecting that they had made the right to do 
whatever one wills the foundation of all morality. To contest these insidious doctrines, which if 
extended to God would lead to voluntarism, Malebranche insisted that the source of morality 
must be derived only from the ideas of reason and the eternal law of justice.
71
 For Malebranche, 
the pernicious political implications of Hobbism followed logically from the theological dangers. 
In each case he insisted on eternal uniform laws of justice, thus his objection to positivism and 
voluntarism were one and the same. Malebranche’s repudiation of Hobbesian positivism is 
worth noting as it rehearses arguments that would be taken up by Leibniz and become the point 
of some contention during the development of natural law theory in the early eighteenth century. 
Just as Malebranche had argued for eternal laws of justice against Hobbes, Leibniz would 
likewise accuse Pufendorf of Hobbism on the same grounds; a debate which Jean Barbeyrac 
would then bring to bear on the French reception of natural law.  
Whilst on a few occasions towards the end of his life Malebranche attacked Hobbes 
explicitly, and often in conjunction with Locke, one of his most developed criticisms is to be 
found towards the end of the eighth of his Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, first 
published in 1688, the same year that a collection of Hobbes’s Latin works became widely 
available to European audiences with the publication of the Opera Philosophica. Although 
Hobbes is not mentioned by name, it is most probable that Malebranche had him in mind, as he 
turned from a discussion of God and His attributes to argue for eternal laws of justice against 
Hobbesian foundations of morality: 
The just and the unjust, as well as the true and the false, are not inventions of the human 
mind, as certain corrupt minds maintain. People, they say, have made laws for their mutual 
conservation. It is on the basis of amour-propre that they have founded them. They agree 
among themselves and are thereby obligated. For people who break the agreement, 
discovering themselves weaker than the other contracting parties, find themselves among 
enemies who satisfy their amour-propre by punishing them. Thus, they should observe the 
laws of the country in which they live from amour-propre, not because they are just in 
themselves, for they say that overseas entirely contrary ones are observed, but because in 
submitting to them they have nothing to fear from those who are stronger. According to 
them, everything is permitted to everyone by nature. Each individual has the right to 
everything, and if I cede my right it is because the force of competitors obliges me to do so. 
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  Riley, The General Will Before Rousseau, pp. 52-54. 
71
  Malebranche, Réflexions sur la Prémotion Physique [1715], Œuvres, XVI, p. 98. See also Riley, The 
General Will Before Rousseau, pp. 56-57. 
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Thus amour-propre is the rule of my actions. My law is an external power, and were I the 
stronger I would by nature recover all my rights. Can anything more brutal and insane be 
said?
72
  
 
The passage anticipates those themes present in Malebranche’s later works (already discussed) 
where Hobbes is targeted explicitly. Justice and truth, to be real and no more than chimeras, 
must be based on eternal laws and not determined by the will of individuals contracting together, 
which would render the essential qualities of justice (which Malebranche thought eternal and 
immutable) different in each society. Malebranche concluded the dialogue by reasserting that 
the eternal laws of justice must be maintained against ‘those rare geniuses who believe that in 
amour-propre they have found the true principles of natural morality.’
73
 Of interest presently is 
not so much what Malebranche had to say about eternal laws of justice but rather his remarks 
concerning amour-propre. Nowhere is his fundamental opposition to Hobbes clearer: 
Malebranche accused Hobbes of making amour-propre the source of all justice and morality. 
This criticism would recur throughout much eighteenth-century French thought and it is well to 
note that some of Rousseau’s earliest comments on amour-propre were set out in opposition to 
Hobbes.
74
  
Although Malebranche was very critical of Hobbes’s account of amour-propre, he also 
maintained that the passion was not itself a vice, and on this point it is worth comparing his 
position with that of Pierre Nicole. For Nicole, to recall, amour-propre could be directed to 
imitate virtue, but morally speaking the passion itself was always contrary to genuine virtue. In 
no way could amour-propre lead to man’s perfection because even though its effects mirrored 
those of charity, the psychological disposition of men motivated by amour-propre was 
necessarily opposed to the disposition of men acting from charity. 
For Malebranche too, virtue consisted in loving order above all things and it was not 
sufficient to only love it when it agrees with our amour-propre;
75
 yet by treating amour-propre 
on a purely psychological level he rendered the passion morally neutral. Malebranche hence 
claimed that amour-propre (or the desire of being happy) was ‘neither virtue nor vice’,
76
 rather 
if it could be enlightened it could lead men to virtue.
77
 Malebranche was thus one of the first 
thinkers to break with the generally pejorative use of amour-propre that prevailed in 
seventeenth-century French moral philosophy and clearly state that it could lead men to either 
genuine virtue or vice. Here again, Malebranche’s discussion of amour-propre and its relation to 
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virtue and vice closely resembled that which Rousseau would later develop; indeed it is a point 
of some significance to recognise that Rousseau followed Malebranche in both criticising 
Hobbes’s account of amour-propre whilst also maintaining the passion’s neutrality in and of 
itself and its potential to be directed towards virtue.
78
 
Malebranche, of course, did not go so far as to claim that amour-propre was the 
foundation of justice – the opinion that he associated with Hobbes – as justice was not to be 
founded on man’s psychological nature. Justice, for Malebranche, was a transcendent standard, 
whereas Hobbes’s alleged positivism reduced it to the will of the sovereign. Malebranche’s 
criticisms of Hobbes would lie dormant for much of the eighteenth century in France, 
discredited as he was by many of the philosophes. Yet Rousseau, in opposing the philosophes, 
would revive Malebranche’s criticisms not just against Hobbes but also against modern natural 
law theory more generally. 
  
Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui and natural law 
 
The most frequent context in which Rousseau would address Hobbes’s ideas was alongside 
those of other natural law theorists. The reception of natural law theory in France is a subject 
that has received relatively little attention.
79
 Compared with other European countries in the 
eighteenth century it might seem unusual to even think of there being a distinctively French 
natural law tradition and there were no seminal works of natural law written in the French 
language (or by French authors) in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century.
80
 
That there were no great French works of natural law during this period is not to say 
that natural law was of little influence. In France, and to a greater extent in Geneva, natural law 
theories were being contested and employed in the political controversies of the time.
81
 Two 
thinkers in particular occupy an elevated position in the transmission of modern natural law, 
especially with regards to Rousseau: Jean Barbeyrac and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, both of 
whom were best known for having delivered a compendium of natural law thought into French, 
with each having made explicit their intention to contribute to a well grounded education in the 
subject.
82
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Burlamaqui supplied what may well be viewed as the first eighteenth-century treatise on 
natural law composed in French, The Principles of Natural and Political Law,
83
 a work that 
although now often overlooked was of great influence at the time. However, the greatest 
contribution to the French reception of natural law was provided by Barbeyrac, who translated 
the principal works of Grotius, Pufendorf and Cumberland in widely read editions.
84
 
Accompanying the translations Barbeyrac included extensive notes and commentary that often 
distorted the original arguments in crucial respects, and in many editions his own discourses 
were also added. The most famous of these, now best known as ‘An Historical and Critical 
Account of the Science of Morality’, was published as the preface to Pufendorf’s Of the Law of 
Nature and Nations, and provides one of the first examples of a new genre, the history of moral 
science, that Barbeyrac was instrumental in advancing.
85
  
According to Barbeyrac, Grotius was the first modern ‘who broke the Ice’ by 
composing a complete system of the laws of nature. He might have been inspired by Francis 
Bacon but he was not surpassed by either of the Englishmen who followed him, John Selden or 
Thomas Hobbes. Selden is briefly dismissed as a disordered and obscure writer who derived the 
laws of nature from the precepts given to Noah rather than from right reason, before Barbeyrac 
turned to examine with greater attention both Hobbes’s De Cive and Leviathan.
86
 
Barbeyrac’s opinion of Hobbes was predominantly critical, and his principal charges 
were four: (1) that he had established the dangerous hypothesis of Epicurus making self-
preservation and individual interest the origin of societies; (2) that he had ascribed to men the 
will and power to hurt one another thus rendering the state of nature a state of war; (3) that he 
had given unlimited authority to kings over both the state and religion; (4) that he had made the 
sovereign the judge of what is just and unjust and claimed that only his power, and not divine 
will, can bind the conscience. Barbeyrac did defer to Bayle’s judgement of Hobbes that ‘no one 
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  Barbeyrac, ‘Historical and Critical Account’, pp. 79-80. Elsewhere, in his response to Leibniz, 
Barbeyrac asserted that Grotius was ‘the first to have systematized a science that, prior to him, was 
nothing but confusion and, more often than not, impenetrable darkness.’ See ‘Judgement of an 
Anonymous Writer’ [1718], p. 272. 
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has ever yet penetrated so far into the Foundations of Civil Policy’,
87
 yet where the tone of 
Bayle’s article was generally positive with some criticism, Barbeyrac’s was generally negative 
with some approval. 
These points will be returned to shortly; but first the manner in which Barbeyrac 
proceeded to align Pufendorf and Grotius against Hobbes should be elucidated. For Barbeyrac, 
Pufendorf provided the most developed account of modern natural law with the history of the 
science of morality culminating in Of the Law of Nature and Nations. Although Pufendorf 
meditated deeply on both Grotius and Hobbes, it would only be in the great Grotius’s footsteps 
that he would follow. Barbeyrac compared Pufendorf and Grotius in some detail and ultimately 
concluded that Pufendorf’s work was far more useful. Even so, to advance a systematic 
understanding of the laws of nature, Barbeyrac maintained that it was essential to read both 
thinkers and with this in mind he hoped that his editions would ‘serve as perpetual Supplements 
to each other.’
88
 
If this was Barbeyrac’s aim, then Burlamaqui’s Principles of Natural and Political Law 
proved testimony to his achievement. Burlamaqui’s deference to Barbeyrac’s editions of Grotius 
and particularly Pufendorf was extensive, with many sections being adopted verbatim. 
Pufendorf set out much of his theory in direct opposition to Hobbes’s principles, especially in 
Of the Law of Nature and Nations, in which his references reveal a familiarity with De Homine, 
De Cive and the Latin Leviathan. This opposition shaped both Barbeyrac’s and Burlamaqui’s 
contributions to natural law. In each case they located themselves as followers of Grotius and 
especially Pufendorf, developing and adapting their arguments to combat what they perceived to 
be the dangers of Hobbism. By the 1750s, then, one can speak of a self-identifying French 
natural law tradition that comprised Barbeyrac’s renditions of Grotius and Pufendorf, Barbeyrac 
himself and Burlamaqui. This tradition viewed itself positively and thus did not include Hobbes 
as such; rather he provided the bête-noire whose arguments had to be refuted. 
With this bifurcation outlined, it is worth returning to the criticisms levelled at Hobbes in 
the ‘Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality’, in order to develop an 
impression of exactly what Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui perceived to be the dangers of Hobbism. 
Barbeyrac’s first charge, that of Epicureanism, was by no means unique to Hobbes’s French 
reception.
89
 The interest in the natural law context, however, is the manner in which 
Epicureanism was opposed to sociability. Barbeyrac only mentioned Hobbes once in his 
translation of Grotius’s The Rights of War and Peace, yet the note added to the discussion of 
man’s desire for society is revealing: 
The natural Inclination of Mankind to live in Society is a Principle which has been admitted 
by the Wise and Learned of all Ages… Hobbes, who with still more Warmth than his Master 
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p. 260. 
 41 
Epicurus, undertook to persuade the World that all men are by Nature so many Wolves one 
to another.
90
 
  
Barbeyrac, who was largely responsible for the transmission of the language of sociability into 
eighteenth-century French thought, aligned Grotius, Pufendorf and other earlier theorists of 
natural sociability against Hobbes’s Epicureanism.
91
 To be sure, Hobbes had set out his theory 
against the guiding Aristotelian assumption that man is naturally a sociable and civil creature.
92
 
Yet it is not evident that the modern theorists of natural sociability so clearly sided with 
Aristotle over Hobbes; the very distinction that Barbeyrac sought to emphasise. Pufendorf had 
claimed, in opposition to Hobbes, that the dictates of reason must be deduced from an 
alternative principle to amour-propre to give them the force of law. That principle was 
sociability, from which the fundamental law of nature followed: ‘Every Man ought, as far as in 
him lies, to promote and preserve a peaceful Sociableness with others, agreeable to the main 
End and Disposition of [the] human Race in general.’
93
 This, however, might not seem that far 
removed from Hobbes’s principal law, to seek peace when peace can be had, and Pufendorf 
even insisted that amour-propre and sociability should be in no way opposed to one another.
94
 
Nevertheless, the distinction had been cast between Hobbism and Epicureanism on the one hand, 
which relied solely on self-interest or amour-propre, and sociability on the other, which 
supposedly did not.
95
  
Barbeyrac’s note is indicative of his attempts to present Grotius as a proto-Pufendorfian 
theorist of sociability and to efface any crucial differences between the two. Both Barbeyrac and 
Burlamaqui adopted Pufendorf’s principle of sociability as providing the foundation of all 
man’s duties to other men (although not to oneself or to God), yet each made important 
revisions in attempting to accentuate the distinction between Hobbes’s and Pufendorf’s 
principles. 
Barbeyrac went further than Pufendorf in not only refuting Hobbes’s alleged reliance on 
amour-propre for providing the foundation of natural law, but also his depiction of life without 
civil society as being one of misery and danger. Pufendorf had contested Hobbes’s account of 
the state of nature being a war of all against all, claiming that reason would overcome man’s 
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base passions and their natural equality would restrain them from fighting one another.
96
 Indeed, 
for Pufendorf, sociability itself was not a natural instinct but only a dictate of reason for men to 
join together to live peacefully. Yet when it came to considering the causes that induced men to 
establish civil society, Pufendorf told a very Hobbesian story in which men joined together to 
protect themselves from the dangers of other men.
97
 Pufendorf, like Hobbes, needed to present 
life without civil laws as miserable and dangerous in order to justify the necessity and extent of 
civil authority. Barbeyrac, however, was wary of the power that both had given to the sovereign 
and did not view the state of nature as such a negative standard. Although Pufendorf had 
formally claimed that the state of nature was not a state of war, a tension remained with his 
Hobbesian account of the origin of society, in which it appeared that self-preservation rather 
than sociability might be doing the work. In response, Barbeyrac rejected Pufendorf’s Hobbism 
with a sentiment that foreshadows the argument that Rousseau would deploy in the Second 
Discourse: 
In my Opinion, there is not Reflexion enough made here upon the Simplicity of those Times 
in which civil Societies began… The World not being as yet very full of People; and 
Sensuality or Luxury not having as yet infinitely increas’d the Wants, or rather the Desires 
of Mankind
98
 
 
Burlamaqui frequently deferred to Barbeyrac’s revisions of Pufendorf, but of this point he 
omitted any discussion. Instead he followed Pufendorf in depicting man’s life without civil laws 
as being one of weakness and ignorance, rendering it ‘a state of indigence and incessant 
wants’.
99
 Like Hobbes and Pufendorf before him, Burlamaqui wanted to preserve the negative 
standard that life without civil laws provided in order to justify the civil state as ‘the most 
perfect, [and] the most reasonable’.
100
 Although he may have been less able than Barbeyrac to 
dissociate his theory from the negative Hobbesian vision of the state of nature, when it came to 
the charge of Epicureanism Burlamaqui exceeded his predecessors in distancing his account 
from that associated with Hobbes. 
Burlamaqui firmly rejected the idea that self-preservation provided any foundation for 
natural law. Such an instinct was suitable only to animals, whereas man strives for happiness.
101
 
Man is a noble creature and to ground natural law on such a base desire would be in conflict 
with the higher faculties that he has been given from God. Burlamaqui extended the domain of 
natural law far beyond man’s preservation to include both his happiness and perfection.
102
 In 
doing so, Burlamaqui distanced himself from Hobbes by reviving a teleological conception of 
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man’s nature.
103
  
For Hobbes, as Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui understood him, the state of nature was a 
moral vacuum, no justice prevailed and the laws of nature had no force.
104
 Only the sovereign is 
empowered with the authority to determine what is just and unjust, thus man’s obligation is to 
the judgement of the sovereign rather than to that of his own conscience. Both Barbeyrac and 
Burlamaqui rejected the idea that life without civil laws was devoid of morality and sought to 
assert the claims of conscience over the will of the sovereign. This became all the more 
pertinent following Leibniz’s (originally anonymous) criticisms of Pufendorf, which Barbeyrac 
published alongside his own response in the 1718 fourth edition of his translation of Pufendorf’s 
Duty of Man.
105
 
Barbeyrac divided Leibniz’s critique into twenty sections and replied to each. Of present 
interest are those in which Leibniz accused Pufendorf of Hobbism. Leibniz claimed that Hobbes 
had denied the possibility of any obligatory justice in the state of nature. According to Leibniz, 
by reducing the efficient cause of natural law to the will of a superior Pufendorf encountered the 
same problem and was unable to prove that it would be injustice for a superior to behave like a 
tyrant towards his subjects.
106
 Barbeyrac’s response was dismissive, asserting that in the state of 
nature all men have a common superior in God, and stressing the gulf between Pufendorf and 
Hobbes: 
Why create monsters for oneself, just in order to fight them? Why draw an odious parallel 
with Hobbes’s principles, which are so diametrically opposed to those of our author?
107
 
 
Yet Barbeyrac’s ‘Discourse on What is Permitted by the Laws’ reveals that, free from having to 
defend Pufendorf from the charge of Hobbism, he took the challenge of justice existing 
independently of civil laws a lot more seriously, providing examples from history of unjust laws 
and concluding 
That, I think, is more than enough of what is needed to indicate the extent to which civil 
laws are liable directly to contradict the clearest laws of nature. And to indicate, in 
consequence, how very insecure it is to consider civil laws as infallible interpreters of the 
laws of nature, or as embodying all that is required to provide a model of conduct.
108
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Barbeyrac surpassed Pufendorf in insisting that even the laws of the most legitimate sovereign 
must be disobeyed as soon as they conflict with the ‘immutable laws written in our heart’. Man 
always has recourse to his own conscience over the sovereign to interpret the laws of nature and 
his conduct must always first be authorised ‘before the tribunal of conscience and reason’.
109
 
Returning to his defence of Pufendorf, Barbeyrac downplayed the power vested in the sovereign 
by insisting that the importance of fear and the authority of the sovereign are only in making 
commands effective, and neither actually give the sovereign any right to command.
110
 
Whilst Barbeyrac concentrated primarily on dismissing the Hobbesian claim that justice 
only begins with the existence of a covenanted sovereign, Burlamaqui was equally intent to 
prove that justice obligates man prior to the instigation of civil laws. Burlamaqui emphasised 
the obligatory force of reason to an extent to which neither Pufendorf nor Barbeyrac would have 
been willing, stressing that ‘obligation, in its original idea, is nothing more than a restriction of 
liberty, produced by reason… It is therefore true, that all rules are obligatory.’
111
 Man could be 
obliged by his conscience alone, which ‘is properly no more than reason itself’, and is sufficient 
to provide for morality and duty independent of civil laws.
112
  
Burlamaqui even insisted that man has a natural moral instinct, the first example of 
which is revealed in the immediate sense of compassion that man feels at the sight of another 
man in misery or pain.
113
 Rousseau would employ a virtually identical definition of compassion 
in the Second Discourse to illustrate, against Hobbes, that man is not naturally vicious, and 
would have concurred with Burlamaqui’s observation that, by reducing morality to the will of 
the sovereign, Hobbes and others had lost ‘sight of the very nature and internal constitution of 
man’.
114
 
For both Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui, conscience was intimately tied together with their 
religious convictions.
115
 As a result, an important consideration for the French reception of 
natural law concerned the role of God, as both Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui sought to reassert the 
importance of God for natural law. Although all the main contributors in the tradition had 
avowed their belief in God, their theories could be read divorced from their theological 
commitments, as is evident from Grotius’s infamous claim: 
And indeed, all we have now said would take place, though we should even grant, what 
without the greatest Wickedness cannot be granted, that there is no God, or that he takes no 
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care of human Affairs.
116
 
 
Pufendorf broke from Grotius on this issue and insisted that it was necessary to presuppose God 
to ground man’s obligation to natural law, yet God only played a minimal role in Pufendorf’s 
theory. As Barbeyrac stressed in his defence of Pufendorf against Leibniz, God’s role, although 
minimal, was crucial, as He provided the obligatory force for natural law that the three all took 
to be notably absent from Hobbes’s account of the state of nature. Hobbes’s God, if He existed 
at all, appeared to be doing little or no work in sanctioning the laws of nature.
117
 Hobbes, of 
course, had famously been associated with atheism, a point that Barbeyrac had noted with 
seemingly some agreement despite Bayle’s attempts to prove otherwise.
118
 
In his defence of Pufendorf, Barbeyrac emphasised the role of God to a far greater 
extent than Pufendorf had done, in doing so somewhat distorting the original account. For 
Barbeyrac, natural law was an expression of divine will and the responsibility to acquiesce in it 
ultimately resided in the conscience of the individual, again undermining the Hobbesian role 
that the civil sovereign had in interpreting and providing the obligation for natural law.
119
 It was 
of even greater concern to Burlamaqui to counter Leibniz’s objections and provide a 
justification for God, most clearly revealed by his inclusion of a chapter demonstrating that the 
immortality of the soul completes the sanction of natural law in accordance with divine 
wisdom.
120
 
This further accounts for the manner in which Hobbes was presented in opposition to 
the other natural law theorists by Barbeyrac in particular. The role of God was an essential 
component of natural law theory for Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui, and if Hobbes was an atheist 
then it was open to dispute whether he could be included in the tradition at all. Indeed it is usual 
to think of modern natural law as a protestant tradition,
121
 which goes some way to explaining 
its lack of proponents in France and perhaps why two of the greatest contributors to the French 
reception of natural law were a Huguenot and a Calvinist.  
Just as Pufendorf had been concerned to set out much of his natural law theory in 
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opposition to Hobbes, so too Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui proceeded to present their arguments as 
justifications of Pufendorf against Hobbes. This bifurcation is characteristic of the reception of 
natural law in France and Geneva. The example of Epicureanism (representing Hobbes) being 
contrasted to sociability (representing Grotius and Pufendorf) illustrates the concerted effort to 
portray an artificial gulf that belied important similarities between the theorists in question. 
One of the most important respects in which natural law was received and modified in 
the French context concerned the state of nature. In opposition to Hobbes’s allegedly amoral 
state, Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui surpassed Pufendorf in reinvesting the state of nature with 
notions of God, morality and obligation to natural laws. In doing so, French natural law theory 
might be viewed as quite removed from its secular, non-teleological roots in Grotius and 
Hobbes. Although Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui both contested Hobbes’s ideas on sovereignty and 
civil society, they did so almost indirectly, by criticising his state of nature theory. If Hobbes’s 
premises regarding the nature of man and life without civil laws could be refuted then, they 
assumed, the rest of his account would also be discredited. 
The French tradition of natural law, then, identified itself as following in the footsteps 
of Grotius and Pufendorf and in contesting the odious principles of Hobbes. Barbeyrac and 
Burlamaqui’s persistent anti-Hobbism had the dual effect of rendering Pufendorf a lot less 
Hobbesian than he really was and rendering themselves a lot less original than they really were. 
Rousseau appears to have been well aware of this opposition between Hobbes and other natural 
law theorists and he would later subvert it for his own ends by collapsing the bifurcation and 
attacking Hobbes and Pufendorf together. 
 
Montesquieu against Hobbes 
 
Whilst the language of modern natural law would shape much of the discourse of political 
thought in the first half of the eighteenth century, the most important French thinker to write on 
politics was undoubtedly Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. Although his great 
biographer dates his interest in political philosophy from as early as 1725 when he was studying 
Pufendorf,
122
 Montesquieu’s thought is usually considered as quite distinct from the natural law 
tradition.
123
 Yet his relationship with this tradition is of great interest as, like Rousseau later, he 
adopted many of their concerns, especially regarding Hobbes, but rejected many of their 
conclusions. Moreover, the influence of Montesquieu on Rousseau has long been recognised,
124
 
as has Montesquieu’s opposition to Hobbes,
125
 hence suggesting that he might have been an 
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important source for the transmission of Hobbes’s ideas to Rousseau. 
The importance of refuting Hobbes’s state of nature theory has been interpreted as a 
recurrent theme throughout Montesquieu’s corpus. The first evidence of this is usually taken 
from the ‘Tale of the Troglodytes’ in the Persian Letters, in which it is commonly understood 
that Montesquieu sided with Shaftesbury over Hobbes by arguing that man is naturally virtuous 
and that justice is not artificial.
126
 Montesquieu introduced the ‘Tale of the Troglodytes’ to 
persuade Usbek’s correspondent, Mirza, of the moral truth concerning a debate over ‘whether 
man’s happiness depends on pleasure and the satisfaction of the senses, or on the practice of 
virtue.’
127
 Montesquieu depicted the Troglodytes as a people ‘so cruel, so savage, that they were 
wholly devoid of principles of equity or justice’, who, as such, agreed to obey nobody and 
pursue their own interests without regard for anyone else’s needs.
128
 
Montesquieu’s description resembles that of Hobbes’s individuals in the state of nature, 
and the result is that the Troglodytes were reduced to a miserable condition, ‘perished through 
their own wickedness, and became victims of their own injustice.’ However, two Troglodytes 
survived, and Montesquieu proceeded to give an account of their peaceful and harmonious life 
founded on the practice of virtue.
129
 Even if the Troglodytes are taken to be representative of 
Hobbes’s natural man, the Tale barely serves to refute Hobbes’s state of nature theory and, if 
anything, reinforces it. The first half of the Tale exemplifies the Hobbesian point that men living 
without civil laws and obedience to a common superior will be drawn into a war of all against 
all. To this extent the Tale rather seems set out to repudiate the doctrine that private vice leads to 
public benefits, most readily associated with Bernard Mandeville.
130
 
As far as the ‘Tale of the Troglodytes’ undermines Hobbes’s account, it does so by 
showing that men can enjoy a peaceful existence without the necessity of civil laws, solely 
through the practice of virtue. However, this is rare – only two of the original Troglodytes were 
capable of virtue – and it is not long before circumstances required a king to be elected.
131
 
Nevertheless, Montesquieu’s point, to the extent that it resonates against Hobbes at all, was that 
justice can be founded on man’s virtue rather than his self-interest or pleasure. If this is the case 
then justice and virtue need not be artificial, in the sense that they are not dependent on the 
establishment of civil laws, a point that Montesquieu would later take up against Hobbes in The 
Spirit of the Laws. 
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The ‘Tale of the Troglodytes’ sought to resolve the question of whether happiness 
resided in the pursuit of pleasure or virtue, and as such it speaks little to Hobbes’s state of nature 
theory. That this was not the main concern of the Tale is supported by elsewhere in the Persian 
Letters, where Montesquieu dismissed and ridiculed the whole theory of grounding an account 
of politics on the instigation of civil society from the state of nature,
132
 a point as applicable to 
modern natural law theorists in general as to Hobbes in particular. 
Given this antipathy towards examining the origin of societies, it might seem surprising 
that the opening chapters of The Spirit of the Laws followed the approach common amongst 
natural law theorists of the time. Montesquieu deemed it necessary to inquire into the laws of 
nature, thus he commenced by considering man’s nature prior to the institution of society. In 
doing so he explicitly set out to refute Hobbes, with arguments that to some extent foreshadow 
those that Rousseau would later deploy for the same purpose. Montesquieu began by denying 
the Hobbesian premise that men are naturally intrepid and would seek to fight one another: 
Such a man would at first feel only his weakness; his timidity would be extreme: and as for 
evidence, if it is needed on this point, savages have been found in forests; everything makes 
them tremble, everything makes them flee.
133
 
 
Montesquieu then proceeded to make the point – now most commonly associated with 
Rousseau but with antecedents at least as far back as Richard Cumberland – that Hobbes had 
given men motives to attack one another and defend themselves that would only arise following 
the establishment of societies.
134
 Here Montesquieu echoed Barbeyrac’s observation with 
regards to both Hobbes and Pufendorf, which stressed that not enough reflection had been given 
on the simplicity of the times from which civil societies began. Montesquieu thus consolidated 
the interpretation that the state of nature should be understood as representing man’s primitive 
or original condition rather than just his state in the absence of civil laws, the latter of which 
provided the normative force for Hobbes’s and Pufendorf’s justifications of sovereignty. To be 
sure, Montesquieu did not go as far as Rousseau would in historicising the passions that Hobbes 
attributed to man, yet the seeds of Rousseau’s critique were clearly sown by Montesquieu. It is 
also important to note another respect in which the discussion anticipates Rousseau’s Second 
Discourse, as even though Montesquieu contested Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, he 
accepted that once a fixed level of social relations became established a state of war ensued. 
Man’s natural state might not have been one of war, but the state of war developed alongside 
society, hence Montesquieu resorted to recounting a Hobbesian story from which the necessity 
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of positive laws arose.
135
 However, Montesquieu did not provide a developed account of the 
origin of societies and, far more importantly, one of the central purposes of the opening chapters 
of The Spirit of the Laws was to contest the positivism of Hobbes. This is a point that 
Montesquieu later stressed when defending the work (in the third person): 
The author has had in mind to contest the system of Hobbes; a terrible system, which, 
making all the virtues and vices depend on the establishment of laws that men have made, 
and by wanting to prove that all men are born into a state of war of all against all, overturns, 
like Spinoza, both all religion and all morality.
136
 
 
Montesquieu asserted that before ‘laws were made, there were possible relations of justice’ and 
that these relations derive ‘from the nature of things’.
137
 Similarly, in the Persian Letters, 
Montesquieu had averred that ‘justice is eternal and independent of human conventions; if it 
were to depend upon them, that would be a terrible truth which we would have to conceal from 
ourselves.’
138
 Montesquieu rejected both the positivism and contractualism that, in addition to 
having been employed by Hobbes, recurred more generally throughout the modern natural law 
tradition.
139
 The contrast is well exemplified by comparing Montesquieu’s position with 
Barbeyrac’s defence of Pufendorf, in which Barbeyrac asserted that obligation to the laws of 
nature is derived from the will of a superior and ‘is no way grounded in the nature of things.’
140
 
In maintaining that justice is eternal and founded on the nature of things, Montesquieu 
distanced himself from the likes of Hobbes, Pufendorf and Barbeyrac, and instead employed the 
same arguments that Malebranche and Leibniz had developed against Hobbes. The first book of 
The Spirit of the Laws resembles the modern natural law theorists in approach: examining man’s 
state prior to civil society, the laws of nature and positive laws. Yet in this context Montesquieu 
employed anti-Hobbesian arguments resembling those of Malebranche and Leibniz – thinkers 
less readily associated with natural law – rather than those of Pufendorf and Barbeyrac, which 
were generally of greater influence at the time. For Montesquieu, Hobbes’s principles were 
subversive of all morality and justice. By combining the idea that justice is founded on the 
nature of things – prior to human conventions or the will of a superior – with the approach 
pursued by modern natural law theorists, Montesquieu would again prove an important 
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precursor of Rousseau’s political thought.
141
 
The similarities between Montesquieu and modern natural law theorists were of a limited 
nature, and many of these were confined to the first book of The Spirit of the Laws, which is 
also one of the shortest. Indeed it is well to remark how striking the absence of discussions of 
sovereignty and the origins of society are from Montesquieu’s thought in general and it is 
evident that he objected to the method by which Hobbes and the modern natural law theorists 
sought to justify political right. This was not only because they had neglected to found justice 
on the nature of things, but also because they assumed that a social contract would effectively 
represent the people. Whether or not society was originally founded on a covenant, people 
living in society could not be bound to it against their will as they had no part in making it.
142
 
Montesquieu rejected genetic accounts of political right and social contract theory tout court, as 
is illustrated in his criticism of Hobbes’s most advanced articulation of the idea of authorisation 
as formulated in Leviathan: 
It is a principle as false as that of Hobbes: that the People having authorised the Prince, the 
actions of the Prince are the actions of the People, and, consequently, the People cannot 
complain about the Prince, nor demand of him any account of his actions, because the 
People cannot complain about the People.
143
 
 
It should be noted that this remark would have been unavailable to Montesquieu’s 
contemporaries, and rather serves only to substantiate his aversion to Hobbes. Although other 
commentators have suggested that Montesquieu’s refutation of Hobbes shaped much of his 
thought, beyond the passages mentioned here it is difficult to assess the extent to which he was 
directly engaged with contesting Hobbes, even if abstract conceptual comparison of the two 
remains of broader interest. As far as Montesquieu contributed to the reception or transmission 
of Hobbesian ideas to his readers in general, and to Rousseau in particular, his role was far more 
limited yet no less important. 
Two aspects of Hobbes’s theory occasioned sustained attacks: first, Montesquieu 
considered Hobbes’s state of nature theory to be either superfluous for examining political right, 
erroneous in its characterisation of man’s primitive condition, or both. Second, Montesquieu 
followed Malebranche and Leibniz in objecting to Hobbes’s alleged positivism, by founding the 
ideas of justice on the nature of things, rather than on conventions or the will of a superior. 
Montesquieu’s critique is of interest as he attacked Hobbes on similar grounds to the modern 
natural law theorists, but by also rejecting much of their method, he ultimately levelled 
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criticisms that resonated as much against natural law theory in general as against Hobbes 
specifically. In this respect, Montesquieu would prove to be an important source for Rousseau’s 
critique of Hobbes. 
 
Diderot and the Encyclopédie 
 
Whilst the influence of modern natural law on Montesquieu was somewhat oblique, the 
reception of Hobbes in the French Enlightenment attests to the prevalence of the natural law 
tradition in shaping the political discourse of the time. Although Barbeyrac’s translations of 
Grotius, Pufendorf and Cumberland were widely read, the impact of natural law theory 
remained negligible in the primary concerns and principal writings of the philosophes. Rather, 
when the philosophes focused their attention on politics, they exhibited a marked deference to 
the works of Barbeyrac in particular, and as such only reinforced the prevailing criticisms of 
Hobbes without adding any original insights. Examination of the Encyclopédie proves a case in 
point. 
In 1752 the whole Encyclopédie project was put into jeopardy following a relatively 
unknown contributor, the Abbé Jean-Martin de Prades, being condemned for Hobbism by the 
University of Sorbonne and the Archbishop of Paris. Prades was forced to take exile in Prussia 
and at the same time the first two volumes of the Encyclopédie were suppressed by the Royal 
Council. The affair eventually died down and the Encyclopédie resumed the following year, but 
not before both Prades and Diderot had each offered a defence against the charge of Hobbism.
144
 
This episode proves instructive for understanding the context in which Hobbes’s ideas were 
employed amongst the philosophes and in the Encyclopédie in particular.
145
 
Given the controversy occasioned by the Prades affair it is unsurprising to find that 
virtually all references to Hobbes in the Encyclopédie were negative. Moreover, the discussion 
was frequently derivative, rarely adding anything to the observations that the likes of Bayle and 
Barbeyrac had made previously. Most articles in which Hobbes was mentioned consisted of 
simple repudiations of his state of nature theory, denying that men were naturally in a state of 
war with one another,
146
 or insisting that ‘the dark system of Hobbes’ undermined the 
foundations of morality and that he was wrong to assert that there was neither virtue nor natural 
law anterior to positive law.
147
 Of all the contributors no one did more to reproach Hobbes for 
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Aspects of Hobbes, pp. 495-496; Israel, Enlightenment Contested, pp. 850-858; Tuck, ‘The Making of a 
Reputation’, Lectures, pp. 8-13. 
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  For example see ‘Paix’ (author unknown), Encyclopédie, vol. XI, p. 768. The first volume of the 
Encyclopédie appeared in 1751 and the seventeenth in 1765, which was intended to conclude the text. By 
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  ‘ce noir système de Hobbes’, J.E. Romilly, ‘Vertu’, Encyclopédie, XVII, pp. 176-182. 
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his alleged slander against human nature than the Chevalier de Jaucourt,
148
 yet perhaps more 
telling is the omission of any reference to Hobbes in his articles on government and sovereignty. 
This further reflects the influence of Pufendorf at the time, from whom de Jaucourt explicitly 
borrowed his definition of sovereignty and followed in his account of sovereignty residing in 
society (as a single body) before being granted to a legislative power.
149
 
Such criticisms were a simplification of Hobbes’s position and elided the more 
problematical issue prominent in the natural law tradition, concerning not whether natural law 
existed in the state of nature (no one, including Hobbes, questioned this), but rather the extent of 
its obligatory force before being upheld by positive laws. Hobbes challenged the philosophes’ 
confidence in both nature and reason. As they read Hobbes, by reducing all positive laws and 
justice to the will of the sovereign, he had disregarding the role of reason and natural law. By 
claiming that Hobbes had denied natural law, then, the more pressing problem of its obligatory 
force prior to positive law could be bypassed; rather, the obligatory force of natural law was 
often unquestioningly assumed. 
Turning to Denis Diderot, one might expect to find the same simplification of Hobbes’s 
ideas. Prior to his contributions to the Encyclopédie, Diderot had satirically remarked that had 
Hobbes been accosted by Cartouche (a celebrated French bandit) with a pistol in hand, 
demanding Hobbes’s money or his life, Hobbes would have soon learned that injustice can exist 
between individuals alone in the state of nature.
150
 This picks up on one of the common 
objections levelled at Hobbes’s denial of justice and injustice prior to positive laws, and 
precisely misses the very distinction that Hobbes had employed between injustice, or wrong, 
and loss.
151
 In fact Hobbes had entertained the very example and arrived at the contrary 
conclusion, stating that ‘it is licit to make a promise to ransom my life and to give anything I 
like of my own to anyone, even to a robber.’
152
 That most of Diderot’s article ‘Hobbism’ was 
lifted from Jakob Brucker (save a comparison in which Diderot compared Hobbes and Rousseau) 
provides further evidence of Hobbes’s influence being mediated through second hand sources 
and that those associated with the Encyclopédie had little of originality to add to discussions of 
Hobbes.
153
 
Nevertheless, when considering the context in which Rousseau responded to Hobbes, 
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Diderot’s contribution was of some significance. Indeed, in his article ‘Citizen’, Diderot 
revealed a great deal more insight into Hobbes’s thought than is to be found in many of the 
other Encyclopédie entries: 
Hobbes draws no distinction between subject and citizen, correctly so, if one takes the strict 
meaning of the term subject, and the widest sense of the term citizen, and if one bears in 
mind that the latter term pertains only to the laws, while the former is defined in relation to 
a sovereign. Citizens and subjects are equally under command, but one by a moral, the other 
by a physical, force.
154
 
 
By attributing positive law to the will of the sovereign, Hobbes had effectively collapsed the 
distinction that Diderot referred to between the sovereign and the laws. Similarly, Hobbes had 
collapsed the distinction between subject and citizen. To appreciate the importance of this for 
Hobbes – provoking his readers to re-evaluate the difference between subject and citizen – one 
has to look no further than the somewhat polemical title of his most readily available work in 
French, De Cive.
155
 Just as Pufendorf had done before him, and Rousseau would do most 
emphatically following him, Diderot employed the distinction between moral and physical force 
to stress that citizen and subject were not one and the same. 
The article that would have the greatest impact on Rousseau’s political thought, 
however, was Diderot’s ‘Natural Right’, which Rousseau set out to refute at the beginning of the 
Geneva Manuscript. Hobbes is not mentioned explicitly in Diderot’s article, but following 
Robert Wokler’s seminal analysis, the ‘violent interlocutor’ has come to be identified as Hobbes, 
or at least Hobbes as Diderot understood him.
156
 Often neglected in analysis of the article is the 
fact that before Diderot turned to consider the violent interlocutor he already had something to 
say against Hobbes and materialism, insisting that free will and liberty are necessary for the 
notions of morality and justice to exist: ‘It is clear that if man is not free… there could be no 
moral good or evil, no justice or injustice, neither obligation nor right.’
157
 
Diderot’s argument against Hobbes, however, is not predicated on man’s free will. Instead 
he proceeded to consider the violent interlocutor, who wants to satisfy his passions and thinks 
himself not blameworthy for putting his own desires above those of others, as all would do 
likewise: 
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If my happiness demands that I rid myself of all persons who intrude upon my life, then 
anyone else may equally rid himself of my presence if it offends him. This only stands to 
reason, and I agree. I am not so unjust as to demand from someone else a sacrifice which I 
am not myself prepared to make for him.
158
 
 
Assuming that this should be taken as a reference to individuals in Hobbes’s state of nature – 
and leaving aside that it ascribes a sense of justice to the interlocutor for otherwise ‘we should 
have to shut him up without any reply’ – Diderot’s response consisted of denying that an 
individual ever has the right to determine the nature of justice and injustice and that it is absurd 
to wish upon others that which one would not wish upon oneself. If private wills are always 
suspect, then the question of justice must be put before mankind and be determined by the 
general will, which ‘has never beguiled and will never mislead.’
159
 
For Diderot, natural right always corresponded to ‘the general will and the common 
desire of the whole species’. The general will may be accessed and should be obeyed prior to 
the institution of positive laws. It is ‘evident to anyone who uses his reason’, and is to be 
identified even ‘in the social practices of savage and barbarous peoples’.
160
 In short, the general 
will is universal; accessible to all the species and applies to all, whether in the state of nature or 
in civil society. 
The importance of Diderot’s introduction of the general will is almost self-evident, in part 
because of how strikingly different it is from Rousseau’s conception.
161
 In the same edition of 
the Encyclopédie (1755) Rousseau also employed the concept of the general will for the first 
time, cross-referencing Diderot’s article as providing ‘the source of this great and luminous 
principle’, although it is unclear how familiar he was with it at the point of composition.
162
 
Political Economy provides Rousseau’s least precise discussion of the general will, yet from the 
Geneva Manuscript onwards Rousseau specified his understanding of the concept more closely 
so as to distinguish it from Diderot’s. Even in Political Economy crucial distinctions are evident, 
as Rousseau discussed the general will of particular societies, rather than the universal general 
will of the species, confining his use of the concept to within the body politic: 
The body politic is thus also a moral being that has a will; and this general will, which 
always tends toward the preservation and welfare of the whole and of each part, and which 
is the source of the laws, is – for all the members of the state in relation to themselves and 
to it – the rule of what is just and unjust.
163
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Riley’s history of the concept of the general will emphasises the influence of Malebranche on 
both Diderot and Rousseau, suggesting that Diderot had Malebranche in mind towards the end 
of his article on ‘Natural Right’. This being the case, Rousseau’s refutation of Diderot should be 
taken as ’an oblique treatment of Malebranche as well.’
164
 For both Malebranche and Diderot, 
the general will was equivalent to eternal laws of justice; although in Malebranche’s more 
political moments, such as his criticisms of Hobbes’s positivism, he only employed the idea of 
eternal laws of justice and did not use the term general will at all.
165
  
It is worth stressing that whether or not Rousseau viewed Malebranche as having 
employed the notion of the general will against Hobbes, there is no doubt that Diderot 
introduced the concept in precisely this context; in direct response to having to refute the violent 
interlocutor taken to be Hobbes. More to the point, Rousseau thought that both Diderot’s 
conception of the general will and his refutation of Hobbes were ultimately deficient and needed 
to be revised, and would argue against both in the Geneva Manuscript. There is, then, evidence 
to suggest that Diderot’s article once again alerted Rousseau to both the inadequacies of the 
prevailing refutations of Hobbes and the problems of employing the general will as a universal 
concept; a context that needs to be kept in mind when considering Rousseau’s engagement with 
Hobbes. 
The preceding discussion indicates that although Diderot’s response to Hobbes was 
important for the way that Rousseau would later engage with Hobbes, there is little evidence of 
new interpretations of Hobbes having developed amongst the philosophes. This might seem 
surprising considering that the materialistic and deterministic psychology of Hobbes would have 
appealed to many of the more radical figures of the French Enlightenment. Yet these elements of 
Hobbes’s thought seem to have been unknown to thinkers such as La Mettrie despite the 
resemblances between their philosophies, and, as Malcolm concludes, ‘it seems that the radical 
philosophers of the French Enlightenment were interested mainly in the non-radical aspects of 
Hobbes.’
166
 Outside of the Encyclopédie there seems to have been little interest in Hobbes, at 
least until 1772 when d’Holbach produced a translation of Humane Nature.
167
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Hobbes before Rousseau 
 
Both Bayle and Barbeyrac remarked that nobody had penetrated as far into the foundations of 
society as Hobbes, and it was these foundations that arrested much of the attention of his French 
audience in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Whilst each commentator on 
Hobbes took objection to, or in some cases even levelled praise on, different aspects of his 
thought, some general conclusions can be drawn as to what the multifaceted image of Hobbism 
consisted in prior to Rousseau’s critique. 
One reason that the foundations of Hobbes’s theory occasioned the greatest analysis was 
that his genius was rarely questioned; many commentators at once noted this with some reserve 
whilst at the same time condemning his subversive ideas. Hobbes was recognised as a 
philosopher of the highest rank and many were all too aware that if his first principles were 
granted then everything else he argued may have to be admitted. It was these supposedly 
prejudiced and insidious principles that were mainly attacked, as is well illustrated by Diderot’s 
warning not to venture beyond his first principles.
168
  
A common feature of the criticisms of Hobbes in this period, then, was that they sought 
to contest his first principles. Malebranche and Leibniz were perhaps unique in attacking the 
very foundations of Hobbes’s philosophy, that is, his materialism, yet all took issue with what 
they perceived to be underpinning his political thought. A recurrent theme was that Hobbes had 
founded all justice on man’s amour-propre, yet there was no uniform response to the problems 
that were widely recognised with this and Hobbes’s corresponding account of obligation. 
For Malebranche, Hobbes’s positivism and voluntarism amounted to much the same 
thing, and against both he insisted on eternal laws of justice, as did Leibniz. Montesquieu too 
attacked Hobbes’s positivism, claiming that relations of justice exist prior to positive law and 
are founded on the nature of things. For Pufendorf and Barbeyrac, by contrast, the opposition 
was not simply one between voluntarism and rationalism. Barbeyrac sought to defend Pufendorf 
against the charge of Hobbism by showing that obligation required both the internal justification 
of reason and the external force of the will of a superior. In so doing he attempted to preserve 
the role of God in sanctioning natural law whilst at the same time rejecting the equation of the 
moral authority of the civil sovereign to that of God; the dangerous error that he followed 
Pufendorf in attributing to Hobbes. 
Without doubt the most common theme in Hobbes’s reception history, however, was the 
focus on his state of nature theory. At the turn of the eighteenth century this was a matter of little 
contention; although criticised by the likes of Malebranche, it was more frequently adopted 
(sometimes explicitly) by thinkers such as Nicole and Bayle. Considering man as overrun by 
violent passions provided a story compatible with man’s post-lapsarian state that appealed to 
neo-Augustinians like Nicole, or that could be used to justify the authority of civil sovereigns as 
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in the case of Bayle. This line of thought, however, came under stringent attack from two 
directions. One was from Montesquieu, who on the one hand rejected state of nature theories 
tout court, and on the other hand thought that Hobbes had misconstrued man’s natural state. The 
latter point has some similarity with the other line of criticism derived from the natural law 
tradition, which sought to recast the state of nature in opposition to Hobbes.  
Barbeyrac emphasised Pufendorf’s doctrine of sociability and set this out in direct 
opposition to Hobbesian self-preservation, a distinction that became entrenched in the French 
reception of modern natural law and was adopted by the philosophes. These arguments were 
also supported by prominent English authors who were translated into French in the period in 
question. Hobbes had been attacked by some of his earliest English critics for founding all 
human society on fear rather than sociability;
169
 criticisms that were taken up in the natural law 
context by Richard Cumberland, who argued vehemently against Hobbes’s rejection of natural 
sociability,
170
 which Barbeyrac then translated for French readers in 1744. Around the same time 
Diderot also took a turn as translator, producing a French edition of the Earl of Shaftesbury’s An 
Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit in 1745, in which Shaftesbury had affirmed man’s 
sociability against Hobbes: 
How unfortunate must it be for a Creature, whose dependence on Society is greater than any 
others, to lose that natural Affection by which he is prompted to the Good and Interest of his 
Species, and Community? Such indeed is Man’s natural Share of this Affection, that He, of 
all other Creatures, is plainly the least able to bear Solitude. Nor is there any thing more 
apparent, than that there is naturally in every Man such a degree of social Affection as 
inclines him to seek the Familiarity and Friendship of his Fellows… For whoever is 
unsociable, and voluntarily shuns Society, or Commerce with the World, must of necessity 
be morose and ill-natur’d.
171
 
 
Diderot’s edition of Shaftesbury emphasised the importance of natural, sociable, virtue and was 
widely read in the French Enlightenment; Rousseau, for one, possessed a copy.
172
 Indeed it is 
interesting to note that the translation into French of Hobbes’s critics from elsewhere in Europe 
seems to have gone some way towards consolidating Hobbes’s negative reception. To suggest 
that no major French thinker engaged with Hobbes between Bayle and Rousseau,
173
 then, is 
both to miss and to be unable to explain the steady deterioration of Hobbes’s reputation that 
occurred in France during the first half of the eighteenth century. The Hobbes that the 
philosophes were discussing in the 1750s was a figure far removed from the one discussed by 
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not only his immediate friends in France a century earlier, but even by the likes of Bayle at the 
turn of the eighteenth century. 
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The State of Nature and the Nature of Man 
 
They know only what they see, and have never seen nature. They know extremely well what a 
Bourgeois of London or Paris is; but they will never know what a man is.
1
 
 
Amongst his eighteenth-century French commentators, the element of Hobbes’s thought that 
provoked the greatest criticism was his state of nature theory. In this respect Rousseau was no 
exception. However, the manner in which Rousseau opposed Hobbes was quite unique, for he 
did so without recourse to the principle of sociability. Rousseau considered that the prevailing 
refutations of Hobbes were inadequate, thus he broke from his predecessors and attempted to 
contest Hobbes on new grounds. These grounds were ones that implicated not just Hobbes, but 
the whole natural law tradition as it was received in France and Geneva at the time. 
Rousseau’s own state of nature theory is developed at greatest length in the Second 
Discourse, a text that raises a number of problems of interpretation. The Discourse invites being 
read in a variety of different historical contexts as it draws upon multifarious sources.
2
 To 
indicate just a few, there is strong evidence to view the Discourse as a contribution to the debate 
on luxury with the doux commerce theorists,
3
 as part of the natural science of the Enlightenment 
project drawing on figures like Buffon,
4
 or as recounting ancient stories of the development of 
man inspired by Lucretius, Cicero or Seneca.
5
 Part of the enduring intrigue that the work 
possesses is no doubt due to the Discourse contributing to all of these debates and more, and it 
would be misguided to reduce it to any one context alone. Nonetheless, the problem cannot be 
avoided, as the historical context in which aspects of Rousseau’s argument are situated goes a 
long way to shaping the interpretation of the Discourse that emerges.  
The present analysis emphasises one context more than any other and argues that 
Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes belongs largely, although not exclusively, to the genre of modern 
natural law theory. Both textual and contextual evidence will be adduced in support of this claim, 
yet ultimately its greatest merit is the extent to which it is able to make sense of what Rousseau 
had to say about Hobbes. Despite being much studied, a comprehensive and cohesive account of 
Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbes remains elusive, in large part because the implications of 
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the natural law context have not been fully appreciated. It is often deemed that Rousseau’s 
critique missed the mark, as Hobbes’s depiction of the state of nature served a very different 
purpose to Rousseau’s.
6
 What is more, Rousseau appears to have at some point resorted to a 
Hobbesian moment whereby men end up in a state of war, which may be viewed as 
undermining the salience of his critique.
7
 Such criticisms, however, frequently evade questions 
regarding the exact purpose of Rousseau’s state of nature theory and why he took issue with 
Hobbes at all. It is only once these points have been addressed that Rousseau’s critique of 
Hobbes may be fully understood and the question as to whether that critique speaks to Hobbes’s 
own theory better answered. 
Reading the Second Discourse in the context of modern natural law suggests that 
Hobbes’s shadow looms over more of the work than might otherwise be apparent, precisely due 
to his influence in how that tradition had come to understand itself in France and Geneva by the 
middle of the eighteenth century, even if such influence was by way of adversary.
8
 Indeed 
without reference to this tradition it is far from evident that Hobbes was even a major target in 
the Discourse. With the exception of one extended passage, he is only otherwise mentioned by 
name twice in passing, and one of those occasions is in the notes.
9
 Any justification that Hobbes 
is important for Rousseau’s argument cannot be sustained by frequency of reference. Rather it 
must be shown that either Hobbes had a more oblique influence on the Discourse or that when 
he was invoked by Rousseau it was of the utmost importance.  
With the natural law context in mind, three central arguments addressing Rousseau’s 
engagement with Hobbes’s state of nature theory are advanced in this chapter. First, Rousseau 
sought to demonstrate that the depiction of man without civil laws adumbrated by Pufendorf 
and his followers was as erroneous as that set forth by Hobbes. By denying that the fundamental 
law of nature is man’s sociability, Rousseau collapsed the very bifurcation that thinkers 
following Barbeyrac had been so concerned to emphasise in order to distance Pufendorf from 
Hobbes. On Rousseau’s account, Pufendorf was no better than Hobbes, the implications of 
which would not have been missed by Rousseau’s Genevan audience or the French philosophes. 
In this sense, Hobbes’s theory provided a negative marker for Rousseau, against which other 
natural law accounts could be evaluated. 
Rousseau expounded his account of the physical side of natural man in opposition to 
Pufendorf, but when he turned to consider man’s moral side he was in agreement with the likes 
of Pufendorf and Burlamaqui in developing an argument that had its roots in a prevalent 
criticism of Hobbes. Explicitly against Hobbes, Pufendorf had insisted on the importance of 
                                                 
6
  Most recently see Pettit, Made with Words, p. 98; Steinberg, ‘Hobbes, Rousseau and the State’, p. 597. 
7
  Lovejoy, ‘The Supposed Primitivism’, p. 31; Starobinski, ‘Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité’, pp. lxiv; 
Taylor, ‘Rousseau’s Debt to Hobbes’, pp. 278-280; Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 284; Melzer, 
Natural Goodness of Man, p. 131; Roosevelt, Rousseau in the Nuclear Age, p. 33; Glaziou, Hobbes en 
France, p. 265. 
8
  See Chapter One, ‘Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui and natural law’. 
9
  For Rousseau’s explicit references to Hobbes see the Second Discourse, CW3:21, 35-36, 90/ OC3:136, 
153-154, 218. 
 61 
man’s free will, an argument that had become commonplace in the natural law tradition and that 
Rousseau appears to have utilised in the Second Discourse. The second argument for the 
importance of Hobbes, then, is an indirect one, yet it is no less significant for this reason. 
Rousseau first introduced his ideas of free will in a context developed in opposition to Hobbes, 
and he would later proceed to insist on the inalienability of this freedom against both Hobbes 
and the modern natural law theorists who had criticised Hobbes. 
The final argument concerning the importance of Hobbes for Rousseau’s theory has 
more frequently been recognised and extends beyond the natural law context. Rousseau claimed 
that, according to Hobbes, man is evil; Hobbes’s mistake was to attribute to natural man violent 
passions that only develop as more complex social relations become established. Rousseau’s 
principle of man’s natural goodness was set forth in contradistinction to Hobbes’s account of 
man. Whilst this much may easily be admitted, the significance of doing so for Rousseau has 
rarely been appreciated. One purpose was polemical: Rousseau developed his principle in 
opposition to the critics of his First Discourse, who he then proceeded to associate implicitly 
with Hobbes. Their defences of luxury and modern commercial society, according to Rousseau, 
rested on an erroneous and Hobbesian account of man’s miserable natural condition. For 
Rousseau, by contrast, the state of nature provided the setting for a model of the good life for 
man and even if man could never return to this state it nonetheless presented the conditions to 
which any form of the good life must conform. It was a life of harmony, free from contradiction, 
where man’s passions neither led to internal conflict within himself nor brought him into 
conflict with other men. Nature served as a normative standard throughout Rousseau’s thought 
and it was against Hobbes and those who followed him in this – who on Rousseau’s account had 
besmirched nature – that the claims of nature had to be advanced. 
The last argument rests great weight on a reading of the status of the state of nature in 
Rousseau’s theory and thus speaks to one of the most challenging interpretative problems that 
the Second Discourse poses.
10
 There is some contention as to what type of argument Rousseau 
sought to advance in the Discourse and whether it should be taken as a purely speculative and 
hypothetical account or one that is supposed to be historically accurate.
11
 The strongest evidence 
for the hypothetical reading comes from Rousseau’s Preface, where he claimed to have simply 
‘ventured some conjectures’, for 
it is no light undertaking to separate what is original from what is artificial in the present 
Nature of man, and to know correctly a state which no longer exists, which perhaps never 
existed, which probably never will exist, and about which it is nevertheless necessary to 
                                                 
10
  The most comprehensive examination of this problem is provided by Goldschmidt, Anthropologie et 
Politique, pp. 115-167. 
11
  The hypothetical reading is the most common, see for instance Charvet, The Social Problem in 
Rousseau, p. 15; Gourevitch, ‘Rousseau’s Pure State of Nature’, pp. 32-33. For the historical reading see 
Plattner, Rousseau’s State of Nature, pp. 17-25; Horowitz, Rousseau, Nature, and History, pp. 50-85. See 
also Kelly’s illuminating discussion of the various readings, in which he argues for the actual possibility 
but not necessary historical reality of the pure state of nature, ‘Rousseau’s “Peut-etre”’.  
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have precise Notions in order to judge our present state correctly.
12
 
 
Although attention is easily drawn to Rousseau’s claim that the state of nature might never have 
existed, the most revealing part of the passage is the concern to separate the artificial from the 
original in the nature of man. To separate what nature has given man from what social relations 
have added to man’s constitution is arguably one of the most important aims of the Second 
Discourse, and a failure to appreciate this lies behind many erroneous interpretations of the 
work. From the outset Rousseau invoked the inscription on the Temple of Delphi to illustrate 
that the subject of the Discourse is knowledge of man, who in society has become all but 
unrecognisable. In the accompanying note Rousseau stated his reliance on the authority of 
Buffon for evidence.
13
 
Rousseau used anthropological evidence drawn from Buffon’s Natural History to support 
his argument without ever resting it on those facts alone. There is an important sense in which 
the genealogy proposed in the Second Discourse had to be a hypothetical history for Rousseau, 
since it was a history beyond the reach of evidence available to modern science.
14
 But this was 
not to render it unscientific; indeed Rousseau viewed the conjectures as ones akin to those that 
physicists make ‘to clarify the Nature of things’, thus he offered the history of man ‘in Nature, 
which never lies.’
15
 The purpose of such a history was to uncover the nature of man, that is, 
man’s essential and inalienable gifts of nature; a point which cannot be stressed too strongly in 
the face of some consensus that, for Rousseau, ‘it became necessary to abandon altogether the 
attempt to find the basis of right in nature, in human nature’.
16
 The history only needed to be 
true to the extent that it could distinguish both what is original from artificial in man, and what 
is in accordance with man’s nature from how that nature has been corrupted by the onset of 
social institutions.
17
 Even if the history itself was hypothetical, Rousseau considered that what it 
established was beyond doubt, for ‘it is up to Philosophy, when history is lacking’, as 
conjectures become reasons when they are the most probable that one can draw from the 
nature of things, and the sole means that one can have to discover the truth, the conclusions 
                                                 
12
  Rousseau, Second Discourse, CW3:13/ OC3:123. Rousseau later claimed he would ‘begin by setting 
all the facts aside’, yet the paragraph preceding this claim suggests that the facts that he had in mind were 
those of Biblical history, Second Discourse, CW3:19/ OC3:132. 
13
  Rousseau, Second Discourse, CW3:12, 68/ OC3:122, 195. 
14
  On the Enlightenment context of philosophical or conjectural histories see Hulliung, Autocritique of 
Enlightenment, pp. 38-75. For Rousseau’s contribution to eighteenth-century debates on human evolution 
see Frayling & Wokler, ‘From the orang-utan to the vampire’. 
15
  Rousseau, Second Discourse, CW3:19/ OC3:133. 
16
  Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 274. For a range of interpretative approaches that arrive at much 
the same conclusion, see Crocker, Rousseau’s Social Contract, p. 91; Shklar, Men and Citizens, p. 38; 
Plattner, Rousseau’s State of Nature, p. 110; Horowitz, Rousseau, Nature, and History, p. 81; Rapaczynski, 
Nature and Politics, pp. 277-278; Manent, History of Liberalism, p. 78; Schneewind, The Invention of 
Autonomy, p. 473. 
17
  In this light consider the epigraph to the Second Discourse, where Rousseau quoted Aristotle: ‘Not in 
corrupt things, but in those which are well ordered in accordance with nature, should one consider that 
which is natural.’ Second Discourse, CW3:1/ OC3:109. 
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I want to deduce from mine will not thereby be conjectural,
18
 
 
Pierre Nicole once wrote that ‘there are two types of knowledge of man, one general and the 
other particular.’ The former pertains to man’s nature and the latter to man’s present condition 
with the corruption that man has added to his nature.
19
 Irrespective of whether Rousseau was 
aware of Nicole’s distinction, it encapsulates well Rousseau’s project in the Second Discourse. 
Revealing the general nature of man would serve to show just how distant the contingent and 
particular existence of modern man had become. The first part of the Discourse may be read as 
Rousseau’s account of the nature of man, or knowledge of man in general, and the second part 
as a speculative genealogy of the contingent and miserable condition that man has fallen into, or 
knowledge of man in his particular state as found in modern society. 
It is important to stress that the nature of man is not the same as man in the state of nature, 
as otherwise the problem arises that Rousseau sought to found his whole philosophy on a lost 
ideal.
20
 To be sure, as was commonplace amongst natural law theorists, the state of nature 
provided the setting for Rousseau’s account of the nature of man. Yet, as will become 
increasingly evident, even when the state of nature has been lost, nature remained a normative 
standard for Rousseau and any legitimate society would have to be in conformity with man’s 
nature. Indeed it is telling that Rousseau chose to quote Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui to illustrate 
the problem of natural right: 
It is ignorance of the Nature of man that throws so much uncertainty and obscurity on the 
true definition of natural right: for the idea of right, says M. Burlamaqui, and even more 
that of natural right are manifestly ideas relative to the Nature of man. It is therefore from 
this very Nature of man, he continues, from his constitution and his state, that the 
principles of that science must be deduced.
21
 
 
Rousseau quoted Burlamaqui almost word for word.
22
 Burlamaqui was the only modern natural 
law theorist to draw a sharp distinction between the nature of man as a regulative normative 
ideal to which any state should conform, and man’s primitive or original state prior to civil laws 
(which Burlamaqui did not refer to as the state of nature).
23
 Burlamaqui’s contribution to the 
natural law tradition was original to the extent that he maintained that man’s natural state 
provides the basis for both natural and political right. For neither Burlamaqui nor Rousseau was 
man’s nature marred by Original Sin, thus one could talk about man’s nature as a normative 
                                                 
18
  Rousseau, Second Discourse, CW3:42/ OC3:162-163. 
19
  ‘Il y a deux sortes de connaissances de l’homme, l’une générale et l’autre particulière.’ Nicole, ‘De la 
Connaissance de Soi-même’, Œuvres, pp. 39-40. 
20
  Charvet, for example, claims that Rousseau’s attempt to re-found society on nature ‘creates a paradox 
which lies at the centre of Rousseau’s ultimate incoherence.’ The Social Problem in Rousseau, p. 2. 
21
  Rousseau, Second Discourse, CW3:13/ OC3:124. 
22
  C.f. Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural Law, i.i.ii.32. 
23
  Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural Law, i.iv.ix.62-63, i.ix.xi.102, i.x.xv.112, ii.vi.ii.173. 
 64 
standard.
24
 Rousseau’s reference to Burlamaqui, then, may plausibly be read as a sign that he 
intended to follow Burlamaqui in his method of deducing natural right from the very nature of 
man.
25
 Even if Rousseau would pursue this approach to conclusions quite contrary to those of 
Burlamaqui, Hobbes and other natural law theorists, it is important to stress that Rousseau did 
not reject the method of deriving natural right from an examination of man’s nature. 
The reason to stress this point is that Rousseau’s relationship to the natural law tradition 
is much disputed. C.E. Vaughan famously claimed that Rousseau ‘sweeps away the idea of 
Natural Law, root and branch… It is therefore the clearest proof both of his speculative genius 
and of his intellectual honesty that he should have decisively rejected it.’
26
 By contrast, Robert 
Derathé sought to locate Rousseau’s thought firmly in the tradition of natural law,
27
 and 
although such an approach has occasioned some criticism,
28
 Helena Rosenblatt has been 
foremost in demonstrating the importance of the natural law context for understanding the 
Second Discourse.
29
 
Rousseau’s critique of natural law was certainly far reaching, implicating all those who 
had attempted to go back to the state of nature but failed to arrive there. Yet it is important to 
realise that Rousseau did not reject the approach of the natural law theorists tout court.
30
 
Rousseau’s objection to his predecessors was not that they were wrong to start with an 
examination of the nature of man but rather that they had failed in those examinations. For 
Rousseau, reason was dormant in natural man, thus he objected to all those who had 
endeavoured to ground natural law on reason and profound metaphysics; rather, for the 
principles of natural right to be natural at all, they must be discoverable prior to the 
development of man’s reason. This move may be interpreted as an outright rejection of natural 
law,
31
 yet it is imperative to recognise that Rousseau still attempted to establish principles of 
natural right through an examination of the nature of man.
32
 
                                                 
24
  For Rousseau, see most explicitly the Letter to Beaumont, CW9:29-31/ OC4:937-939. By the 
eighteenth-century Genevan Calvinism was optimistic about human nature, with many ministers 
relegating the dogma of Original Sin and subscribing to a theological anthropology that stressed man’s 
free will and capacity for virtue – a context in which Burlamaqui’s and Rousseau’s positions appear less 
controversial than might otherwise be expected. See Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva, pp. 11-17, 175-
176. 
25
  More generally see Douglass, ‘Rousseau’s Debt to Burlamaqui’. 
26
  Vaughan, ‘Rousseau as Political Philosopher’, pp. 16-17. 
27
  Derathé, Rousseau et la Science Politique, especially pp. 151-171. 
28
  For discussion and criticism of both Vaughan and Derathé see Viroli, Rousseau and the ‘well-ordered 
society’, pp. 134-148; Wokler, ‘Natural Law and Rousseau’s political thought’. 
29
  Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva, pp. 88-177. Rosenblatt provides arguably the best account of 
Rousseau’s relationship to the natural law tradition – to which the present analysis is much indebted – but 
she does not consider Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes in any detail. 
30
  On this point see Silvestrini, ‘Rousseau, Pufendorf and the natural law tradition’, pp. 295-301. 
31
  Wokler, ‘Natural Law and Rousseau’s political thought’, pp. 326-327; or, at least, that Rousseau 
‘ordinarily rejected natural law,’ Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy, p. 121. 
32
  Rousseau’s relationship to the natural law tradition is further complicated by the fact that he never 
distinguished clearly between natural right (droit naturel) and natural law (loi naturelle), and often used 
the two interchangeably. Indeed the distinction between the two in French was not as pronounced as it 
was in English where, for example, Hobbes had claimed that right and law are as inconsistent as 
obligation and liberty, Leviathan, p. 91. Rousseau did not, however, use right in the Hobbesian sense. 
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The state of nature and the state of war 
 
The natural law tradition is prominent in the early stages of the Second Discourse and much of 
Rousseau’s response to Hobbes is located in this context while considering the nature of man in 
general. In the Preface, Rousseau claimed that for natural law to be natural at all it must be 
known by nature’s voice, thus by reflecting on ‘the first and simplest operations of the human 
Soul’ he discovered 
two principles anterior to reason, of which one interests us ardently in our well-being and 
our self-preservation, and the other inspires in us a natural repugnance to see any sensitive 
Being perish or suffer, principally those like ourselves.
33
 
 
Similarly, in the Epistle Dedicatory to De Cive, Hobbes had sought to ground his theory on ‘two 
absolutely certain postulates of human nature’: human greed and the avoidance of violent 
death.
34
 Rousseau would have agreed with the latter of Hobbes’s principles, but insisted on 
man’s pity against the postulate of human greed. Indeed there is good reason to think that 
Rousseau might have had Hobbes in mind when formulating his two principles. Later Rousseau 
confirmed that ‘Hobbes saw very clearly the defect of all modern definitions of Natural right’.
35
 
That is, unlike ‘our Jurists’, Hobbes started from the principle of individual self-preservation, a 
principle that is innate in all beings and requires neither reason nor reflection to be discerned. 
According to Rousseau, Hobbes’s mistake was only in the conclusions that he deduced from this 
principle.
36
 One of the reasons that Hobbes went wrong was that he ascribed to natural man a 
need to satisfy a multitude of passions that are only the product of society. In the place of those 
artificial passions, Rousseau insisted on the force of pity (pitié), which Hobbes had neglected. 
Pity, or compassion, is the sole natural virtue, which tempers the ardour natural man has ‘for his 
own well-being by an innate repugnance to see his fellow suffer.’
37
 These aspects of Rousseau’s 
critique will be discussed further,
38
 yet at present it suffices to highlight that from the outset 
Rousseau’s two principles may well have been formulated with Hobbes in mind. The first 
                                                                                                                                               
Rousseau employed natural right in an objective sense (pertaining to a given state of affairs) rather than a 
subjective sense (pertaining to an individual). 
33
  Rousseau, Second Discourse, CW3:14-15/ OC3:125. Later Rousseau would revise his position slightly 
by claiming that pity is actually a modification of amour de soi-même (as are all passions), Emile, 
CW13:374-375/ OC4:505-506. 
34
  Hobbes, De Cive, Cam.6/ Par.85.  
35
  C.f. Hobbes, De Cive, II.1, Cam.32-34/ Par.101-103. 
36
  Rousseau, Second Discourse, CW3:35/ OC3:153. The ‘jurists’ that Rousseau had in mind could have 
included Grotius, Pufendorf, Cumberland, Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui; i.e. those modern natural law 
theorists who set their theories out in opposition to Hobbes. To be sure, Hobbes had described man’s fear 
of death as a postulate of natural reason. However, this can be read as a principle from which reason 
derives the laws of nature, rather than a principle discerned by reason. Rousseau appears to have read 
Hobbes’s principle of self-preservation this way as he claimed that Hobbes, unlike the jurists, realised that 
natural man does not reason.   
37
  Rousseau, Second Discourse, CW3:36/ OC3:154. See also the State of War, where Rousseau described 
pity as part of ‘natural law…engraved in men’s heart in indelible characters and that it is there that it 
speaks more strongly than do all the Precepts of Philosophers’, CW11:65/ OC3:602. 
38
  See below, ‘Natural goodness and the recovery of the golden age’. 
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principle for deducing the rules of natural right, self-preservation, was strictly Hobbesian. The 
second principle, however, was set out in opposition to Hobbes, as it tempers man’s self interest 
and makes him a compassionate being disinclined to fight or harm others.  
Rousseau immediately proceeded to claim that from these two principles all of the rules 
of natural right follow without introducing the principle of sociability. By denying that 
sociability was necessary for determining natural right, Rousseau denied the very principle that 
distinguished Pufendorf from Hobbes, to which the likes of Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui, the 
philosophes and the Genevan authorities all deferred. Richard Tuck has rightly pointed out that 
at this stage Rousseau drew an important contrast between his theory of natural right and those 
of the theorists of natural sociability, most notably Pufendorf. By jettisoning sociability, 
Rousseau might appear to be returning to a more Hobbesian starting point.
39
 This is certainly 
accurate, but it only tells half of the story. Rousseau’s insistence on pity as a natural principle 
was intended to distance his account from pure Hobbesian self-preservation and Pufendorfian 
sociability. Rousseau’s staring point might have resembled Hobbes’s more than Pufendorf’s, but 
the principle of pity was directed against both. 
As early as the Preface, then, Rousseau sought to collapse the very bifurcation between 
Hobbes and the theorists of sociability that had become so entrenched in eighteenth-century 
French thought. The denial of sociability from the outset was a remarkable and highly polemical 
move that would lead to accusations of Hobbism. Yet, far from simply siding with Hobbes, 
Rousseau rejected the principle of sociability to clear the ground for a new critique that would 
implicate both Hobbes and the theorists of sociability. 
This approach is pursued in Part One of the Second Discourse where Rousseau 
examined natural man’s physical condition, the purpose of which was to show that man is 
neither naturally dependent on others nor driven to conflict and ultimately a state of war by his 
primitive desires and needs. Rousseau stated that ‘Hobbes claims than man is naturally intrepid 
and seeks only to attack and fight.’ At this point readers who were familiar with the natural law 
treatises of Pufendorf and Burlamaqui might have expected Rousseau to continue with a 
refutation of Hobbes’s alleged slander against human nature. Yet Rousseau only mentioned 
Hobbes in passing; rather the whole section on the physical natural attributes of man seems to 
have been reserved to contest the contrary assertion that ‘nothing is so timid as man in the state 
of Nature, and that he is always trembling at the slightest noise he hears, at the slightest 
movement he perceives.’
40
 Rousseau attributed this opinion to Pufendorf, Cumberland and an 
‘illustrious Philosopher’.
41
 Assuming the ‘illustrious philosopher’ represented Montesquieu, it is 
well to note that the three theorists that Rousseau cited had all set out their own accounts of 
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  Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, pp. 198-199; ‘Pitié’, Lectures. On Rousseau’s critique of 
sociability see also Kapossy, Iselin contra Rousseau, pp. 207-222. 
40
  For all of the following references to Rousseau’s discussion of the physical side of natural man, see the 
Second Discourse, CW3:20-25/ OC3:134-141. 
41
  Pufendorf himself associated his opinion with that of Cumberland, see Law of Nature and Nations, 
ii.i.vii.100-101; see also Cumberland, Philosophical Enquiry into the Laws of Nature, I.27, p. 362.  
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man’s natural condition in opposition to Hobbes.
42
 
Of those who claimed that man is naturally weak, Pufendorf appears to have been 
Rousseau’s main target.
43
 Pufendorf had argued that man’s weakness requires that he live with 
law and that without law man would be a ‘wretched Creature… A mute and ignoble Animal.’ 
Rousseau’s account of the physical side of natural man was largely concerned with refuting the 
idea that man is naturally weak, and in doing so he contested the main arguments that are to be 
found in Pufendorf’s summary of the nature of man living without laws as formulated in the 
final section of Book II, Chapter I, Of the Law of Nature and Nations.
44
 This is well illustrated 
by drawing attention to the four most serious arguments that Rousseau dealt with, which taken 
together comprise the best part of his account of the physical side of natural man. 
First, Pufendorf claimed that natural man would be uneducated, having no knowledge 
except that generated from his natural abilities, to which Rousseau responded that this would 
have actually been to his advantage as the ‘savage man’s body being the only implement he 
knows, he employs it for various uses of which, through lack of training, our bodies are 
incapable’. Second, Pufendorf insisted that man would struggle to avoid dying from hunger, 
only being able to feed himself from shrubs and gathered fruit and only drinking from rivers and 
springs. Rousseau simply retorted that this would be more than sufficient with the natural 
fertility and lack of scarcity that characterised natural man’s condition: ‘I see him satisfying his 
hunger under an oak, quenching his thirst at the first Stream, finding his bed at the foot of the 
same tree that furnished his meal; and therewith all his needs are satisfied.’ Third, Pufendorf 
depicted natural man as being helpless before wild beasts that would devour him. To this 
Rousseau rejoined that even if not stronger, natural man is more agile than any other species, 
and that this is all but irrelevant as wild animals rarely attack men. Finally, Pufendorf stressed 
the threat of the cold and the insecurity of man stumbling around living in caves, to which 
Rousseau was at his most cynical in maintaining that such alleged necessities were superfluous 
for natural man’s survival: ‘it is clear in any case that the first man who made himself clothing 
or a Dwelling, in doing so gave himself things that were hardly necessary’.  
Rousseau provided a historicised account of the state of nature that was at odds with 
those set forth by Hobbes and Pufendorf. In doing so he drew on a variety of sources, many of 
them ancient, even if supported with anthropological evidence taken from travellers’ reports or 
                                                 
42
  Montesquieu is identified as the ‘illustrious Philosopher’ by Scott, ‘The Theodicy of the Second 
Discourse’, p. 702. See also Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, I.2, p. 6. 
43
  For more comprehensive analyses of Rousseau’s response to Pufendorf see Wokler, ‘Rousseau’s 
Pufendorf’; Kapossy, Iselin contra Rousseau, pp. 211-218; Silvestrini, ‘Rousseau, Pufendorf and the 
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Pufendorf only developed this argument in the Law of Nature and Nations, iv.x.iv.419-420. 
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  All references to Pufendorf in this paragraph and the next, which should be compared with the 
aforementioned section in the Second Discourse, are to the Law of Nature and Nations, ii.i.viii.101.  See 
also Duty of Man, i.iii.iii.53-54. 
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from Buffon’s Natural History.
45
 This is evident in Rousseau’s depiction of the physical side of 
natural man, which bears a striking resemblance to Lucretius’s portrayal of the first men who 
roamed the earth, ‘wide-wandering like wild beasts’.
46
 This resemblance was not missed by 
Rousseau’s contemporaries, with Jean de Castillon quoting extensively from Lucretius’s poem 
to reveal the Epicureanism of Rousseau’s account.
47
 In addition Castillon noted that Rousseau’s 
natural man was evil like Hobbes’s,
48
 but the association with Hobbes was more forcefully 
insisted upon by Jean-Bertrand Castel. Castel recognised that Rousseau had set his system out in 
opposition to Hobbes, yet he claimed that Rousseau had in fact surpassed his predecessor by 
stripping natural man of all moral qualities.
49
 
At this point it is worth recalling that Barbeyrac had aligned Hobbes with Epicurus in 
contradistinction to Pufendorfian sociability. Given that Rousseau employed an Epicurean 
account of man to refute Pufendorf, there is some reason to view him as siding with Hobbes 
over Pufendorf. Indeed Richard Tuck draws on Castel and Castillon, amongst other sources, in 
support of his Hobbesian reading of Rousseau.
50
 Yet Rousseau thought that his contemporaries 
had misunderstood his work and his account should by no means be taken as an endorsement of 
Hobbes’s position, for he rather sought to collapse Barbeyrac’s bifurcation and realign 
Pufendorf’s account of the state of nature with Hobbes’s. 
Examination of Rousseau’s account of natural man reveals that he perceived 
Pufendorf’s rendering of man’s natural state as one of weakness to be just as erroneous as 
Hobbes’s conception of the state of nature as a war of all against all. Moreover, both accounts 
were accompanied by equally pernicious implications, which Rousseau thought imperative to 
contest. In the chapter following his description of man’s miserable condition without civil laws, 
Pufendorf proceeded to examine the natural state of man, setting out his account in opposition 
to Hobbes. Pufendorf had insisted from the outset that a ‘common or universal War engaging all 
Mankind at the same time, is an impossible Supposition; this being a direct Consequence of the 
State of Beasts,’ and thus he formally renounced the Hobbesian account of a state of war.
51
  
Whilst Pufendorf officially rejected the Hobbesian state of war, a tension remained with 
his depiction of man’s state without civil laws, as he admitted the prevalence of the very 
passions that led to conflict between men in Hobbes’s state of nature, and ended up portraying a 
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virtually identical condition.
52
 Similarly, when Pufendorf turned to examine the causes that 
induced men to establish civil society, he once again appeared to be telling a very Hobbesian 
story, supporting his argument with examples taken directly from Hobbes, noting that people 
sleep with closed doors for fear of thieves and arm themselves against bandits when travelling.
53
  
Rousseau set out his account of the physical side of natural man against Pufendorf 
precisely because Pufendorf’s account was so Hobbesian. By averring that man was naturally 
weak, Pufendorf had reached the same conclusions as Hobbes had by insisting that man was 
naturally intrepid; in each case man’s natural condition was wretched, disordered, and rife with 
a level of conflict that could only be remedied by a civil sovereign. The principle of sociability 
could thus be dismissed as, contra Barbeyrac, it failed to distinguish Pufendorf from Hobbes.
54
 
Not only did Rousseau’s depiction of Pufendorf’s account of natural man draw attention to 
important theoretical resemblances with Hobbes that Barbeyrac had sought to occlude,
55
 it also 
spoke to the Genevan controversies of the 1750s. 
The Second Discourse was dedicated to the Republic of Geneva and contemporary 
Genevans would not have missed the salience of Rousseau’s refutation of Pufendorf. The 
Genevan patriciate, to which Rousseau was firmly opposed, frequently invoked the theories of 
Pufendorf, Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui, whilst officially repudiating Hobbes’s ideas. The 
arguments that they proposed however – especially concerning their pessimistic description of 
man in the state of nature – were, in fact, very Hobbesian.
56
 To demonstrate that the modern 
natural law theorists and therewith the patriciate were no better than Hobbes, then, would have 
been a move of great polemical weight and political consequence at the time. 
Even if Rousseau’s account of the physical side of natural man was set out primarily 
against Pufendorf, the reason for doing so was because of the Hobbesian connotations there 
implied. The bifurcation that Barbeyrac had set up between the natural law theorists of 
sociability and Hobbes could be collapsed because, for Rousseau, the question of whether or not 
man is naturally sociable was not of primary importance. Rousseau was, first and foremost, 
concerned with whether the state of nature was peaceful or miserable, for, as will be seen, only 
if the state of nature provided a negative standard could Hobbesian accounts of the social pact 
and sovereignty be justified. 
That Rousseau was centrally concerned with refuting the idea that man’s natural condition 
was one of war may be further attested by a brief consideration of his unpublished work the 
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State of War, which was set out directly against Hobbes.
57
 The work appears to be 
contemporaneous with the Second Discourse, even though there is some uncertainty concerning 
the precise dates of its composition. The following passage seems to be an explicit reference to 
the Second Discourse, suggesting that it was written after the composition of the Discourse: 
I have already said it and I cannot repeat it too much that the error of Hobbes and of the 
philosophers is to confute natural man with the men they have before their eyes, and to 
transport into one system a being who can continue to exist only in a different one.
58
 
 
The notes to the Second Discourse, however, suggest that at least a draft of the State of War was 
already then complete, as Rousseau wrote that he would ‘not repeat here what I have said about 
war’.
59
 None of his prior publications addressed the topic of war, and it seems safe to assume 
that he had the State of War in mind, perhaps expecting that it would soon be published. A 
similarly indicative, but by no means conclusive, reference to the work can be dated from 
March 1758, when Rousseau appears to have referred to it in a letter to his publisher.
60
 Whilst 
the evidence for a precise dating remains inconclusive, these references, along with the largely 
overlapping themes, suggest that both the State of War and the Second Discourse existed in draft 
at the same time. Indeed it is likely that Rousseau was working on the State of War for some 
time during the mid-1750s. 
In the State of War Rousseau considered ‘the horrible system of Hobbes’ and was at his 
most vehement in denying ‘the insane system of natural war of each against all’. Summarising 
the arguments of the Second Discourse, Rousseau reiterated that natural man’s well being is 
confined ‘to what is physically necessary’ and that consequently man is naturally inclined 
towards peace.
61
 In De Cive Hobbes defined war as ‘that time in which the will to contend by 
force is made sufficiently known by words or actions’.
62
 Rousseau conceded that in the state of 
nature individuals might occasionally have to use force to defend themselves and that they have 
the right to do so. Natural man, however, would have no inclination to use force and as 
Rousseau defined war as ‘a permanent state which assumes constant relations,’ the state of war 
would not occur.
63
 To be sure, Rousseau realised that Hobbes’s argument was not based on a 
natural inclination to harm others but rather ‘founded on the inevitable competition of the right 
of each to all things’,
64
 yet Rousseau denied that such competition was natural to man and 
instead insisted that man’s primitive desires would rarely draw him into conflict with others, 
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thus natural man would neither have nor recognise in others a will to contend by force. The state 
of war, on Rousseau’s definition, consisted in a constant and manifest will to destroy one’s 
enemy, which could not be derived from the right of self-preservation in the state of nature. The 
right to self-preservation, according to Rousseau, only entailed the right to defend oneself and 
not the right to wage constant relations of war aimed at the destruction of an adversary. 
Even if much of Rousseau’s argument in the State of War recast that of the Second 
Discourse, there are two important differences, at least of emphasis, that merit attention. One is 
that Rousseau added the twist that there could never be a genuine war between private 
individuals as war only obtains between public persons;
65
 hence suggesting that Hobbes’s 
natural man was really modelled on a state all along.
66
 More significantly, however, Rousseau 
made more explicit why it was so important to show that the state of nature was not a state of 
war. Towards the end of the State of War, Rousseau asserted that ‘the rights of society, being 
founded upon those of nature, are not able to annihilate them’.
67
 Similarly, in the Second 
Discourse, Rousseau appears to have referred to the longer work he had planned on Political 
Institutions (from which the Social Contract was extracted), in which he ‘would weigh the 
advantages and inconveniences of all Governments relative to the Rights of the state of 
Nature’.
68
 Rousseau’s political thought would be based on the rights of nature and it was 
imperative to demonstrate that those rights did not entail the rights of war, for it was only on 
such grounds that the likes of Grotius and Hobbes were able to legitimise slavery.
69
 
One purpose of Rousseau’s critique of both Hobbes and his modern natural law critics 
in the Second Discourse and the State of War, then, was to show that natural man’s physical 
attributes did not lead to a miserable condition, be it one of weakness or aggression. Moreover, 
as the state of nature would not have originally been one of war, the rights of war could not be 
derived from man’s natural condition. This served to undermine the basis from which other 
thinkers had developed their justification of sovereignty and the social order. Both Hobbes and 
Pufendorf presented man’s natural condition as wretched, from which the necessity of civil 
sovereignty and positive laws arose. By rejecting the accuracy of their depictions of this state 
the rest of their theories were left open to question. Yet Rousseau’s state of nature theory also 
presented a model of the good life for man, which would inform his philosophy more generally. 
Before exploring this aspect of Rousseau’s theory, however, it is worth first considering his 
account of the metaphysical and moral side of man. 
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Free will and man’s moral nature 
 
To demonstrate that the state of nature was not a state of war, Rousseau only had to consider 
that which he termed the physical side of natural man. Natural man, when viewed this way, 
lived a primitive life barely distinguishable from the beasts. To determine what was distinctively 
human in man he must be viewed from another perspective. To this end Rousseau turned to 
consider man from his ‘Metaphysical and Moral side’ and in so doing introduced a distinction 
between the physical and moral that would permeate his thought.
70
 Rousseau might well have 
been in disagreement with Pufendorf concerning the physical side of natural man, yet the two 
were in greater accord when examining the moral side of man; indeed there is evidence to 
suggest that Rousseau may well have adopted Pufendorf’s criticisms of Hobbes’s account of the 
nature of man as set forth in Book I, Chapter IV, Of the Law of Nature and Nations. 
Pufendorf’s most comprehensive discussion of man’s will and its relationship with moral 
actions was formulated primarily in opposition to Hobbes, with both De Homine and Leviathan 
targeted. Pufendorf began by claiming that the will can exert itself either spontaneously or freely, 
and that ‘Liberty is a Faculty of the Will,’ which adds something to spontaneity. The will’s acts 
of choice and refusal are not necessitated; liberty adds ‘Freedom of Determination… upon an 
internal Impulse’.
71
 As for Hobbes, the appetite or aversion that man has for certain objects does 
not depend on the will, yet, contra Hobbes, it does not eliminate the will’s freedom to determine 
itself to any external act. For Pufendorf, man’s freedom consisted simply in the inner impulse 
that he has when he chooses or rejects, as is well summarised in his Duty of Man, in a passage 
that foreshadows Rousseau’s discussion of free will in the Second Discourse: 
The other Faculty, which does peculiarly distinguish Men from Brutes, is called the Will; by 
which, as with an internal Impulse, Man moves himself to Action, and chuses that which 
best pleases him; and rejects that which seems unfit for him. Man therefore has thus much 
from his Will: First, that he has a Power to act willingly, that is, he is not determin’d by any 
intrinsick Necessity to do this or that, but is himself the Author of his own Actions: Next, 
that he has a Power to act freely, that is, upon the Proposal of one Object, he may act or not 
act, and either entertain or reject; or if divers Objects are propos’d, he may chuse one and 
refuse the rest.
72
 
 
For Pufendorf, man’s free will was necessary to demarcate the sphere of moral actions. Moral 
actions are voluntary actions, which ‘depend on human Will as on a free Cause, that without its 
Determination… they would never have been perform’d’. A voluntary action requires two 
things: a material cause depending on the motion of a naturally existing power and a formal 
cause, that is, ‘the Dependence of the Will, as on a Cause that is truly free, and acts by its own 
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Resolution.’
73
 Pufendorf insisted on free will against Hobbes to allow the realm of moral 
entities to be undetermined by the physical world, as he held that neither morality nor 
responsibility could be preserved if everything was physically determined.
74
 
Pufendorf’s criticisms of Hobbes anticipate the account of free will that Rousseau 
would expound in the Second Discourse, yet these could also have been mediated to Rousseau 
via Burlamaqui’s Principles of Natural Law. Burlamaqui considered that Pufendorf had 
successfully repudiated Hobbes’s materialism and established man’s freedom. Following 
Barbeyrac’s editions of Pufendorf closely, Burlamaqui maintained that voluntary actions could 
be imputed to man because he is endowed with free will, thus this freedom provided the 
foundation for all morality.
75
 
Burlamaqui emphasised that which he took to be the distinction that Pufendorf had 
drawn between man’s physical and moral side. For Burlamaqui, however, actions were 
distinguished into those that are merely corporeal or physical and those that emanate from the 
soul and are purely spiritual. All voluntary actions are in the latter class, originating in the soul, 
‘as they are produced and directed by those noble faculties with which man has been enriched 
by his Creator’; those faculties being liberty, will and understanding.
76
 Burlamaqui surpassed 
Pufendorf in the emphasis he placed on the inward sense of liberty, which he thought to be 
wrongly contested by those that subjected it to a purely metaphysical light.
77
 Whilst the details 
of Burlamaqui’s account of free will might have been borrowed from Pufendorf, the language 
that he employed and the spiritual emphasis added indicate that he may have been an influential 
precursor for Rousseau’s discussion.  
Turning then to the Second Discourse, when Rousseau considered the metaphysical and 
moral side of man he commenced by claiming that man is distinguished from the beasts as he 
‘contributes to his operations by being a free agent. The former chooses or rejects by instinct 
and the latter by an act of freedom’.
78
 Man’s freedom consists in his consciousness of being free 
to acquiesce in or resist the commands of nature. What is more, this freedom is of a spiritual 
quality and cannot be reduced to the laws of mechanics or physics: 
For Physics explains in some ways the mechanism of the senses and the formation of ideas; 
but in the power of willing, or rather of choosing, and in the sentiment of this power are 
found only purely spiritual acts about which the Laws of Mechanics explain nothing.
79
 
 
It is well to stress the importance of free will at this stage as the significance of its introduction 
in the Second Discourse is a point of some contention. Following Leo Strauss and Roger 
Masters, much scholarship has insisted that Rousseau actually denied the significance of man’s 
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free will straight after introducing it by replacing the concept with perfectibility.
80
 Timothy 
O’Hagan’s valuable analysis of the Strauss-Masters thesis has gone some way to refuting this 
claim, although he too accepts that the remainder of the argument in the Second Discourse relies 
on man’s perfectibility rather than his free will.
81
 O’Hagan views this as an olive branch to the 
materialists and locates the discussion of free will in the context of the thought of the 
Encyclopédie, and it has elsewhere been suggested that Rousseau’s remark that man is not just a 
machine reveals that he had La Mettrie in mind.
82
 
In his discussion of free will Rousseau was silent over who he had in his sights and did 
not indicate whether or not he was following anyone else’s account (which was fairly typical for 
Rousseau).
83
 La Mettrie had argued against Descartes that man, as well as the animals, is only a 
machine, and in this context Rousseau’s claim that man’s free will reveals him to be more than a 
machine could be viewed as restating the Cartesian argument in response to La Mettrie. What is 
more, Rousseau’s assertion that physics is unable to explain the power of willing could also be 
read against La Mettrie’s insistence that only physicians have the right to speak on the subject of 
man.
84
 
Whilst it is certainly possible that Rousseau had La Mettrie in mind, the precise 
language that Rousseau employed more closely resembled Burlamaqui’s discussion of free will. 
Burlamaqui stressed the introspective and spiritual knowledge by which free will is known and 
stated that it is man’s soul that distinguishes him from the beasts, which ‘finds itself at liberty to 
act or not to act,’
85
 a claim echoed by Rousseau’s insistence that it is not man’s understanding as 
much as his being a free agent that sets him apart from animals.
86
 Burlamaqui, in turn, owed his 
account of man’s free will to Barbeyrac’s edition of Pufendorf. A considerable amount of the 
first part of the Second Discourse is concerned with addressing issues central to the modern 
natural law tradition, and Rousseau’s definition and discussion of man’s freedom is neither 
particularly original nor controversial when read in this context. 
Given the limited evidence, it is difficult to conclude decisively whether or not 
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Rousseau’s discussion of free will was influenced by Pufendorf and Burlamaqui, or La Mettrie, 
or all three. Nonetheless, given Rousseau’s concerns throughout the early stages of the Second 
Discourse and the resemblances between his arguments and Burlamaqui’s, it is at least plausible 
to read Rousseau as having followed the Pufendorfian criticisms of Hobbes by insisting that the 
nature of man has to be considered in terms of both his physical and moral attributes. Whether 
Rousseau intentionally introduced his discussion of man’s free will against Hobbes would be 
hard to prove either way.
87
 What is clear is that Pufendorf explicitly introduced his claims about 
freedom in direct opposition to Hobbes, and there is evidence to suggest that Rousseau followed 
Burlamaqui in adopting this element of Pufendorf’s argument. It can tentatively be concluded, 
therefore, that Rousseau’s first discussion of free will appeared in this anti-Hobbesian context. 
Locating the discussion of man’s free will in the natural law context indicates that rather 
than intervening in a controversial debate with the materialism of the philosophes,
88
 Rousseau 
was simply following those who opposed Hobbes by maintaining that free will had to be 
admitted to render man a moral being. Pufendorf’s engagement with Hobbes structured this 
debate and, even if Rousseau’s insistence on free will was only indirectly formulated against 
Hobbes, the importance the concept played in demarcating a moral sphere in contradistinction to 
a purely physical sphere (associated with Hobbes) cannot be understated. Rousseau would insist 
on the inalienability of man’s freedom throughout his political thought, frequently against both 
Hobbes and other natural law theorists.  
It is worth reiterating that the importance of free will for Pufendorf and his followers 
was to make sense of moral as opposed to physical actions. Man’s freedom provided a 
normative basis which was employed in opposition to Hobbes, and this became increasingly 
pronounced in the French and especially Genevan contexts. For Burlamaqui, free will was 
essential to man’s nature thus he declared that ‘Man cannot absolutely, and without any manner 
of reserve, renounce his liberty’.
89
 Similarly, in his most explicit contribution to natural law (an 
article implicitly targeting Hobbes), Diderot claimed that if man is not free then ‘there could be 
no moral good or evil, no justice or injustice, neither obligation nor right.’
90
 In his earlier 
Encyclopédie article (largely indebted to Pufendorf), ‘Political Authority’, Diderot had likewise 
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remarked that man’s freedom ‘is a gift from heaven’.
91
 
At the time Rousseau wrote the Second Discourse it was not uncommon to follow 
Pufendorf in averring, against Hobbes, that man’s free will separated moral from purely 
physical actions, and with Rousseau man’s free will was most explicitly elevated to the status of 
a gift from nature that would remain essential for rendering any form of social body legitimate. 
This is evident in Part Two of the Second Discourse, where Rousseau discussed illegitimate 
contracts and stressed the inalienability of ‘the essential Gifts of Nature, such as life and 
freedom’, maintaining that freedom is ‘the most noble of man’s faculties… a gift they receive 
from Nature by being men’. To be consistent this freedom could only be free will as it is only 
free will and perfectibility that distinguish man from animal, and the latter is in no sense a 
freedom. Hence to renounce one’s freedom would be ‘putting oneself on the level of Beasts 
enslaved by instinct, even offending the Author of one’s being’.
92
 
This gives an indication of the importance of man’s free will for Rousseau, and it also 
illustrates how he would insist on its preservation against both Hobbes and the natural law 
theorists. Indeed Rousseau’s assertion that man’s freedom is an inalienable gift of nature was set 
out in direct opposition to Pufendorf, who ‘says that just as one transfers his goods to another by 
conventions and Contracts, one can also divest himself of his freedom in favour of someone 
else.’
93
 Hobbes also appears to have been an implicit target at this stage, as Rousseau attacked 
the ‘odious System’ of a contract that would only obligate one of the parties and where the 
sovereign is not subject to the laws of his state.
94
 The full significance of free will and the 
distinction between moral and physical force would only be realised in the Social Contract, 
however, where Rousseau would turn his insistence on the inalienability of freedom back on 
both Hobbes and the other modern natural law theorists, echoing the charges against their 
illegitimate contracts that he first levelled in the Second Discourse and offering a radically 
different account of the social pact. 
Even with respect to the Second Discourse, however, it is imperative to stress the 
importance of free will.  One of the reasons that Rousseau was never to abandon nature was that 
much of his political thought was concerned with the problem of preserving man’s inalienable 
gifts of nature in political society. For Hobbes, man is a mechanical being, composed of one 
principle, matter in motion. Underpinning the laws of nature and the principles of civil 
association there is similarly one principle, self-preservation. For Rousseau, there is both a 
physical and a moral dimension to man; he is not just a mechanical being as he also has free will. 
Underpinning the principles of civil association for him, then, are two principles, or two 
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inalienable gifts of nature: man’s freedom and man’s life. Nothing is more crucial for 
appreciating the extent of both Rousseau’s agreement with and departure from Hobbes than the 
centrality of man’s freedom for his entire philosophy. According to Rousseau, freedom was a 
gift of nature, for free will separates man from the animals, makes him a moral being and is the 
source of his spirituality. Just as any form of social pact that deprived man of his life would 
clearly be illegitimate, for Rousseau, any form of social pact that divested man of his freedom 
would prove equally so. 
 
Natural goodness and the recovery of the golden age 
 
In considering the physical and moral side of natural man the modern natural law tradition has 
been of foremost significance. Yet this context was by no means the only one that shaped the 
arguments of the Second Discourse. One of the most important contemporary intellectual 
debates was that which Rousseau addressed in the First Discourse. There he argued that the 
progress of the sciences and arts in society is always accompanied by the growth of luxury, 
which together lead to the corruption of morals and virtue. This launched him into the heart of 
one of the most contentious debates in early eighteenth-century French (and European) thought, 
concerning whether the development of luxury should be considered as beneficial or damaging 
for societies. 
Perhaps the most important of Rousseau’s interlocutors in this debate was Jean-François 
Melon, whose work was widely read and may be taken as representative of the doux commerce 
theorists in general. Melon argued for the benefits of luxury for a state, insisting that it is to be 
found in any well governed society as it destroys idleness and leads men to perform their 
duties.
95
 There are two particular aspects of the argument that are worth drawing attention to 
presently, as they indicate the deep opposition between the views concerning luxury held by 
Melon and Rousseau. The first is that Melon stressed that societies only move away from 
savagery to the extent that they procure general commodities.
96
 Melon’s argument rested on the 
assumption that the state of man’s existence prior to the development of commerce was a 
miserable one that needed to be remedied. The second point of importance is that Melon was 
well aware that the advance of luxury leads to great inequality, but he deemed this to be 
advantageous to states and considered that ‘equality amongst men is a chimera that can hardly 
give birth to an ideal Republic’.
97
 
Rousseau wrote that Melon was the first to publish ‘these odious maxims, which tend 
only to destroy and debase virtue’, and considered himself to be the only one in the century to 
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combat them.
98
 In the years between his first two discourses, Rousseau spent much time 
defending and developing his position against the many criticisms that the First Discourse 
provoked, which he regarded as being based on the same mistaken assumption as Melon’s 
defence of commerce and luxury. In replying to his critics, Rousseau developed themes that 
would only be fully explored in the Second Discourse, in which he would respond to both the 
doux commerce and natural law theorists at the same time.
99
 
It is in this context, where doux commerce and natural law theory meet, that Rousseau’s 
principle of the natural goodness of man should be situated. Many scholars have noted that 
Rousseau set out his principle of natural goodness in opposition to Hobbes.
100
 This is certainly 
true of the Second Discourse, where Rousseau’s account of natural man builds up to the remark 
‘let us not conclude with Hobbes that because man has no idea of goodness he is naturally 
evil.’
101
 Yet it is important to recognise that Rousseau developed his principle of natural 
goodness prior to the Second Discourse. In a note towards the beginning of that work Rousseau 
felt already able to state that ‘man is naturally good; I believe I have demonstrated it.’
102
 For this 
demonstration one has to turn to the replies that Rousseau gave to the critics of the First 
Discourse, where he first elucidated, albeit gradually, his all important principle.
103 
 
The critics of the First Discourse sought to defend luxury and show that the arts and 
sciences were necessary for the cultivation and civilization of man, releasing him from his 
otherwise barbaric and miserable condition and making him fit for society and moral life. 
Without entering into the details of these critiques, it is worth highlighting the fact that many of 
them rested on the assumption that man is naturally evil and that the sciences and arts were 
necessary to draw man out of this deplorable condition; the premise implicit in Melon’s 
theory.
104
 Rousseau was well aware of how much of the argument between himself and his 
critics turned on man’s natural condition and, in what he at the time intended to be his final 
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reply to those critics, he sought primarily to refute the doctrine that man is naturally evil.
105
  
The question of man’s natural goodness, in the form it took between Rousseau and his 
critics, might seem somewhat removed from the concerns of the Second Discourse. Yet, for 
Rousseau, the relationship between inequality, luxury and the sciences and arts was intrinsically 
connected with the genealogy of man’s evil and vice: 
The first source of evil is inequality. From inequality came wealth, for those words poor and 
rich are relative, and everywhere that men are equal, there are neither rich nor poor. From 
wealth are born luxury and idleness. From luxury comes the fine Arts and from idleness the 
sciences.
106
 
 
If man was naturally evil then the development of luxury and the perfection of the arts and 
sciences could be thought to make man sociable and allow for a stable social order, whereas if 
man was naturally good then the sciences and arts may be deemed responsible for the vices and 
inequality that flourish in modern society. Between the first two discourses, Rousseau was 
drawn to realise that the idea that man is naturally evil not only underlay many of the defences 
of commerce and luxury but also the very justifications of the social order that Rousseau 
thought so illegitimate. Just as Pufendorf had relied on a Hobbesian depiction of natural man to 
justify his political theory, so too Rousseau’s critics relied on a Hobbesian depiction of natural 
man to justify their defences of luxury, the arts and sciences. The mistake made in each case by 
the natural law and doux commerce theorists was the same: they had failed to understand the 
nature of man’s condition prior to the development of the arts and commercial society. The point 
at which the natural law and doux commerce contexts converged in Rousseau’s thought may 
even be indicated with some precision. In his refutation of the First Discourse and defence of 
modern society, Claude-Nicolas Lecat added a note in which he addressed the question ‘What is 
understood by natural law?’ and proceeded to conclude: 
Thus, when it is commonly said this principle, do to another only what you would want him 
to do to you, is a natural law, it is understood that this is the first consequence that reason 
has drawn from its reflections and experience, the first principle finally of the science of 
natural morality, of the morality established independently of the enlightenment of 
revelation; but this morality is truly one of those arts, one of those sciences to which I have 
attributed the fortunate revolution achieved in humankind.
107
 
 
Lecat argued that only by being educated in the science of morality could man’s evil be 
prevented and this note clearly caught Rousseau’s attention. Rousseau wrote a short letter in 
response to the refutation in 1752, but his full reply was not developed until the Second 
Discourse. Having denied that the principles of natural right are established by reason and that 
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the arts and sciences were necessary for natural law to have force, Rousseau offered an 
alternative principle of natural right that appears to have been set out in direct response to Lecat: 
Instead of that sublime maxim of reasoned justice, Do unto others as you would have them 
do unto you, [pity] inspires all Men with this other maxim of natural goodness, much less 
perfect but perhaps more useful than the preceding one: Do what is good for you with the 
least possible harm to others. In a word, it is this Natural feeling, rather than in subtle 
arguments, that we must seek the cause of the repugnance every man would feel in doing 
evil, even independently of the maxims of education.
108
 
 
Rousseau formulated his maxim of natural goodness by insisting on the force of pity, which he 
considered to be the ‘sole Natural virtue that the most excessive detractor of human virtues was 
forced to recognise.’
109
 The detractor in question was Bernard Mandeville, to whom Rousseau’s 
conception of pity was greatly indebted.
110
 Indeed the main distinction between Mandeville and 
Rousseau, as Rousseau was well aware, was not concerning the natural force of pity but rather 
over whether or not it should be considered as a virtue.
111
 According to Mandeville, pity was the 
counterfeit of the virtue of charity,
112
 as on his definition virtue required rationality and self-
denial, whereas pity was derived from man’s self-love.
113
 Echoing Pierre Nicole, Mandeville 
claimed that self-love remained a vice even if its effects imitated those of charity. When 
Rousseau criticised Mandeville, then, it was less due to his psychology of man and more due to 
his definition of virtue. On Rousseau’s account, pity was a natural virtue and the source of all 
social virtues precisely because virtue need not require the denial of natural inclination. By 
repudiating Original Sin, Rousseau obviated the necessary antithesis between natural inclination 
and virtue that man’s post-lapsarian state presupposed.
114
 
It is worth dwelling further on Rousseau’s relationship to Mandeville as their 
genealogies of modern society were largely in agreement. To be sure, Mandeville thought that 
the notion of natural goodness was ‘meerly Chimerical’,
115
 but this was directed against 
Shaftesbury’s idea of natural sociable virtue, and both Mandeville and Rousseau denied the 
more prevalent interpretation of natural sociability. Rousseau would also have concurred with 
Mandeville’s view that man’s vices provided the origin of (at least commercial) society, and that 
the precepts of morality and civil law were developed by cunning politicians to reap benefits 
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from those they governed.
116
 Similarly, Rousseau’s claim that modern commercial society leads 
men to live outside of themselves, always pretending to be something they are not, would have 
been easily conceded by Mandeville, who considered that ‘it is impossible we could be sociable 
Creatures without Hypocrisy.’
117
 The two thinkers agreed on the consequences of luxury for 
society and morality, and were only divided over whether or not this should be considered as in 
the public benefit.
118
 As Adam Smith soon appreciated, the difference between Mandeville and 
Rousseau, which represented one of the central issues in the eighteenth-century debate over 
commerce, was not concerning the details of the effects of luxury on society, but only whether 
these effects should be deemed beneficial or corrosive.
119
 In large part, the evaluation of the 
consequences rested on the starting point with which they were compared, which is why the 
question concerning man’s pre-civilized state was of such great importance for both Rousseau 
and his adversaries. 
Rousseau only mentioned Mandeville briefly and eschewed any acknowledgement of 
the deeper similarities between their theories. Rather he used a conception of pity adopted from 
Mandeville to counter both the doux commerce theorists and Hobbes together, by showing that 
this natural virtue serves to refute the idea that man is evil and his natural condition wretched. 
Rousseau’s discussion of pity occurred towards the end of the first part of the Second Discourse, 
following his claim that we should not conclude with Hobbes that man is naturally evil. The 
critics of the First Discourse would have been well aware that Rousseau was thereby 
associating their positions with that of Hobbes. Not only would this undermine their positions, 
given the odious reputation that Hobbes’s name carried, but it also implicitly underlined their 
hypocrisy, as some of those critics had made a point of emphasising the perniciousness of 
Hobbes’s principles.
120
 
Rousseau’s invocation of Hobbes clearly served a polemical purpose, yet this should not 
detract from recognising the philosophical depth of his critique. Rousseau did not only invoke 
Hobbes to draw attention to the hypocrisy of his adversaries, but also because they really did 
rest their arguments on fundamentally Hobbesian premises concerning the nature of man that 
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genuinely needed to be confuted if the true principles of both natural and political right were to 
be established. By historicising the passions that Hobbes thought natural to man, Rousseau 
recreated a space in man’s genealogy for the golden age, which would serve as a model of the 
good life throughout his thought. 
Given his assertion that Hobbes thought that man is naturally evil, Rousseau’s 
understanding of Hobbes might be considered as superficial or even derived predominantly 
from secondary commentators.
121
 Hobbes had quite explicitly stated that men are not evil by 
nature, and made the point (which Rousseau would later echo) that the passions that arise from 
nature are not evil in themselves.
122
 However, Rousseau appears to have paid close attention to 
the very page of De Cive on which Hobbes claimed that man is not naturally evil, as he 
proceeded quite accurately to clarify that Hobbes thought the evil man to be like a robust child, 
against which he argued that to be dependent and robust are contradictory suppositions in the 
state of nature.
123
 Dependency is a result of man’s weakness, whereas to be robust man must be 
independent. Moreover, the passions that Hobbes thought could be excused as arising from 
nature, were ones that Rousseau deemed not natural at all, rather their development is part of the 
story by which man becomes evil by abusing his natural faculties. When Rousseau claimed that 
Hobbes’s man was evil, then, he was neither simply deferring to the prevalent view nor 
misreading Hobbes. Rather on Rousseau’s account and definition, even if not on Hobbes’s, the 
passions that Hobbes attributed to natural man were ones that rendered man evil. 
The view that Hobbes had misattributed social passions to natural man was by no means 
unique to Rousseau, with both Barbeyrac and Montesquieu having levelled similar charges 
against Hobbes and Pufendorf. However, it is only with Rousseau that the critique was fully 
developed by charting the rise of the passions that Hobbes had thought natural within a detailed 
account of man’s genealogy. Amongst French commentators it was widely regarded that Hobbes 
derived the laws of nature from man’s amour-propre, and it was at least true to Sorbière’s 
French translation of De Cive that Hobbes considered all societies to develop from this 
passion.
124
 The passions that Hobbes attributed to natural man were ones associated with man’s 
inflamed amour-propre,
125
 and Rousseau criticised Hobbes not only for failing to recognise that 
this level of amour-propre was not natural to man, but also for not appreciating that pity tempers 
the ardour of amour-propre in its earliest stages. In a note to his criticism of Hobbes, Rousseau 
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elucidated what he took to be the true nature of the passion: 
Amour-propre and amour de soi-même, two passions very different in their Natures and 
their effects, must not be confused. Amour de soi-même is a natural sentiment which 
inclines every animal to watch over its own preservation, and which, directed in man by 
reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Amour-propre is only a relative 
sentiment, artificial and born in Society, which inclines each individual to have greater 
esteem for himself than for anyone else, inspires in men all the harm they do to one another, 
and is the true source of honour… in our primitive state, in the genuine state of Nature, 
amour-propre does not exist
126
 
 
This passage is of great significance as it is the first time that Rousseau articulated the 
difference between amour de soi-même and amour-propre, a distinction that proves pivotal for 
understanding a great deal of his thought and the psychology of which he would fully expound 
later in Emile. Rousseau first explicated this distinction in direct response to Hobbes and for the 
very purpose of refuting him.
127
 Hobbes was right to start from man’s self-love, but he had 
failed to appreciate the distinction between amour de soi-même and amour-propre, and for this 
reason rendered man’s natural state wretched. 
To understand how natural man developed towards both the golden age and the state that 
Hobbes depicted, the development of pity and amour-propre needs to be charted. In the Second 
Discourse Rousseau claimed that pity is a principle of natural right anterior to reason, which 
precedes all reflection and can be discerned even in animals. This definition appears 
problematical, however, when read alongside Rousseau’s posthumously published Essay on the 
Origin of Languages – which he described as a fragment to the Second Discourse – in which he 
stated that 
Pity, although natural to the heart of man, would remain eternally inactive without the 
imagination that puts it into play. How do we let ourselves be moved to pity? By 
transporting ourselves with the suffering being. We suffer only as much as we judge he 
suffers; it is not in ourselves, it is in him that we suffer. Consider how much this transport 
presupposes acquired knowledge! How could I imagine evils of which I have no idea? How 
would I suffer in seeing someone else suffer if I do not even know that he is suffering, if I 
do not know what he and I have in common? He who has never reflected cannot be clement, 
or just, or pitying – no more than he can be wicked and vindictive. He who imagines 
nothing feels only himself; he is alone in the midst of mankind.
128
 
 
The contradiction between the two works appears irresolvable; in one Rousseau claims that pity 
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precedes in man the use of all reflection, whereas in the other reflection is necessary for pity to 
become active.
129
 The important point for considering the psychological development of man in 
relation to Hobbes, however, is simply that pity precedes amour-propre.
130
 For man’s pity to be 
active he has to identify with others (man or beast) only as sentient beings like himself, from 
this alone he develops a natural repugnance to seeing them suffer. However, the level of 
identification required for amour-propre to develop is much greater, as this passion only forms 
once man begins to reason and to consider the advantage to be had in the opinion held of him by 
others. Pity alone, Rousseau claimed, contributes to the mutual preservation of the species and 
‘takes the place of Laws, morals, and virtue’ before amour-propre even begins to develop.
131
 
Once amour-propre does become active the result is still far from a Hobbesian state of 
war. This is because as amour-propre begins to develop, its ardour is assuaged by pity, which by 
this stage is in full force. Man begins to unite with others as chance circumstances draw him 
into more frequent intercourse with those around him. As others act in the same way as he 
would himself, experience teaches him that ‘love of well-being is the sole motive of human 
actions’ and the common interest thereby perceived leads men to unite together in herds.
132
 Over 
time this leads to the first revolution in man’s existence when families were established, which 
later formed into small societies where morality and the duties of civility first developed. 
Rousseau deemed that, on reflection, this stage in man’s genealogy must have been ‘the best for 
man’, where pity, although altered, remained fully active ‘maintaining a golden mean between 
the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our amour-propre, [this] must 
have been the happiest and most durable epoch.’
133
 
 Hobbes, according to Rousseau, had only presented the petulant effects of man’s 
amour-propre and failed to recognise that in its earliest stages it is tempered by pity. This was 
no small omission, for the golden age of man’s existence was precisely that stage when amour-
propre was active yet assuaged by pity. Amongst Rousseau scholars, amour-propre was long 
thought to be a purely negative passion, but following Nicholas Dent’s seminal analysis it is 
now widely recognised to have the potential to be directed either towards virtue or vice.
134
 This 
is usually supported by reference to Emile, where Rousseau wrote that amour-propre is 
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‘naturally neutral.’
135
 Yet it is worth stressing that even as early as the Second Discourse amour-
propre could have positive manifestations;
136
 so far from being a solely negative passion, the 
golden age for man could only occur once amour-propre had become active.  
By historicising the passions that Hobbes had attributed to natural man, Rousseau was 
able to recreate a space in man’s genealogy for the golden age. This is the time when pity 
tempered man’s amour-propre and men lived a simple and harmonious life, ‘content with their 
rustic huts’ before the great revolution in man’s state brought about by the development of 
agriculture and metallurgy.
137
 Again, it is worth noting that the critics of Rousseau’s First 
Discourse, deferring to a Hobbesian picture of natural man, had ridiculed such a possibility: 
It is a long time since the chimera of the golden age has been abandoned: that everywhere 
barbarism preceded the establishment of societies is a truth proven by the annals of all 
peoples. Everywhere, needs and crimes forced men to unite, to impose laws on themselves, 
to surround themselves with walls.
138
 
 
Rousseau was not quite alone amongst his contemporaries in eulogizing the simple life of the 
golden age against those who extolled the benefits of luxury. It is to be found, for instance, in 
the portrayal of Bétique in François de Fénelon’s Telemachus (one of Rousseau’s favourite 
books).
139
 Yet Fénelon’s account remained fictitious and could still be read as the sort of 
chimera depicted by Rousseau’s critics. Rousseau, however, was the first to revive the idea of 
the golden age and incorporate it into a genealogy of man that could be used against those that 
deemed the state of nature – or society prior to commerce, arts and science – as barbaric and 
miserable. Michel de Montaigne may have also proved an important source for Rousseau’s 
recovery of the golden age. In a note to the First Discourse Rousseau had drawn on 
Montaigne’s ‘On the Cannibals’ to argue that the savages of America lived a life more perfect 
than that which could have been enjoyed under the laws of Plato,
140
 and what Montaigne said of 
Plato and Lycurgus, Rousseau might well have said of Hobbes, Pufendorf and the doux 
commerce theorists: 
They could not even imagine a state of nature so simple and so pure as the one we have 
learned about from experience; they could not even believe that societies of men could be 
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maintained with so little artifice, so little in the way of human solder.
141
 
 
Harmony, contradiction and the Hobbesian moment 
 
Rousseau’s depiction of the golden age may have aimed to refute the state of nature theories 
employed by his adversaries, yet the role it plays in his wider thought is not immediately 
evident. Rousseau was adamant that civilized man could never return to such a state, and even if 
his critics accepted that the golden age might not have been a chimera, they could have still 
dismissed it as an anachronism. Indeed at the beginning of the Geneva Manuscript, in a chapter 
omitted from the final version of the Social Contract, Rousseau wrote that ‘the happy life of the 
golden age was always a state foreign to the human race.’ This is not because such a state never 
existed, but rather because when it did exist man was not enlightened enough to recognise it as a 
golden age, and now that man is enlightened he is prevented from ever enjoying such a simple 
state.
142
 Perhaps more seriously, however, there is also a question concerning the internal 
consistency of Rousseau’s account, as he exemplified his principle of natural goodness amongst 
the isolated monads in Part One of the Second Discourse, but then presented social, tribal 
societies at the beginning of Part Two as the golden age for man.
143
 
To allay these concerns, Rousseau’s principle of natural goodness must be considered 
further by addressing the questions of why goodness was exemplified in natural man and how 
the golden age relates to natural goodness. For Rousseau, one of the greatest evils that man 
could experience was contradiction, either from conflicting internal passions and inclinations, or 
between his internal desires and his external condition. For man to be happy and lead a good life 
he must possess unity both within himself and with his external surroundings, thereby enjoying 
a harmonious existence. This is a recurrent theme throughout Rousseau’s thought, but is most 
explicitly set out in an unpublished fragment on the public happiness: 
What causes human misery is the contradiction between our conditions and our desires, 
between our duties and inclinations, between nature and social institutions, between the man 
and the citizen. Make man united and you will make him as happy as he can be. Give him 
entirely to the state or leave him entirely to himself; but if you divide his heart, you tear him 
to pieces.
144
 
 
Man, as portrayed in the most primitive state of nature, lived a life of goodness, happy in his 
solitary existence. Natural man lived alone and with limited resources, yet he nevertheless 
enjoyed ‘original happiness’. This is precisely due to the ease with which his primitive wants 
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could be satisfied as his ‘desires [did] not exceed his physical needs.’
145
 Living predominantly 
by himself, natural man was united, neither drawn into contradiction internally nor externally.
146
 
All that he required could easily be obtained and his primitive desires were so few that they 
would have rarely come into conflict with each other. Moreover, he had no natural inclination to 
harm others and was compassionate; he would sooner avoid another man than harm him. 
Rousseau’s conception of natural goodness was pre-moral, as the goodness of natural man 
pertained to the simplicity of his physical condition and passions. His moral faculties were yet 
to develop and the harmony that man enjoyed in his most primitive state was in part due to the 
fact that his moral side lay dormant and would not come into conflict with his physical side. 
When Rousseau stated that man is naturally good, then, he simply meant that there is nothing 
inherent in man’s nature that causes conflict either within himself or with others. The first 
movements of nature are always good and right.
147
 
Even if the most primitive state exemplified man’s natural goodness, he could still live 
in conformity with nature in more developed states. As man becomes a moral being his desires 
and needs change and thus the external conditions must alter if they are to be satisfied. 
Rousseau considered the golden age to be one in which man’s desires were still limited to 
simple needs and where compassion and the sweet sentiments of conjugal and patrimonial love 
bound individuals together. Although these passions developed in the family, it was only in the 
slightly larger societies of the golden age that the state was least subject to revolutions and 
would have been the best for man. In this golden age man lived a harmonious existence and to 
the extent that his life was free from contradiction he lived in accordance with nature.  
Nature would serve as a normative standard throughout Rousseau’s thought and he was 
more concerned with the polarity between living in accordance or contradiction with nature, 
than that between nature and society or artifice.
148
 To be sure, Rousseau frequently employed 
nature in a descriptive sense, referring to a pre-civilized natural man and the state of nature, 
which owed much to his predecessors in the natural law tradition such as Hobbes and Pufendorf. 
Yet Rousseau also referred to the ‘Gifts of Nature’ and maintained that what is good and just is 
so in accordance with nature; an understanding of nature as a normative standard that, amongst 
his immediate predecessors at least, more closely resembled Burlamaqui.
149
 For man’s life to be 
in accordance with nature he must enjoy an ordered and harmonious existence without 
alienating his gifts of nature: his life and freedom. This understanding of nature as a normative 
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standard was not only applicable to man’s original state, thus a legitimate body politic would 
also have to be in accordance with nature. As Rousseau wrote in Emile, one ‘must not confound 
what is natural in the savage state with what is natural in the civil state.’
150
 
The golden age, then, provided a model of the good life for Rousseau as it was in 
accordance with nature. This is not a state that could ever be regained, but one that presents an 
ideal of a unified and harmonious existence where man is free from contradiction. The good life, 
for civilized man, would only be possible if such harmony could be restored in the ideal body 
politic. To do so the contradictions that develop through man’s socialisation as delineated in the 
remainder of the Second Discourse would have to be remedied. It is worth turning to those 
contradictions presently, with the model of natural goodness outlined, to consider man’s fall 
from the golden age and whether, and if so why, Rousseau had recourse to a Hobbesian moment 
in his genealogy of modern society. 
According to Rousseau, the great revolutions of agriculture and metallurgy drew men 
out from the golden age and led to the successive development of many other arts and therewith 
inequality of fortunes. At this stage ‘amour-propre [was] aroused’, as not just physical abilities 
but also qualities of mind and beauty became esteemed and were sought after. All men needed 
the help of others to survive, and in this new state of entrenched interdependence a man’s worth 
was only the opinion that others had of him. Thus to ‘be and to seem to be became two 
altogether different things’, and from this distinction followed all of the vices.
151
 
For Rousseau, amour-propre became inflamed and a source of vice when it led man to be 
drawn into contradiction, concerned with his reputation before all else. Where the savage man 
lived inside of himself, the sociable man, ‘always outside of himself, knows how to live only in 
the opinion of others; and it is, so to speak, from their judgment alone that he draws the 
sentiment of his own existence.’
152
 It is only when man lives in the opinion of others that he 
becomes deceitful, jealous and vicious, as he is concerned with his own standing amongst others 
yet wants to attain this with the least possible inconvenience to himself. Rousseau was at his 
most vehement about these ill effects in his earliest discussion of amour-propre: 
Thus it is a very marvellous thing to have made it impossible for men to live among 
themselves without being prejudiced against, supplanting, deceiving, betraying, mutually 
destroying each other! Henceforth we must beware of letting ourselves be seen as we are: 
for two men whose interests agree, a hundred thousand can be opposed to them, and there is 
in this case no other means to succeed than to deceive or ruin all these people. This is the 
deadly source of violence, treachery, perfidy, and all the horrors necessarily demanded by a 
state of things in which each – pretending to work for the fortune and reputation of the 
others – seeks only to raise his own above them and at their expense.
153
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The problem with the perfection of the arts and onset of commercial society is one of 
contradiction, as each man’s interests conflict with those of others around him. In pursuing his 
own good man must pretend to be doing otherwise. To this extent he is torn in two directions 
and a contradiction emerges between his natural amour de soi-même and his socially acquired 
amour-propre; satisfying one does not satisfy the other, thus man’s very existence is divided. 
Amour-propre is only an evil, then, when it leads to man living outside of himself, when his 
interests conflict with the reputation that he desires from others, hence rendering the satisfaction 
of his amour de soi-même and amour-propre in constant opposition. To restore unity to 
socialised man he would have to live in a state where his amour de soi-même and amour-propre 
did not drive him in opposite directions and where the harmony between the two passions could 
be restored.
154
 
Man’s natural goodness comprises his harmonious existence and man only becomes evil 
as he develops passions associated with inflamed amour-propre. These ‘factitious passions’, 
according to Rousseau, ‘have no true foundation in Nature.’
155
 It is at this point in Rousseau’s 
genealogy that there appears to be a Hobbesian moment, where ‘the unbridled passions of all, 
stifling natural pity and the as yet weak voice of justice, made men avaricious, ambitious, and 
evil’, from which ‘the most horrible state of war’ ensued.
156
 There is one sense in which 
Rousseau’s account is very Hobbesian, for war is only a result of man’s unrestrained passions 
that develop from his amour-propre. What is more, Rousseau stated that this development ‘has 
been in appearance so many steps toward the perfection of the individual, and in fact towards 
the decrepitude of the species.’
157
 So far from being the individualistic dream,
158
 then, the decay 
of the species in the Second Discourse is actually a result of the same causes that led to the state 
of war in Hobbes’s theory: the onset of amour-propre and the pursuit of rampant individualism. 
This being said, the differences between Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s accounts are more telling 
than the similarities. Most significantly, Rousseau considered that the state of war could only 
develop once equality had been destroyed. The inflamed passions that Hobbes attributed to 
natural man were, on Rousseau’s account, only the consequence of entrenched inequality and 
they could never have been aroused in a state of equality.
159
 
As far as Rousseau did have recourse to a Hobbesian moment, then, it was for the very 
purpose of demonstrating the illegitimacy of societies justified from a Hobbesian state of war. 
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Rousseau considered that it was only by illustrating the horror of this situation that the rich were 
able to convince others to unite into society and establish laws, as all men ‘ran to meet their 
chains believing they ensured their freedom.’
160
 The establishment of such societies 
gave new fetters to the weak and new forces to the rich, destroyed natural freedom for all 
time, established forever the Law of property and inequality, changed a clever usurpation 
into an irrevocable right, and for the profit of a few ambitious men henceforth subjected the 
whole human Race to work, servitude, and misery.
161
 
 
Rousseau maintained that once inequality had become rife amongst men the only political 
bodies to form would have been the result of the rich and powerful deceiving the weak. Far 
from this being legitimate, as it arose from a state of war, the purpose of Rousseau’s genealogy 
was to reveal just how far removed the preceding state of inequality was from man’s original 
condition. The Hobbesian story of the origin of society and its rationale was one where force 
prevailed and men were led to debase themselves by alienating their gifts of nature. Rousseau’s 
genealogy, then, served the purpose of critique, exposing the prevailing justifications of political 
order and inequality as illegitimate. The point that Rousseau would make repeatedly against 
Hobbes and those who followed him was that society cannot be justified solely by its ability to 
provide for preservation and sustain peace. Such a justification would only be valid if man’s 
natural state was really one of nascent inequality where unbridled passions led to perpetual 
conflict. This, however, was not the case. Before the onset of inflamed amour-propre and 
unrestrained individualism, man lived a harmonious life in which he was not forced to alienate 
his gifts of nature. It is this vision of the golden age and not the Hobbesian state of war against 
which, according to Rousseau, all political states must be measured.
162
 
 
Rousseau’s critique, reappraised 
 
Having examined Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbes in the Second Discourse in some depth, 
the problems raised at the beginning of the chapter may now be addressed. To recap: first, 
Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes appears to have missed the mark given the different purposes the 
state of nature served in their respective theories. Second, as Rousseau had recourse to a 
Hobbesian moment in the Second Discourse the salience of his critique seems, in some respects 
at least, to be undermined. The latter of these two concerns may be passed over briefly. From 
the foregoing discussion it should be evident that Rousseau employed a Hobbesian moment in 
his story to show why societies justified against a state of conflict were illegitimate, thus 
countering one stand of the Hobbesian justification. The more interesting point of resemblance 
is that both Hobbes and Rousseau viewed such conflict as being a result of inflamed amour-
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propre, the passions thereby aroused and the pursuit of individualism. Yet where for Hobbes 
such passions led to conflict amongst men living in equality together without civil law, for 
Rousseau the passions were only the result of the transformed social relations brought about by 
the development of inequality. 
A subject of greater debate, however, is the degree to which Rousseau’s critique speaks 
to Hobbes’s theory, if it does so at all. There seems to be some consensus that Rousseau 
completely missed the point of Hobbes’s account of the state of nature.
163
 As one commentator 
recently put it, ‘Rousseau’s criticism of Hobbes fails as a matter of apples and oranges’; they 
were simply talking about very different things.
164
 To some extent this view is accurate. Hobbes 
certainly did not provide an account of man’s primitive nature; rather he claimed that there is a 
need to view the commonwealth as taken apart, ‘to understand correctly what human nature is 
like’.
165
 Human nature, viewed this way, is just the nature of socialised man abstracted from 
society; indeed much of the evidence that Hobbes adduced in support of his view of human 
nature was drawn from the behaviour of men in civil society, such as the famous examples of 
people sleeping with closed doors for fear of thieves and arming themselves against bandits 
when travelling.
166
 To the extent that Hobbes’s state of nature theory was concerned solely with 
depicting the miserable condition that men would fall back into without a sovereign,
167
 
Rousseau’s critique may have missed the mark – knowledge of primitive man is irrelevant for 
such a purpose; all that needs to be known is the nature of man living in civil society. 
This view of Hobbes’s philosophy, however, is inadequate, or at least incomplete. Whilst 
it goes without saying that Hobbes was centrally concerned with portraying the condition of 
men living together without the force of civil law, this was by no means his sole purpose. 
Hobbes wanted to make civil philosophy a science, much like geometry,
168
 for which it was 
necessary to start with the nature of man. This is most evident in the opening lines of the 
Elements of Law, where Hobbes stated that 
THE true and perspicuous explication of the Elements of Laws, Natural and Politic, which is 
my present scope, dependeth upon the knowledge of what is human nature, what is a body 
politic, and what it is we call law.’
169
  
 
Similarly, in the Introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes stressed that it is not enough to know man in 
particular; rather the much harder task of knowing ‘Man-kind’ in general must be pursued.
170
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Even if Rousseau was not familiar with these remarks, Hobbes’s intentions are clear enough 
from De Cive, which is presented as the final section of his elements of philosophy.
171
 If 
Hobbes’s civil philosophy was to be a true science then it must rest on an accurate account of 
human nature, for this in turn would shape both the arguments concerning the state of nature 
and civil society. The importance of uncovering the true nature of man was as paramount for 
Hobbes as it was for Rousseau.  
Rousseau, quite justifiably, read Hobbes’s account of the state of nature as being an 
inference from the passions.
172
 To this end he argued that Hobbes had misconstrued the passions 
natural to man by failing to understand the development of amour-propre and pity. The success 
of Rousseau’s critique, however, is a matter of some contention. With respect to amour-propre, 
Richard Tuck argues that ‘Hobbes is really [Rousseau’s] major precursor, even if Rousseau was 
scarcely aware of this fact.’
173
 Tuck turns to the first part of the Elements of Law, where 
Hobbes’s theory of the passions was most clearly expounded, to demonstrate that Rousseau’s 
account of amour-propre closely resembled the political and moral dangers that Hobbes 
attributed to the pursuit of vain-glory. For Hobbes, man’s preoccupation with his own reputation 
and glory developed from the active use of his imagination, the same faculty that is instrumental 
in Rousseau’s account of the development of man’s socially acquired passions. Rousseau, not 
reading English, would have been unaware of the details of the first part of the Elements, and 
Tuck’s point is to illuminate the similarities between their theories of the passions, rather than to 
claim that Rousseau was actually indebted to Hobbes for his understanding of amour-propre.
174
 
These similarities, however, do not detract from the force of Rousseau’s critique. Rousseau 
acknowledged that Hobbes’s account of the passions of man was accurate with respect to men 
living in civil society, but denied that those passions were natural to man. It should not, 
therefore, be surprising that the later stages of Rousseau’s account of the development of 
amour-propre were largely in agreement with Hobbes’s general theory of man’s passions in the 
state of nature. What distinguishes the two is that Hobbes presented his theory as the inevitable 
and necessary result of men living together without a civil sovereign, whereas Rousseau 
depicted the negative manifestations of amour-propre as a decline from man’s golden age. 
Rousseau’s account of pity has also come under criticism for being of little force and 
ultimately falling back into Hobbesian self-preservation.
175
 Similarly Tuck argues that, for 
Rousseau, pity was meant to be a minimal principle set out against the developed accounts of 
sociability of the natural law theorists following Pufendorf. In this respect Rousseau resembled 
Hobbes (and even Grotius), to all of whom Tuck attributes the principle of minimal natural 
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sociability.
176
 Hobbes had not countenanced natural men doing whatever they pleased, but only 
that which they judged necessary for their own preservation. On Tuck’s reading, then, 
Rousseau’s principle of natural right derived from pity, ‘Do what is good for you with the least 
possible harm to others’,
177
 might not seem all that far removed from Hobbes’s laws of nature. 
Tuck is certainly right to draw attention to the affinities between the two thinkers concerning the 
question of sociability, yet this is not the reason that Rousseau insisted on pity against Hobbes. 
Rousseau claimed that as men begin to live together in settled communities their pity proves of 
greater force than their amour-propre, to the extent that pity tempers the ardour of amour-propre 
in its earliest manifestations. Hobbes’s state of nature, on the contrary, is one where amour-
propre (or the pursuit of vain-glory) is so rife that it stifles all other passions.
178
 It is the way in 
which amour-propre and pity interact that is all important here. What Hobbes failed to recognise, 
according to Rousseau, was that amour-propre is not naturally inflamed and when tempered by 
pity the resulting condition, so far from being a state of war, would have been a golden age for 
man. 
There are two interrelated reasons why Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes does not simply 
miss the mark. The first is that having a true idea of the nature of man matters because of the 
importance of the state of nature in each of their theories. Hobbes presented a stark dichotomy 
between war and peace. Lasting peace could only be attained with undivided and uncontested 
sovereignty. The alternative of the state of nature, given the passions of man, would necessarily 
be one of war. Michael Oakeshott captured the predicament well when he wrote that, for 
Hobbes, there ‘is a radical conflict between the nature of man and the natural condition of 
mankind’.
179
 The purpose of sovereignty, in turn, was to bring conflict – or war – to an end, for 
which men’s passions must be redirected in order to ensure peace. The state of nature thus 
served as a negative standard against which sovereignty could be justified. According to 
Rousseau, such a justification of sovereignty was no more than a trick that the rich and powerful 
played on the weak and poor. If man is depicted at his worst then even despotism might appear 
legitimate. Hobbes was wrong to postulate radical conflict in the state of nature, rather in the 
most primitive form of existence man lived a life of goodness, in harmony with nature. This was 
equally true of some of the earliest forms of social relations, which would have proved to be a 
golden age, even if man at the time was scarcely able to recognise it as such. By rediscovering 
the golden age in the genealogy of modern society, Hobbes’s dichotomy of war or peace could 
be repudiated as man could have enjoyed a harmonious existence prior to the instigation of civil 
sovereignty. This harmonious existence provided a positive standard against which any 
legitimate civil society should be measured. Where Hobbes had lowered the bar, Rousseau 
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sought to raise it again.
180
 
The second reason why Rousseau’s critique should be taken seriously is because it 
suggests the historically contingent status of Hobbes’s natural man.
181
 Hobbes’s theory of the 
passions was largely constitutive of his account of human nature. Rousseau’s sought to show 
that, like all philosophers of the time, Hobbes had only provided a historically contingent 
account of man that was not natural at all. Hobbes had only studied men, not man: 
The great flaw of the Europeans is always to philosophize about the origin of things 
according to what happens around them… When one wishes to study men, one has to look 
close by, but in order to study man, one has to learn to cast one’s eyes far off; first one has 
to observe the differences in order to discover the properties.
182
 
 
These criticisms do not detract from Hobbes’s state of nature theory if it is just read as 
portraying the conditions which men inevitably fall into when civil society breaks down. Yet 
Hobbes clearly intended his account of human nature to do more than this. Not only did he 
consider his account exemplified in the natives of America,
183
 he also intended his theory of 
human nature, or of man, to underpin his whole civil philosophy, which he claimed to have 
raised to the level of science. Rousseau’s point was that civil society as presented by Hobbes – 
and his account of human nature abstracted from society – is historically contingent and not true 
of man in all times and places.
184
 If Rousseau was right then Hobbes’s claim to have developed 
a science of civil philosophy is severely undermined, precisely because Hobbes aimed to ground 
his theory on general principles of human nature, not historically particular features of man’s 
present state. 
The most important aspect of Rousseau’s critique was his refutation of the passions that 
Hobbes thought natural to man, for it is by way of this refutation that he was able to insist on 
man’s natural goodness and recover the idea of the golden age as a model of the good life. Yet it 
was also imperative for Rousseau to present an account of the moral side of man constituted by 
the faculty of free will, which, even if indirectly, was developed against Hobbes. Man’s free will 
underpinned Rousseau’s all-important distinction between the moral and the physical, allowing 
him to stress the importance of freedom as a moral capacity which could not be impinged upon 
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by force, a physical capacity. This aspect of Rousseau’s account does not refute Hobbes’s theory, 
but rather illuminates how much both realised was at stake concerning the question of free will. 
Indeed in the prolonged controversy on the subject with Bishop Bramhall, Hobbes argued that 
the distinction between moral and physical force is absurd. Hobbes ridiculed Bramhall for 
claiming that man’s will is determined morally as opposed to physically, averring that ‘what it is 
to determine a thing morally, no man living understands’ and that ‘[m]oral motion is a mere 
word, without any imagination of the mind correspondent to it.’
185
 Conversely, for Rousseau, 
obligation and sovereignty could only ever be legitimate if they could be obtained while 
respecting man’s free will. The question of man’s free will, then, would prove of great 
consequence for shaping both thinkers’ accounts of sovereignty and of a legitimate social order. 
To some extent Rousseau’s critique was in keeping with the prevalent criticisms of 
Hobbes at the time. Rousseau’s remarks on free will, for example, resembled those that 
Pufendorf had developed against Hobbes, which had in turn been echoed by Diderot and 
Burlamaqui. Similarly, Rousseau’s refutation of the passions that Hobbes had attributed to 
natural man had been rehearsed by Barbeyrac and Montesquieu, although it was only with 
Rousseau that these passions were comprehensively historicised for the very purpose of refuting 
Hobbes. Rousseau did not, however, simply follow the likes of Pufendorf and the modern 
natural law theorists in their criticisms of Hobbes; such an explanation would fail to account for 
the extent to which their positions were also attacked in the Second Discourse. Yet it would be 
equally mistaken to view Rousseau as siding with Hobbes against those theorists, as, if this was 
the case, then Rousseau’s own criticisms of Hobbes would make little sense. To fully understand 
Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbes its deeply polemical character must be recognised. In the 
Second Discourse Rousseau sought to collapse the prevalent bifurcation between Hobbes and 
Pufendorf that had become so entrenched in eighteenth-century French thought. To do so was to 
reveal that both the natural law theorists of sociability and the doux commerce theorists were in 
fact indebted to a Hobbesian vision of man’s natural condition. Both parties carried great weight 
amongst the Genevan patriciate at the time and the Enlightenment philosophes, and to associate 
their positions with the odious reputation of Hobbes was not only to undermine their theories 
but also to underline their hypocrisy.  
 
                                                 
185
  Hobbes, The Question Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance [1656], EW5:188, 293. 
 96 
Sovereignty and Law 
 
To put law over man is a problem in politics which I compare to that of squaring 
the circle in geometry.
1
 
 
In a letter of 1767 to the French economist and Physiocrat, Victor Riqueti Marquis de Mirabeau, 
Rousseau remarked that the problem of putting the law above man was fundamental to politics. 
If this could not be achieved then man would have to be placed completely above the law; there 
could be no middle ground, for it is the conflict between man and law that throws the state into 
continual civil war. The choice for Rousseau, then, was the most austere democracy or the most 
perfect Hobbism.
2
 This concern was clearly still on Rousseau’s mind between 1771-1772 when 
he was working on the Considerations on the Government of Poland, where, omitting any 
mention of Hobbism or civil war, he reaffirmed that this was the fundamental problem of 
politics. Indeed the problem permeates many of Rousseau’s political writings but was most 
comprehensively explored in the Social Contract, which he later described as a work ‘so decried, 
but so necessary; [where] throughout you will see the Law put above men; throughout you will 
see liberty laid claim to, but always under the authority of the laws’.
3
 
In the Social Contract Rousseau sought to combine modern ideas on sovereignty 
employed by thinkers such as Bodin, Hobbes and Pufendorf, with the classical republican 
imperative of placing the law above men.
4
 This alone would have been an ambitious project, yet 
Rousseau was also faced with evading a plethora of criticisms that he had levelled at prevalent 
justifications of the social order in the Second Discourse. These were discussed in some detail in 
the previous chapter but for present purposes and by way of recapitulation two problems may be 
highlighted. The first concerns the alienation of man’s God-given gift of nature, his free will. 
Any legitimate social order, according to Rousseau, must be generated without man alienating 
his free will. The second problem concerns the status of nature as a normative standard. In 
modern societies man’s duties and inclinations, his amour de soi-même and amour-propre, have 
been rendered in constant opposition, thus man lives a life rife with contradiction. The harmony 
and order of nature have been lost. Man’s unity must be restored for the social body to be in 
accordance with nature; he must suffer neither internally from conflicting passions and 
inclinations nor from his interests being in contradiction with the external order of the body 
politic. 
The approach pursued in this chapter assumes that the problems from the Second 
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Discourse informed the argument of the Social Contract, yet whether there was any such 
continuity between the two works has in the past proved a matter of some contention.
5
 Even if 
the question appears to concern scholars less now, those who have more recently attempted to 
treat Rousseau’s corpus as a coherent whole have nonetheless struggled to reconcile the Social 
Contract with the principle of natural goodness adumbrated in the Discourse, hence it has been 
claimed that the theme of unity is absent from the Social Contract, which is instead argued from 
the position of Hobbesian self-preservation.
6
 Similarly, even in the most comprehensive 
explorations of Rousseau’s theory of freedom, the importance of free will for the argument of 
the Social Contract remains understated.
7
 
Rousseau was no doubt exaggerating when he asserted that everything ‘that is bold in 
the Social Contract was previously in the Discourse on Inequality’,
8
 but there is nonetheless 
some truth to his claim. The present analysis, then, examines the Social Contract in light of the 
foregoing discussion of the Second Discourse to bring out the continuity between the two works 
and in doing so further elucidates Rousseau’s relationship with Hobbes. Three aspects of this 
relationship are explored throughout the chapter, which for present purposes may be introduced 
separately although they are intertwined and analysed together as the chapter progresses. 
The first way in which the relationship is explored is by demonstrating the extent to 
which Rousseau’s political thought was concerned with problems of a fundamentally Hobbesian 
nature. This is most apparent when considering the chapter from the Geneva Manuscript entitled 
‘On the General Society of the Human Race’, which provides something of a bridge between 
the Second Discourse and the Social Contact. Therein Rousseau accepted that any legitimate 
political order would have to offer solutions to the problems posed by Hobbes’s state of nature 
theory. Indeed, like Hobbes, Rousseau maintained that it would be self-defeating for individuals 
to hold rights against the sovereign, and similarly argued that the will and judgement of the 
sovereign must be absolute and incontestable. More generally, both thinkers were concerned 
with the importance of establishing unity in the body politic and nowhere was this more evident 
than in Rousseau’s discussion of civil religion, where he identified Hobbes as the only thinker to 
have understood both the nature of the problem and its remedy. 
The other two ways in which the relationship between the thinkers is explored relate to 
the aforementioned problems concerning freedom and nature. Analysis of the Geneva 
Manuscript draws attention to the continuing importance of the natural law context for 
understanding the Social Contract, which upon publication was read as a contribution to debates 
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in modern natural law theory, with Rousseau’s contemporaries comparing it to the works of 
Grotius and Pufendorf.
9
 Pufendorf had criticised Hobbes by insisting on the importance of free 
will to make sense of obligation in contradistinction to coercion, and this criticism was adopted 
by many theorists following Pufendorf, including Rousseau. However, Rousseau thought that 
the accounts of sovereignty proposed by Hobbes’s natural law critics were equally inimical to 
man’s freedom. Much as he attacked Pufendorf and Hobbes in the Second Discourse, in the 
Social Contract Rousseau conflated the positions of Grotius and Hobbes to the same end; that of 
collapsing the prevalent bifurcation between Hobbes and the modern natural law theorists. 
Rousseau radically inverted the theories of sovereignty proposed by his predecessors by arguing 
that sovereignty could never legitimately be alienated from the people. This argument rested on 
Rousseau’s understanding of the will and the importance he attached to free will in rendering 
the social order legitimate. The significance of free will for the argument of the Social Contract 
is thus examined in some detail, as it was arguably their different positions on this concept, 
more than anything else, that distinguished the political thought of Hobbes and Rousseau. 
One respect in which nature proved important in the Social Contract follows from the 
significance of free will. For Rousseau, any legitimate social order would have to respect man’s 
free will, along with his life, as inalienable gifts of nature. Nature was also important, however, 
in setting Rousseau apart from charges of Hobbism. In much eighteenth-century French thought 
Hobbes was considered to have reduced justice to the will of a superior and to have abandoned 
natural law or nature as a normative standard. More recently, this reading of Hobbes informs the 
criticisms of some Straussian commentators, who have accused Rousseau of succumbing to 
Hobbesian positivism. Such readings, however, misconstrue Rousseau’s position. Although 
Rousseau thought that the social order had to be based on conventions, these would only be 
legitimate if in accordance with nature as a transcendent normative standard. Not only did a 
legitimate social pact have to preserve man’s inalienable gifts of nature, but for the social order 
to be in accordance with nature man would have to recover a harmonious existence free from 
contradiction. In political terms this involved reconciling man’s private will and general will. 
This project would ultimately prove beyond the scope of the Social Contract, even if Rousseau 
did indicate how it might be achieved in his discussion of the legislator’s role in denaturing 
citizens. 
The Social Contract was an incomplete text, at least in one important respect, as it was 
extracted from a larger projected work entitled Political Institutions. Given this it would be all 
the more remarkable if Rousseau had provided comprehensive solutions to the problems 
concerning free will and nature in the one work alone. This is not the case, and analysis of the 
Social Contract rather raises as many problems as it resolves, thus one purpose of this chapter is 
to elucidate the bearing of these problems, which are then discussed further in the following 
chapters. To understand how Rousseau thought a harmoniously ordered body politic could be 
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preserved in accordance with man’s freedom requires analysis of the ways in which the passions 
could be cultivated in political society; a theme that was only touched upon in the Social 
Contract. Far from providing a comprehensive reading of the Social Contract, a more selective 
approach is pursued presently, addressing the interpretative problems that best elucidate both 
Rousseau’s relationship to Hobbes and also the corollary themes of free will and nature that 
resonate throughout his œuvre. 
 
From the state of nature to political society 
 
In the Second Discourse Rousseau stated that the advantages and inconveniences of all states 
must be weighed ‘relative to the Rights of the state of Nature’.
10
 Beyond this claim, however, he 
offered little impression of what a legitimate social order might look like. The final version of 
the Social Contract is just as elusive in providing the connection between his account of the 
state of nature and his developed theory of political institutions, as therein Rousseau declined to 
discuss his state of nature theory elucidated previously. One way of providing a partial bridge is 
to turn to Book I, Chapter II of the Geneva Manuscript,
11
 the subject of which is that of ‘why 
the necessity for political institutions arises’,
12
 a question that Rousseau had addressed in the 
Second Discourse but barely considered at all in the Social Contract. The chapter consists of a 
response to Diderot’s Encyclopédie article ‘Natural Right’, which was eventually omitted from 
the final version of the Social Contract. Given that Rousseau had publically announced his 
break from Diderot in the preface to his Letter to d’Alembert in 1758,
13
 the chapter may have 
been removed for fear that it would be dismissed as a personal attack on a former friend. There 
is, however, no conclusive evidence indicating why the chapter was omitted and Rousseau 
might have simply deemed it of less relevance by 1762.  
In ’Natural Right’ Diderot responded to a violent interlocutor by claiming that there is a 
general will of the human race, which must be consulted on questions of justice.
14
 The aim of 
the short article was simply to define the difficult concept against the most commonly raised 
objections. Those objections, associated with Hobbes’s position, were raised by an interlocutor 
who Diderot assumed was already committed to taking reason as his standard and who would 
thus adhere to what it prescribes. Against the violent interlocutor, who thinks it is equitable to 
satisfy his violent passions as long as he allows others to do likewise, Diderot’s aim was simply 
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to make the general will known. Diderot denied the Hobbesian premise that it was equitable for 
individuals to be judges of justice and injustice, on the grounds that this would be to insist that 
others will that which one wills for oneself. Rather he claimed that questions of justice must be 
put before mankind by consulting the general will, which applies to all and is universally 
accessible by the simple use of man’s reason. 
It is a point of some contention whether or not Diderot’s argument in ‘Natural Right’ 
was aimed at Rousseau, or at least whether Rousseau thought that it was aimed at him. 
According to Robert Wokler, the article was simply directed at Hobbes and there is no reason to 
suppose that Rousseau would have thought the violent interlocutor referred to him.
15
 By contrast, 
in their editorial notes to the Geneva Manuscript, Roger Masters and Christopher Kelly claim 
that ‘Diderot intends the speech to represent Rousseau–and that Rousseau accepts the 
attribution’.
16
 Most recently, Richard Tuck has claimed that Rousseau might have felt threatened 
by Diderot’s article precisely because his own position was really so Hobbesian.
17
 
The interpretation of the Second Discourse advanced in the previous chapter would 
suggest that Wokler’s analysis is closest to the mark. Rousseau did not take the violent 
interlocutor to refer to himself but he did strongly object to the response that Diderot provided. 
The interlocutor should be understood as Hobbes, yet Rousseau thought that Diderot’s refutation 
of Hobbes was inadequate. Diderot’s argument was largely inspired by his reading of Pufendorf 
and Rousseau’s chapter, in turn, was predominantly set out in opposition to the type of 
arguments advanced by the natural law theorists of sociability, rather than against Hobbes. 
Diderot and Pufendorf were thus Rousseau’s main targets.
18
 The reason for this is that 
Rousseau’s starting point in the Geneva Manuscript was not the beginning of the Second 
Discourse – man’s primitive nature that Hobbes had failed to capture – but rather the point 
when man’s ‘desires finally encompass the whole of nature’ and political institutions become 
necessary.
19
  
This stage in man’s development, it should be noted, is not that which preceded the 
onset of the golden age in the Second Discourse, when man ‘found himself able to distinguish 
the rare occasions when common interest should make him count on the assistance of his 
fellows’.
20
 Instead Rousseau insisted that it ‘is false that in the state of independence, reason 
leads us to cooperate for the common good out of a perception of our own interest.’
21
 The state 
of independence depicted in the Geneva Manuscript is far removed from the golden age of the 
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Second Discourse. It is rather a state where man’s life is already miserable, peace and innocence 
have been lost and ‘nature’s gentle voice is no longer an infallible guide for us’;
22
 that is, it is 
the state from which illegitimate justifications of the social pact developed in the Discourse. 
Rousseau appears to have taken Diderot’s article to be addressing the problem of 
whether or not natural right is of force before the instigation of positive law – the very question 
that concerned many of Hobbes’s critics in the French natural law tradition.
23
 To be sure, this 
was not really Diderot’s intention, as he was only concerned with outlining what natural right 
entailed without considering its sanctions or the motivation for adhering to its precepts. 
Nonetheless, Rousseau objected to the article on two counts: first, that Diderot provided no 
incentive to adhere to natural law when it would be against one’s own interests; and, second, 
that he mistakenly assumed that accessing the general will requires no more than the simple 
application of man’s reason. 
Rousseau’s rejoinder to Diderot rested, in large part, on restating the argument behind 
Hobbes’s account of the state of nature. The violent interlocutor, or the ‘independent man’ in 
Rousseau’s rendition, responds to Diderot, ‘the wise man’, that he would be happy to observe 
the laws of nature if he were sure that all other men would reciprocate and observe them equally, 
but no such assurance exists. Diderot had argued against an interlocutor that was overcome by 
violent passions and, similarly, Rousseau stated that the point at which political institutions 
become necessary is when our ‘needs bring us together in proportion as our passions divide 
us’.
24
 Consequently, in this ‘state of independence’, man’s private interest and the general good 
are mutually exclusive.
25
 In such a state the Hobbesian interlocutor may well realise what 
constitutes the general good but he has no reason to moderate his actions accordingly unless 
assured that others will do likewise, for he would be unable to see how such moderation could 
protect him. Diderot’s failure was not that of teaching the interlocutor what justice is but rather 
that of giving him a reason to compromise his self-preservation and revealing to him his interest 
in being just. 
Although Rousseau provided a Hobbesian response to Diderot, he did accept some of 
Diderot’s critique, at least for the purpose of the argument. Rousseau accepted that the 
interlocutor knowingly renounces the duties imposed on him by natural law. Amongst 
Rousseau’s contemporaries, especially in the natural law tradition, it was widely regarded that 
the laws of nature were of no force in Hobbes’s state of nature and that individuals willingly 
violated them. There is some justification for this claim, as for Hobbes it was certainly true that 
all the precepts of natural law could not obtain without the instigation of a sovereign to assure 
the security requisite for their practice. In the state of nature, however, it was in accordance with 
right reason (and thereby natural right) for individuals to judge what is necessary for their self-
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preservation, thus in doing so individuals would not actually violate natural law.
26
 Since each 
man has a natural right to self-preservation, the foundation of natural law was only to seek 
peace where peace can be had, and where not, to defend oneself.
27
 It was precisely because 
peace could not be had in the state of nature that it would be against right reason to observe the 
other laws of nature which would then compromise one’s self-preservation, therefore, they 
could only bind in foro interno and not in foro externo.
28
  
Even if Rousseau did not appreciate all the nuances of Hobbes’s argument, he did 
evince a greater awareness of the problems of the state of nature than was often displayed by his 
contemporaries, since he recognised that they could not simply be overcome by the invocation 
of natural law, irrespective of whether this was founded on the principle of sociability or the 
general will of the human race. If the principles of natural right ‘were innate in every heart’ – as 
for instance with Barbeyrac’s (but not Pufendorf’s) understanding of sociability – then it would 
be superfluous to teach them explicitly. Rousseau certainly considered that the principles of 
natural right were ‘engraved in men’s heart in indelible characters’,
29
 yet for this to refute the 
Hobbesian interlocutor ‘it would be necessary that there had never arisen in his heart any of 
those passions that speak louder than conscience, [and] muffle its timid voice’.
30
 The conditions 
that lead to the instigation of political institutions only arise because man’s innate knowledge of 
natural right has been silenced by the development of his violent passions. 
Diderot had not actually rested his argument on the principles of natural right being innate, 
but rather considered that they were known by a simple appeal to man’s reason. Aside from 
failing to provide sufficient motivation for the Hobbesian interlocutor to act in accordance with 
such principles, this argument was open to another objection. Even if it is true, as Diderot had 
claimed, that the general will ‘is a pure act of understanding that reasons in the silence of the 
passions’, few people are to be found that demonstrate such understanding. Rousseau did not 
deny that natural law exists prior to positive law, but simply that it ‘will always escape the 
multitude’, at least under the conditions that make political institutions necessary. What is more, 
it is mistaken to think that knowledge of the general will requires such a simple application of 
man’s reason: 
Furthermore, since the art of generalizing ideas in this way is one of the most difficult and 
belated exercises of human understanding, will the average man ever be capable of deriving 
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his rules of conduct from this manner of reasoning?
31
 
 
Rousseau considered that if the general will only amounted to an abstract precept of reason it 
would never be of any force. Men must see that being just, whilst in accordance with natural 
right, is equally in line with their own interests. The problem, as he famously put it in the 
opening lines of the Social Contract, was to reconcile ‘what right permits with what interest 
prescribes, so that justice and utility are not at variance.’
32
 All that Diderot had provided was an 
account of right and not of interest. The way that Hobbes was read by his natural law critics, 
conversely, was as having only provided an account of interest and not of right which, so those 
critics maintained, had to be established on principles independent from those of self-
preservation. The general will, when understood as a universal principle discernible by reason, 
would thus fail to overcome the problems posed by Hobbes’s state of nature theory. The 
circumstances whereby the necessity for political institutions arises are those in which the laws 
of nature are of insufficient force for peace to be secured without an appeal to man’s interest. 
Although Rousseau reiterated that Hobbes’s mistake was to have ‘supposed this state 
natural to the species and [given] it as the cause of the vices of which it is the effect’,
33
 the 
problem that is set out in the second chapter of the Geneva Manuscript is the one from which 
Hobbes’s political theory commenced. More than anywhere else in his œuvre, Rousseau appears 
to have accepted the problematic of Hobbes’s state of nature to a far greater extent than any of 
his contemporaries, at least since Pierre Bayle.
34
 At the end of the chapter, Rousseau even 
proceeded to suggest how ‘to draw from the ill itself the remedy that should cure it’ in response 
to Diderot’s violent interlocutor, or Hobbes: 
Let our violent speaker himself judge its success. Let us show him in perfected art the 
reparation of the ills that the beginning of art caused to nature. Let us show him all the 
misery of the state he believed happy, all the falseness in the reasoning he believed solid. 
Let him see the value of good actions, the punishment of bad ones, and the loveable 
harmony of justice and happiness in a better constituted order of things.
35
 
 
This passage is of less remark for what it proposes than for the fact that it is set out against the 
Hobbesian interlocutor. Rousseau indicated that any account of the social order should be 
justified with respect to Hobbes’s independent man, hence why it was essential that justice and 
utility were not at variance. In the final version of the Social Contract it is less clear that the 
Hobbesian account of the state of nature is endorsed, as there is little indication of at what stage 
in man’s genealogy, as recounted in the Second Discourse, the social compact might be 
instigated. The most instructive passage is to be found at the beginning of Book I, Chapter VI: 
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I assume that men have reached the point where obstacles to their self-preservation in the 
state of nature prevail by their resistance over the forces each individual can use to maintain 
himself in that state.
36
 
 
This is a toned down version of a corresponding passage in the Geneva Manuscript,
37
 yet what 
is missing from the Social Contract is any depiction of just how miserable and Hobbesian the 
state of nature is at the point where the obstacles to men’s self-preservation prevail. Even so, 
elsewhere in the Social Contract Rousseau appears to have endorsed aspects of the Hobbesian 
account, such as when he wrote that in the passage from the state of nature to the civil state man 
loses ‘his natural freedom and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and that he can 
get’;
38
 the very right that led to a state of war according to Hobbes. 
It is well to note that the acceptance of the Hobbesian problematic does pose problems 
for the coherence of Rousseau’s political thought. In the Second Discourse Rousseau presented 
the instigation of civil societies that followed from a state of war as a trick that the rich played 
on the poor. Therein Rousseau only had recourse to a Hobbesian moment for the very purpose 
of demonstrating the illegitimacy of social contracts justified against Hobbes’s account of the 
state of nature. Rousseau certainly thought that the principles of natural right could not be 
derived from a Hobbesian state of nature as such a state was contrary to natural right; rather, 
they could only be derived from the golden age in man’s genealogy where men lived in 
conformity with nature.
39
 However, even though Rousseau maintained that the principles of 
political right must be in accordance with those of natural right, an adequate political theory 
must also show men their interest in being just by addressing the problems inherent in the 
Hobbesian state of nature and answering the Hobbesian interlocutor.
40
  
It has recently been argued that the viability of the argument in the Social Contract 
depends on the starting point not being Hobbes’s state of nature,
41
 and there certainly seems to 
be some incongruity between the conditions from which the necessity for political institutions 
arises in the state of nature and the conditions obtaining amongst a people capable of receiving 
good laws and therewith political institutions.
42
 Nonetheless, nowhere in the Social Contract 
was the Hobbesian problematic repudiated and, to the extent that the chapter from the Geneva 
Manuscript reflects Rousseau’s starting point, his project was one of a fundamentally Hobbesian 
nature. 
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Free will, slavery and obligation 
 
Analysis of the Geneva Manuscript suggests that Rousseau was grappling with the same sort of 
problems that Hobbes’s political thought was intended to overcome. However, in one respect at 
least, Rousseau’s problems were far more challenging, for he was also committed to finding a 
political solution compatible with the importance he attached to man’s free will. Hobbes, having 
ridiculed the idea of free will, did not encounter such a problem. For Hobbes, man was no more 
or less free depending on how his will had been formed; a covenant or contract entered into out 
of fear of violent death was therefore just as legitimate and valid as any other. Indeed Hobbes 
may plausibly be read as attempting to show that obligation to the sovereign is always owed 
because by receiving protection individuals consent and ‘the mutuall Relation between 
Protection and Obedience’ is thereby secured.
43
 Even if Rousseau was unaware of the famous 
articulation of the relationship between protection and obedience in Leviathan, Hobbes 
employed the concept of implied consent in De Cive to much the same effect, claiming that the 
consent of citizens is implied ‘when they accept the benefit of a person’s power and laws for 
protection and preservation of themselves against others.’
44
 
For Rousseau, however, only certain types of contract could ever be considered 
legitimate, a problem which he considered at the outset of the Social Contract. Book I is 
concerned with what could render the chains of society legitimate and Rousseau commenced by 
stating that although the social order is a sacred right, ‘this right does not come from nature; it is 
therefore based on conventions.’
45
 To prove this assertion Rousseau proceeded by first 
dismissing the contention that political society can be based on the family, an argument most 
readily associated with Robert Filmer that he had earlier ridiculed in his Discourse on Political 
Economy.
46
 He then turned to counter the claim that there is a natural right of the strongest and 
that natural slavery can ground the social order. In arguing thus, Rousseau sought to conflate the 
positions of Grotius and Hobbes and associate the former with the insidious reputation of the 
latter. 
Although Grotius is sometimes thought to have been one of the thinkers targeted in the 
Second Discourse there is little evidence in support of this view.
47
 In the dedication Grotius is 
rather presented in exalted company as Rousseau reminisced about his boyhood days in 
Geneva,
48
 and the earliest explicit criticism of Grotius is only found in the Geneva Manuscript.
49
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When defending his Letter to d’Alembert in 1758, in response to the charge of having failed to 
recall Grotius’s sentiment, Rousseau even remarked that ‘I could not recall what I have never 
known, and I probably never shall know what I do not concern myself at all with learning.’
50
 
Even if Rousseau was ambivalent towards Grotius in the late 1750s, by 1762 he had 
opted to open the Social Contract with a forceful attack on Grotius’s principles. It is likely that 
Rousseau was re-reading Grotius around this time (much as might be expected of someone 
working on a projected volume on Political Institutions) as he was familiar enough with the 
French edition to quote a letter from Grotius that Barbeyrac had cited in the preface to his 
translation.
51
 There are at least three possible reasons why Rousseau might have chosen to 
oppose Grotius: one contextual, one personal and one philosophical. First, Grotius was an 
authority invoked by the Genevan patriciate, to whom Burlamaqui, in particular, deferred.
52
 
Second, Rousseau might have regretted once acclaiming Grotius alongside Tacitus and Plutarch 
and have been concerned to redress his earlier praise with vehement criticism. Finally, he 
considered Grotius’s idea that some men are born for slavery to be just as untenable and 
objectionable as Aristotle’s.
53
 
Grotius is first criticised in the Social Contract for using the example of slavery to deny 
‘that all human power is established for the benefit of those who are governed’. The comment is 
drawn from the Geneva Manuscript, yet Rousseau extended the criticism to Grotius’s whole 
method of establishing right by fact, claiming that there is no approach ‘more favourable to 
Tyrants.’
54
 In the corresponding section of the Geneva Manuscript Grotius is mentioned just 
once and there is no reference to Hobbes.
55
 By contrast, in the Social Contract, Rousseau linked 
Grotius and Hobbes twice in a passage in which he claimed that they both adhered to the view 
that ‘the human race belongs to a hundred men’ and that men are not naturally equal.
56
 That 
Rousseau should think Hobbes an advocate of natural inequality would be remarkable, 
especially given that he levelled no such charge against him in the Second Discourse. Rather it 
seems that Rousseau was attempting to implicate Grotius with the reputation that was usually 
reserved for Hobbes. 
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The reason for considering Rousseau’s remarks on Grotius, then, is that it was in this 
context that Hobbes was first mentioned in the Social Contract. To some extent Rousseau’s 
invocation of Hobbes was polemical. Much as he had shown that Pufendorf was no better than 
Hobbes in the Second Discourse, in the Social Contract ‘Grotius and others’ were brought down 
to Hobbes’s level.
57
 Yet the criticisms of Hobbes served more than a polemical purpose, and it is 
well to notice that they precede Rousseau’s first extended discussion of the alleged right of the 
strongest and of slavery. In the chapter on slavery, Rousseau brought his account of the state of 
nature to bear on the arguments that he associated with Grotius and Hobbes. The origin of the 
alleged right to slavery was derived from the rights that individuals have with respect to others 
in a state of war, but, as demonstrated in the Second Discourse and the State of War, man’s 
natural state was not one of war, thus this right could not be derived from nature.
58
 
Underlying Rousseau’s refutation of slavery, however, was a more compelling argument 
against the right of the strongest, which states that ‘force produces no right’.
59
 Rousseau 
justified this argument by insisting on the difference between moral and physical power, 
averring that ‘Force is a physical power. I do not see what morality can result from its effects. 
Yielding to force is an act of necessity, not of will.’
60
 In the Second Discourse Rousseau 
introduced free will in order to draw a distinction between the physical and moral side of man, 
and this distinction is central to the argument of the Social Contract. Free will rendered man a 
moral being and thus it could never legitimately be renounced, much as he indicated when 
echoing his criticism of illegitimate contracts from the Discourse: 
To renounce one’s freedom is to renounce one’s status as a man, the rights of humanity and 
even its duties. There is no possible compensation for anyone who renounces everything. 
Such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man, and taking away all his freedom 
of will is taking away all morality from his actions.
61
 
 
Throughout the Social Contract, and indeed throughout his œuvre, Rousseau insisted on the 
importance of free will as an inalienable gift of nature, necessary to make sense of man as a 
moral being in contradistinction to a purely physical being.
62
 This is of the utmost importance 
when considering Rousseau’s response to Hobbes, as his criticisms rely on, and would make no 
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sense without, his commitment to dualism and belief in free will. The distinction between man’s 
physical and moral side was first drawn in the Second Discourse, and in doing so Rousseau 
followed a prominent criticism of Hobbes in the natural law tradition.
63
 What is more, the idea 
that Hobbes’s accounts of obligation and sovereignty were inimical to man’s freedom also 
recurred within the natural law tradition, and there is good reason to situate Rousseau’s 
distinction between moral and physical force in this context. 
Perhaps the most strikingly similar criticism of Hobbes is to be found in the second 
volume of Martin Hübner’s compendium of modern natural law, which followed the form of 
Barbeyrac’s ‘Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality’, and was published 
only four years prior to the Social Contract. Hübner insisted that Hobbes’s de facto theory of 
sovereignty only provided an account of constraint and not of obligation, ‘being founded on 
power, which is a physical quality, but not in the least on Right, that being a moral quality.’
64
 
There is no conclusive evidence as to whether or not Rousseau was familiar with Hübner’s work, 
and the point is more to indicate how prevalent the criticism of Hobbes was rather than to 
suggest direct influence. The line of criticism, however, goes back at least as far as Pufendorf 
and was prominent amongst thinkers with whom Rousseau was familiar. 
Pufendorf had set out his account of free will in direct opposition to Hobbes. Similarly, 
when he turned to consider political obligation, Pufendorf’s starting point was to refute the 
argument of De Cive. Pufendorf insisted on the difference between compulsion and obligation, 
as although they both represent some object of fear, compulsion only affects the will with an 
external force, whereas obligation has a moral force.
65
 In remarking thus, Pufendorf implied that 
Hobbes did not really have an account of obligation at all, but only one of coercion. Pufendorf 
even insisted that ‘he alone is capable of Obligation, who can have Knowledge of a Rule 
prescrib’d him, and hath a Will intrinsically free’.
66
 Man’s free will, then, was not only a natural 
capacity that should be admitted, but the very capacity that could make sense of the concept of 
obligation in contradistinction to coercion. 
Where Hobbes had argued that the irresistible power of another was sufficient for 
obligation,
67
 Pufendorf maintained that power must be combined with reasons and that 
obligation generates ‘a Fear mix’d with Reverence’.
68
 Against Hobbes, Pufendorf argued that 
obligation derived from force alone would be fleeting and insecure: 
Strength indeed, may of it self so far bend me contrary to my Inclinations, as to make me 
choose rather, for a while, to obey another’s Will, than to venture the Experience of his 
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Force: But this Inducement ceaseth, when once the Fear is over, and I shall then have no 
Reason why I should not act rather according to my own Pleasure, than according to his. 
And where a Man can bring no other Argument for my Compliance to his Orders, but Force 
and Violence, nothing hinders, but that if I judge it expedient for my Affairs, I may try all 
Means to repel the Violence, and to assert and vindicate my own Liberty.
 69
 
 
This argument served to entrench the de facto reading of Hobbes’s theory of obligation amongst 
thinkers influenced by Pufendorf. Barbeyrac added a note summarising Pufendorf’s argument to 
his French edition of Grotius’s The Rights of War and Peace,
70
 and Burlamaqui claimed, 
explicitly against Hobbes, that force generates neither reason nor motive sufficient to oblige the 
will and that in such a case one would only be constrained without obligation and would fight 
off the oppressive yoke when the opportunity arises.
71
 In his Encyclopédie article ‘Citizen’, 
Diderot similarly noted that by dissolving the distinction between subject and citizen Hobbes 
had equally dissolved the distinction between moral and physical force, which Diderot 
reaffirmed: ‘Citizens and subjects are equally under command, but one by a moral, the other by 
a physical, force.’
72
  
Read in this context, Rousseau’s chapter ‘On the Right of the Strongest’ adds little to 
the prevalent refutations of Hobbes amongst his critics following Pufendorf. Yet this is not the 
only reason why it is important to keep the context in mind, as even though the natural law 
theorists had insisted on free will against Hobbes, Rousseau deemed their alternative accounts 
of obligation and sovereignty equally opposed to man’s freedom. It is well to consider these 
accounts briefly as, along with Hobbes’s, they supply much of the context for Rousseau’s own 
discussion of sovereignty. 
Pufendorf developed his theory of the generation of sovereignty in direct opposition to 
Hobbes, claiming that a sovereign is instigated by two pacts and a decree. The first pact joins a 
people together or else they would remain in their natural liberty. The decree takes the form of a 
vote (the majority vote prevailing) in which the form of government is decided upon. Finally, a 
second pact is needed to constitute the person or persons on whom sovereignty is to be 
conferred, ‘by which the Rulers, on one hand engage themselves to take care of the common 
Peace and Security, and the Subjects on the other hand to yield them faithful Obedience’. This, 
according to Pufendorf, was the most natural form of generating a commonwealth, although he 
also admitted that a monarchy could be constituted through a single pact only.
73
 
For Pufendorf, obligation had to be presupposed in the people before it could be 
transferred to a sovereign.
74
 Pufendorf thus sought to refute Hobbes’s argument that the 
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dissolution of government amounted to the dissolution of society and, on the contrary, 
maintained that both the people and the sovereign have rights and duties.
75
 However, the 
important element of Pufendorf’s theory of sovereignty, as far as Rousseau was concerned, 
resided in the second pact. Significantly it was the second pact that was emphasised by the 
patriciate in the Genevan controversies of the 1750s, which sought to collapse the two contract 
model into a single contract of submission.
76
 It was this second pact that rendered Pufendorf’s 
account of sovereignty little more attractive than Hobbes’s, for in each case what is given up in 
the contract is precisely that which according to Rousseau could never be alienated; that is, 
man’s freedom.  
Even though Pufendorf claimed that the people retained rights against the sovereign, he 
also stated that the sovereign was unaccountable and unconstrained by, or superior to, civil 
laws.
77
 The consent of the people was not required for the instigation of civil laws,
78
 and by 
submitting their wills to one man the people bind themselves not to resist so that the sovereign 
can compel anyone to abide by his commands.
79
 Those who followed Pufendorf in the natural 
law tradition were no better by Rousseau’s standards, with, for instance, Burlamaqui seemingly 
contradicting the emphasis that he had placed on free will being essential to man’s nature when 
he claimed that sovereignty ‘may therefore be acquired either by force and violence, or in a free 
and voluntary manner.’
80
 
Pufendorf and his followers had criticised Hobbes for having man alienate his freedom, 
yet their developed accounts of sovereignty proved just as inimical to man’s free will. Where in 
the Second Discourse Rousseau’s critique of modern natural law had focused on Pufendorf, in 
the Social Contract the same theorists were targeted under the banner of ‘Grotius and others’. In 
each case Rousseau sought to collapse the prevalent bifurcation between Hobbes and his critics 
in the natural law tradition, thereby revealing them to be no better than one another. When 
Rousseau turned to expound his own ideas on legitimate sovereignty, then, the problem was to 
find a form of association ‘by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys 
only himself and remains as free as before’.
81
 Hobbes and the natural law theorists were equally 
culpable not only for failing to propose such a solution but also for denying its very possibility, 
which is arguably why Rousseau deemed that in spite of Grotius and Hobbes the ‘science of 
political right is yet to be born.’
82
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Sovereignty inverted 
 
If the political problems Rousseau confronted were Hobbesian in nature, the manner in which 
he sought to resolve them was by radically inverting the Hobbesian solution. Only in this way 
could the modern discourse of sovereignty and contract, so often used to justify the submission 
of the people, be invoked to support classically republican conclusions where the law is placed 
above men and the people are free.
83
 Rousseau first set out the details of the social contract that 
instigates the sovereign in Book I, Chapter IV of the Social Contract, where he reduced the 
clauses of the contract to one, ‘namely the total alienation of each associate, with all his rights, 
to the whole community.’
84
 It is worth considering this remark as Rousseau surpassed Hobbes 
by claiming that the associates retain no rights, not even that of self-preservation, through an 
extension of Hobbes’s own argument.
85
  
According to Hobbes, all men’s opinions differ about what constitutes ‘mine and yours, 
just and unjust… and so on, and everyone decides them by his own judgement.’ It is therefore 
imperative that all judgement in the commonwealth belongs to the sovereign power, for 
otherwise men would fall back into a state of war.
86
 This idea was widely criticised by those, 
such as Barbeyrac, who sought to stress the importance of man’s conscience over the will and 
judgement of the sovereign in determining what is or is not in accordance with natural law.
87
 
Such criticism, however, either missed or deliberately evaded Hobbes’s point, as the very 
prevalence of individual judgments concerning what the laws of nature entailed was a cause of 
war and tended to the dissolution of the commonwealth. Against those who asserted the claims 
of conscience, Hobbes argued that conscience amounts to no more than judgment, appeals to 
which are equally likely to be mistaken and lead to sedition.
88
 Rousseau, however, was one of 
the few who appreciated the problem with which Hobbes was concerned. Justifying the 
alienation of all rights, Rousseau explained that ‘if some rights were left to private individuals, 
there would be no common superior who could judge between them and the public.’
89
 He later 
clarified that the individual only alienates that which matters to the community, but, at the same 
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time, that ‘the Sovereign alone is the judge of what matters.’
90
 For Rousseau, as for Hobbes, it 
was essential that individuals could claim no rights against the sovereign as to do so would be 
self-defeating. To this extent the power of the sovereign was absolute, as there could be no 
legitimate challenge to his will and judgement. This has resulted in some of Rousseau’s more 
liberally inclined critics arguing that his conception of sovereignty was just as dangerous and 
wrongheaded as Hobbes’s,
91
 yet such criticism elides the more significant differences between 
the two thinkers. 
According to Rousseau, the authoritative judgment would be that of the general will, so 
that each associate ‘puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of 
the general will’. Rousseau continued to detail how the contract forms the unity of the body 
politic or republic, which it is worth quoting at some length: 
Instantly, in place of the private person of each contracting party, this act of association 
produces a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as there are voices in 
the assembly, which receives from its same act its unity, its common self, its life, and its will. 
This public person, formed by the union of all the others, formerly took the name City, and 
now takes that of Republic or body politic, which its members call State when it is passive, 
Sovereign when it is active, Power when comparing it to similar bodies. As for the 
associates, they collectively take the name people; and individually are called Citizens as 
participants in the sovereign authority, and Subjects as subject to the laws of the State.
92
 
 
As some commentators have recognised, the language employed closely maps onto that used by 
Hobbes,
93
 most notably in the double relation of citizen and subject that is unique to De Cive.
94
 
To be sure, Grotius had discussed the state in terms of its body, head and person,
95
 yet the 
metaphor of the body politic was only fully developed by Hobbes, which was in turn adopted by 
Pufendorf and Rousseau.
96
 The passage leads into Rousseau’s first discussion of the sovereign, 
which he returned to examine in more detail at the beginning of Book II. 
Rousseau’s inversion of his predecessors’ accounts of sovereignty centred on two 
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claims: that sovereignty is inalienable and that it is indivisible.
97
 Rousseau first argued ‘that 
sovereignty, being only the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated’. The sovereign 
can only be represented by itself because although power can be transferred the same is not true 
of will.
98
 To appreciate why Rousseau thought that sovereignty was inalienable, then, his 
understanding of the will has to be considered. To recall, Rousseau insisted that man’s free will 
is an inalienable gift of nature which must be respected to render any body politic legitimate; 
something that both Hobbes and his natural law critics had failed to achieve in their accounts of 
sovereignty. 
According to Rousseau, the alienation of both sovereignty and freedom occur at the 
same point and in the same act; the act whereby sovereignty is conferred from the people to a 
superior. Burlamaqui, most explicitly, had argued that although sovereignty resides originally in 
the people every individual can transfer this sovereignty to another.
99
 Rousseau denied that there 
could be any such contract, like Pufendorf’s second pact, where sovereignty is transferred to 
another individual or body of individuals; rather the only contract is that of civil association, 
‘the act by which a people becomes a people.’
100
 This argument rested on Rousseau’s claim that 
it is ‘absurd for the will to tie itself down for the future’,
101
 as for the social pact to be legitimate 
it must constantly and freely be willed by all of the citizens.
102
 For citizens to remain free they 
must always retain their will in the present, as to transfer their will to another for the future 
would be to alienate that will. In practice, the sovereign people’s constant willing may be 
presumed from it not revoking its will,
103
 yet in theory all citizens remain free to retract their 
will, even if to do so would be to render themselves foreigners to the body politic.
104
 
Rousseau’s position is well illustrated by way of comparison with Hobbes’s.
105
 Hobbes 
argued that contracts or promises where rights are transferred ‘are signs of will, that is… signs 
of the last act of deliberation by which the liberty not to perform is lost; consequently they are 
obligatory’.
106
 To will and then not to be obligated would be contradictory and unjust, and even 
in the revised theory of authorisation in Leviathan it was necessary that at the point of entering 
into the contract each individual irrevocably authorises all of the sovereign’s acts as thereafter 
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representing his own will.
107
 The argument was not unique to Hobbes, as the accounts of 
sovereignty proposed by all of Rousseau’s predecessors in the natural law tradition relied on 
individuals willingly committing themselves for the future by instigating a superior as the 
sovereign power whose will then speaks for the body politic.
108
 To reject this line of argument, 
at first glance, might seem to render all contracts impossible. However, all that Rousseau needed 
to deny was that will could legitimately be transferred, alienated, or represented by another 
through a contract; such being the nature of will in constituting man as a moral being. To do so 
would be to alienate to another the freedom to determine one’s future will, by which one would 
be bound thereafter.  Rousseau’s argument only applied to contracts where will is transferred (as 
opposed to other goods transferable by contract), as in such cases one would be dependent on 
the will of another; the antithesis of freedom. The first way in which Rousseau inverted the 
conception of sovereignty was thus to insist that it always remained with the people; the general 
will being no more than a generalised form of man’s inalienable gift of nature, his free will. 
In Book II, Chapter II, Rousseau proceeded to argue that sovereignty is indivisible. This 
might not seem to be a particularly controversial argument as all the major theorists of 
sovereignty going back to Bodin had insisted on its indivisibility. Nonetheless, Rousseau 
claimed that ‘our political thinkers, unable to divide the principle of sovereignty, divide it in its 
object.’
109
 Grotius and Barbeyrac were the only thinkers mentioned in the chapter, and Rousseau 
might have had in mind Grotius’s claim that although the sovereign power ‘be but one, and of 
itself undivided’, it can still be divided into ‘subjective’ or ‘potential’ parts.
110
 Rousseau’s 
objection had wider application, however, as it resonated against all those who had divided or 
mixed legislative and executive power under the sovereign, granting it the rights of making war 
and peace, taxation, and implementing law.
111
 
Rousseau insisted that sovereignty needed to be brought back to its object, which only 
pertained to the making of general laws.
112
 Indeed at the beginning of Book III he drew on the 
distinction between the moral and physical power necessary for any free action in order to 
establish the division between legislative and executive power.
113
 Sovereignty, the moral power 
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in the state, pertained only to the legislative function of forming general laws, whereas 
government, the physical power in the state, pertained to the execution of those laws.
114
 Sharing 
the sympathies of those theorists concerned with the dangers of tyrannical rule, Rousseau 
supported the division of powers. Yet with Hobbes, Rousseau maintained that holding rights 
against the sovereign is self-defeating. Rousseau’s response to Hobbesian accounts of 
sovereignty was largely definitional. On Rousseau’s definition, the sovereign was absolute in 
power although limited in the form of its actions. In this way Rousseau adopted the modern 
discourse of sovereignty and inverted it towards classically republican conclusions. 
In the Social Contract Rousseau arrived at a number of conclusions that reveal his 
republican sympathies: placing the law above men, defining liberty in terms of being free from 
dependence on the will of other men, and claiming that the legislative right always remains with 
the citizens. At this stage it is well to notice that although Rousseau arrived at a political 
outcome much indebted to his admiration of classical republican thought, he did so by grappling 
with problems that were prominent in the modern natural law tradition and frequently set up in 
opposition to Hobbes; problems concerning sovereignty, the will and contract. It was 
Rousseau’s engagement with this tradition that often supplied the justifications for his 
republican conclusions. Moreover, to use prominent debates in modern natural law theory to 
elucidate the nature of a legitimate republic was an approach well suited for addressing 
contemporary political controversies in Geneva.
115
 Rather than viewing republican and natural 
law theories as two opposed traditions on which Rousseau sought to draw, then, it is best to 
consider how he attempted to use them in a complementary manner to support his justification 
of the ideal body politic.
116
  
The foregoing analysis has focused on the context for understanding Rousseau’s 
conception of sovereignty and the reasons why he thought his predecessors had alienated man’s 
freedom. To explicate how Rousseau thought freedom could be preserved, however, a more 
analytical approach to the Social Contract must be pursued. In doing so Rousseau’s response to 
Hobbes is left in the background, yet given the importance of free will in distinguishing the two 
thinkers it is well to see how this all important concept plays out in the Social Contract. 
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Freedom preserved 
 
Central to Rousseau’s understanding of sovereignty is the role of the general will, which is the 
most controversial and contested concept in his corpus. A number of objections could be raised 
in light of the preceding discussion that merit attention, of which the most arresting is that of 
showing exactly how the general will is in accordance with man’s free will. This problem is 
particularly acute given the tension between Rousseau’s claim that individuals entering the 
social contract alienate all their rights and his insistence in both the Second Discourse and his 
discussion of slavery that man’s life and freedom are inalienable gifts of nature. When 
considering the problems associated with the general will it is well to keep in mind that 
throughout the Social Contract Rousseau examined both the nature of the general will (i.e. what 
the general will is) and the conditions under which it would most likely be realised. 
Unfortunately Rousseau never made explicit when he was addressing each of these problems, 
and a failure to keep them distinct in analysis of the work often leads to confusion.
117
 
To consider why Rousseau thought that the general will was in accordance with man’s 
free will its nature must be examined. The first point to stress is that each citizen possesses the 
general will qua citizen, that is, all citizens do in fact will the general will.
118
 They may also 
have conflicting particular wills yet these do not negate their general will; rather, as will be seen, 
this conflict poses a problem that needs to be overcome. For Rousseau, citizens could be free 
under the general will because it is actually their own will, thus he averred that ‘they do not 
obey anyone, but solely their own will’.
119
 This idea might initially sound odd, not least because 
the very notion of a general will seems inherently oxymoronic.
120
 However, the objective 
content of the general will, at least, makes more sense when thought out in terms of a general or 
common interest, which could potentially conflict with individual interests.
121
 This reading of 
the general will is justified since Rousseau frequently discussed its content in terms of interests 
and claimed that the general will ‘considers only the common interest’.
122
  
The general will, then, is the rule of the body politic – or the will of the sovereign – that 
articulates the common interest that any group of people uniting together possess, and must 
possess, in order to form a society. Where there is no common interest there can be neither 
society nor general will. More needs to be said, however, to show why Rousseau thought that 
                                                 
117
  Typical here is Charvet’s criticisms of the general will, which to a large extent depend upon conflating 
the problem of its legitimacy with the problems of its realisation and implementation, The Social Problem 
in Rousseau, pp. 126-128.  
118
  Rousseau, Social Contract, CW4:140-141/ OC3:363. 
119
  Rousseau, Social Contract, CW4:150/ OC3:375. 
120
  Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy, p. 112.  
121
  See the seminal interpretation by Barry, ‘The Public Interest’, pp. 119-123. Even if the objective 
content of the general will may be understood in terms of the common interest, for Rousseau it was also 
imperative that citizens subjectively willed the general will as their own, a point which will be returned to 
shortly. 
122
  Rousseau, Social Contract, CW4:147/ OC3:371; see also CW4:145, 149, 198/ OC3:369, 374, 437. 
 117 
the general will preserved man’s freedom. At this stage it is worth turning to Emile,
123
 where 
Rousseau supplied his clearest explanation of the relationship between freedom and dependence 
in a passage that deserves to be quoted at length: 
These considerations are important and serve to resolve all the contradictions of the social 
system. There are two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; 
dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, since it has no morality, 
is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is 
without order, engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually corrupted. If 
there is any means of remedying this ill in society, it is to substitute law for man and to arm 
the general wills with a real strength superior to the action of every particular will. If the 
laws of nations could, like those of nature, have an inflexibility that no human force could 
ever conquer, dependence on men would then become dependence on things again; in the 
Republic all of the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the civil 
state, and freedom which keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality which 
raises him to virtue.
124
 
 
For Rousseau, acts of sovereignty were only those of passing general laws. The general will 
would therefore provide the guiding rule for general laws and thus only pertained to general 
objects. To be dependent on the law alone would be in accordance with freedom as it is only 
dependence on the will of other men that is opposed to freedom. There are two interrelated 
aspects to Rousseau’s argument here. The first is simply that dependence on the law is not 
dependence on the will of another man; the sovereignty of law, rather than man, being 
compatible with freedom. The second aspect is that the reason that law (when in accordance 
with the general will) is compatible with freedom is that it emanates from the will that each 
individual has as a citizen and, famously, ‘obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is 
freedom.’
125
  
Rousseau insisted that ‘the general will is always right’, that is, by its nature it is always 
what it should be.
126
 As each citizen always wills what is in the common interest of the body 
politic (even if he has other conflicting wills) the general will is always his own. However, the 
general will may not always be realised and Rousseau was equally concerned to delineate the 
conditions under which its realisation would be most likely; it is to this problem that analysis 
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now turns. Without examining all of these conditions, it is worth briefly considering majority 
voting, since it might otherwise appear opposed to man’s freedom. 
For Rousseau, laws could only be passed when put to the vote of the sovereign body 
freely assembled. Each citizen would vote on whether or not he thinks that the law conforms to 
the general will and Rousseau recommended that the majority vote should determine the 
outcome. Yet even the citizen who is in the minority, according to Rousseau, still ‘consents to all 
the laws, even to those passed in spite of him, and even to those that punish him when he dares 
violate them.’
127
 This might appear to suggest that the general will does not emanate from each 
citizen’s will, yet for Rousseau this was not the case. Each citizen consents because each citizen 
constantly wills that the content of the general will be determined by majority voting, for the 
‘law of majority rule is itself an established convention, and presupposed unanimity at least 
once.’
128
 When in the minority, citizens are only free because they will that majority voting 
should determine the content of the general will. In addition they are free to revoke this will and 
leave the body politic at any time, and only under such conditions could citizens ever be free 
while partaking in the duties required of democratic sovereignty. 
When the opinion that prevails from the vote is contrary to that of any individual citizen, 
the citizen is then supposed to realise that he was simply mistaken regarding what he took to be 
the content of the general will. It is essential, however, that even the citizen who is in the 
minority comes to realise that the general will is his own will. This is sometimes denied and it 
has even been argued that, for Rousseau, there is ‘a sense in which the general will’s being the 
will of each individual does not depend upon the individual’s recognition of it as such’.
129
 For 
Rousseau, however, both the objective content of the general will (the common interest) and the 
subjective recognition of the general will as one’s own will were necessary for the general will 
to be in accordance with man’s free will. The proof of man’s free will was only ever the inner 
sentiment that an individual feels when acquiescing or resisting. Moreover, the consciousness of 
being free – and thus the general will being recognised as one’s own will – was all important, 
since ‘it is in the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of [man’s] soul is shown’.
130
 
Elsewhere Rousseau similarly affirmed that citizens are only free when obeying laws that ‘have 
the internal assent of their will.’
131
 
For Rousseau, then, it was imperative that the citizens actually willed the general will. 
This is not only because at least a majority of them would have to do so for the general will to 
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prevail from the voting process, but also because Rousseau’s understanding of freedom involved 
the citizens’ conscious recognition of the general will as their own. This leads to another 
problem with which Rousseau was faced, concerning the potential opposition between private 
and general wills. The problem is well captured by John Charvet’s comment that Rousseau’s 
solution in the Social Contract is vacuous ‘to the extent that it cannot take into account the 
actual particularity of men’s ends.’
132
 There are at least two possible ways that this criticism 
could be met. One is by showing that the opposition between private and general wills need not 
be transcended. On this reading a healthy body politic is quite consistent with the actual 
particularity of men’s ends, thus Rousseau offered insights that might have application for 
modern pluralistic societies (henceforth this is referred to as the pluralistic reading). The other 
response would be to suggest that the actual particularity of men’s ends is a problem that 
Rousseau aimed to overcome through a process of will-formation, hence he was concerned with 
‘complete civic unity – about willing only the common good, and about a complete renunciation 
of particular desires’.
133
 
The reading of Rousseau advanced here rests somewhere between these two extremes. 
For present purposes it will suffice to show that Rousseau was more concerned by the 
opposition between the private will and general will than is contended by those who advance the 
pluralistic reading. The intention at this stage is simply to establish the nature and bearing of 
this problem. The extent to which Rousseau required a process of will-formation to achieve 
civic unity and the implications that this has for his understanding of freedom are only fully 
explored in the following chapter. 
One of the strongest defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary and healthy 
opposition between the general and particular wills has been Robert Wokler, according to whom 
the ‘general will could only be realised through opposition to the particular wills of each of its 
members, so that the constant tension… proved indispensable to the achievement of the 
common good.’ Moreover, this ‘opposition was present in the minds of all citizens… dividing 
his judgement of what was beneficial to himself from what was right for the community.’
134
 
Taking the references that Wokler supplies, along with the evidence adduced in Joshua Cohen’s 
recent discussion of the problem, there are three passages from the Social Contract that might 
appear to support the pluralistic reading. 
One of these may be passed over briefly as it has previously been examined. Rousseau 
claimed that the ‘life and freedom’ of the private persons who compose the body politic ‘are 
naturally independent of it.’ Each citizen, therefore, only alienates ‘that part of his power, goods, 
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and freedom whose use matters to the community’, although the sovereign determines what 
matters.
135
 In this sense the citizen remains free to do what he desires in the silence of the law, to 
borrow Hobbes’s phrase, yet nowhere in the chapter does Rousseau indicate that the sovereign 
should allow citizens to pursue private interests that might be opposed to the common interest. 
The passage thus fails to shed much light on the problem of the conflict between particular and 
general wills. 
The second piece of evidence in support of the pluralistic reading is drawn from Book I, 
Chapter VII, and the passage needs to be quoted in full: 
Indeed, each individual can, as a man, have a private will contrary to or differing from the 
general will he has as a Citizen. His private interest can speak to him quite differently from 
the common interest. His absolute and naturally independent existence can bring him to 
view what he owes the common cause as a free contribution, the loss of which will harm 
others less than its payment burdens him. And considering the moral person of the State as a 
being produced by reason because it is not a man, he might wish to enjoy the rights of the 
citizen without wanting to fulfil the duties of the subject, an injustice whose spread would 
cause the ruin of the body politic.
136
 
 
Attention is often focused on the first sentence from this passage, which appears to support the 
pluralistic reading, as Rousseau certainly admitted that individuals can have conflicting private 
and general wills. On closer inspection, however, the sentence seems to be purely definitional; 
Rousseau was simply outlining the different perspectives from which an individual could view 
the sovereign body: the individual qua man and the individual qua citizen. When the passage is 
read in full it is clear that it is the prevalence of private interest over the common interest, or the 
perspective of the man over the citizen, that leads to injustice and the ruin of the body politic. 
This opposition is in no way healthy for the body politic and it is well to note that elsewhere, in 
an unpublished fragment on the public happiness, Rousseau claimed that this very contradiction 
between man and citizen is the cause of human misery.
137
 
The final piece of evidence is drawn from a footnote in which Rousseau quoted the 
Marquis d’Argenson to the effect that the ‘agreement of two private interests is formed in 
opposition of a third.’
138
 It is worth mentioning that for d’Argenson the opposition of different 
interests was a problem that had to be overcome, thus the passage from which Rousseau quoted 
concludes that ‘it is this [opposition] which renders general Laws so difficult to compose 
well.’
139
 Rousseau’s problem is the same as that which occupied d’Argenson. The title of the 
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chapter in which the footnote was inserted is ‘Whether the General Will Can Err’. Rousseau 
insisted that by its nature it cannot, yet was concerned that the people may fail to realise the 
general will by bringing it into being as law. When read in this context it appears that the 
opposition of the common interest to that of each individual proved an obstacle that must be 
overcome. Indeed the passage is profitably read in conjunction with the beginning of Book II, 
where Rousseau wrote that ‘if the opposition of private interests made the establishment of 
societies necessary, it is the agreement of these same interests that made it possible.’
140
 As it is 
the opposition of private interests that posed the problem for which the general will was the 
solution, one would expect that these conflicting private interests could not be ordered into the 
body politic. In a footnote to the passage on freedom and dependence quoted earlier from Emile, 
Rousseau stated as much: ‘In my Principles of Political Right it is demonstrated that no 
particular will can be ordered in the social system.’
 141
 
Elsewhere in the Social Contract Rousseau frequently made it clear that the conflict 
between private and general wills would have to be overcome as otherwise it would lead to the 
ruin of the body politic. Rousseau maintained that the ‘better constituted the State, the more 
public affairs dominate private ones in the mind of the Citizens’,
142
 that repressive force should 
increase to the extent that the relationship between private wills and the general will 
diminishes,
143
 and that the state begins to weaken as soon as ‘the general will is no longer the 
will of all.’
144
 This last remark is of great significance given that the will of all is nothing but the 
sum of private wills and that when this differs from the general will Rousseau thought that the 
state was on its way to ruin. Although by definition the will of all and general will differ, then, 
the longevity of the state depends on their being brought into lasting agreement. 
Cohen argues that, for Rousseau, the general will should be the citizen’s dominant will 
but it need not be their only will.
145
 This interpretation is certainly plausible, but only if it is 
further stressed that the content of the citizen’s private will cannot be in contradiction with that 
of the general will; the citizen may, therefore, have a private will independent of the general will 
providing that their private will is not in opposition to the general will. In an unpublished 
fragment on the social compact Rousseau even wrote that ‘Wickedness is basically only the 
opposition of the private will to the public will’.
146
 Rousseau thought that the opposition 
between private wills and the general will needed to be transcended, yet this does not necessitate 
a complete renunciation of all private desires, even if Rousseau occasionally indicated that it 
might. Private desires and wills would only destroy the order of the state to the extent that they 
contradicted the general will and it is only this contradiction that would have to be alleviated for 
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any body politic to maintain itself. 
Analysis of the Social Contract alone, then, suggests that Rousseau thought that the 
opposition between private and general wills needed to be overcome. This is not just because 
the opposition posed a threat to the stability of the state, but also because it would be necessary 
if the unity and order associated with nature and man’s happiness were to be restored. Indeed 
the reading advanced here coheres well with the discussion of nature as a normative standard 
outlined previously.
147
 For man in the social state ever to enjoy living a harmonious and ordered 
existence in accordance with nature, it is imperative that he does not suffer from any 
contradiction between his private and general wills. 
Rousseau did not, however, offer a full solution to this problem in the Social Contract. 
In the Geneva Manuscript he distinguished between the ‘idea of the civil state’ and ‘the science 
of the Legislator’, claiming only to be addressing the former,
148
 and similarly in the Social 
Contract he was primarily concerned with the principles of political right. For the most part, 
Rousseau claimed only to be dealing with political and constitutional law and not the morals of 
the people,
149
 yet to ascertain a complete understanding of his political thought both aspects 
have to be examined, for those ‘who want to treat politics and morals separately will never 
understand anything of either of the two.’
150
 The cultivation of morals and civic virtue involved 
orientating citizens’ passions towards love of fatherland, the possibility of which was only fully 
explored elsewhere in Rousseau’s political writings. 
Ultimately for man to be free, given Rousseau’s understanding of freedom, he would 
have to constantly and consciously will the general will over any conflicting private will. For 
man to regain a harmonious existence more would be required. The opposition between his 
private and general wills would have to be transcended; he must not suffer from any 
contradiction between the two. Although this theme is more thoroughly explored in the 
following chapter, Rousseau did indicate how the opposition might be resolved in the Social 
Contract, most prominently in his discussion of the legislator. Examination of the legislator also 
proves instructive for appreciating the continuing significance of nature as a normative standard 
through a closer analysis of Rousseau’s understanding of law. 
 
Law, nature and denaturing 
 
Rousseau rarely mentioned nature or natural right in the Social Contract and it might appear far 
from obvious that nature remained a normative standard throughout the work. Yet one sense in 
which nature proved important should now be clear, as Rousseau sought to preserve man’s 
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inalienable gifts of nature – his life and freedom – in the body politic. Rousseau’s argument for 
what is able to render a society legitimate cannot be adequately understood detached from his 
commitment to free will and his account of the nature of man; moreover, he insisted that the 
‘equality of right, and the conception of justice [the social compact] produces’ are derived ‘from 
the nature of man’.
151
  
Nonetheless, many commentators maintain that Rousseau’s political thought and key 
concepts such as the general will may be coherently understood without reference to such 
transcendent standards or metaphysical commitments.
152
 This need not involve denying that 
Rousseau adhered to some variety of neo-Platonic metaphysics, but only that this affected his 
politics.
153
 The general consensus that Rousseau’s politics can be detached from his metaphysics 
has been comprehensively challenged by David Lay Williams, however, who argues forcefully 
for the priority of Rousseau’s neo-Platonic understanding of justice, which supplies an 
indeterminate transcendent constraint on the general will.
154
 
The question of whether or not nature served as a transcendent standard is particularly 
relevant when considering Rousseau’s relationship with Hobbes.
155
 Williams claims that 
Rousseau’s Social Contract ‘is designed explicitly to counter Hobbesian positivism… Rousseau 
responds to Hobbes’s brutish Leviathan with a morally grounded social contract.’
156
 This 
argument is set out in opposition to Straussians who read Rousseau as having followed Hobbes 
by reducing justice to artifice and conventions.
157
 For Strauss, Rousseau was caught between 
nature and ‘a world of artificiality and conventionality’.
158
 Where the ancients thought that 
justice was founded on the nature of things, for moderns it was based only on conventions and 
consent. Ultimately Rousseau followed Hobbes and thus instigated the first crisis in modern 
natural right by abandoning any ‘attempt to find the basis of right in nature, in human nature’,
159
 
a conclusion endorsed by a number of commentators not necessarily of Straussian persuasion.
160
 
Whether or not Strauss’s reading of Rousseau is correct is especially important given 
that the charge of Hobbism – representing a positivistic and conventional understanding of 
justice – loomed large at the time when Rousseau was writing. Indeed Strauss’s reading of 
Hobbes is not all that dissimilar from the interpretation of Hobbes that prevailed in eighteenth-
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century France. The accusation of positivism was closely associated with the theological 
position of divine voluntarism, as in each case justice emanates from the will of a superior – be 
it God or a sovereign – which is supposedly distinct from eternal, uniform laws of justice (a 
position often referred to as rationalism or intellectualism).
161
 Malebranche, for instance, 
advanced the same arguments in order to counter both Hobbes’s alleged positivism and 
voluntarism; arguments with which Rousseau would have also been familiar from his reading of 
Leibniz.
162
  
Leibniz proves especially significant because he brought the accusation of Hobbesian 
positivism to bear directly on debates in modern natural law by accusing Pufendorf of 
Hobbism.
163
 According to Leibniz, both Hobbes and Pufendorf had destroyed the possibility of 
obligatory justice antecedent to positive laws by locating the efficient cause of natural law in the 
will of a superior. For Leibniz, by contrast, justice does not emanate from the will of a superior 
but from eternal truths in accordance with certain rules of equality and proportion.
164
 Although 
Jean Barbeyrac defended Pufendorf and sought to navigate a middle ground between the 
extremes of voluntarism (or positivism) and rationalism, he conceded that either obligation to 
the rules of justice is ‘independent of the divinity, and grounded solely in the very nature of 
things… or it is no way grounded in the nature of things.’
165
 A somewhat crude opposition thus 
developed between justice being reduced to Hobbesian positivism or being founded on the 
nature of things, and this opposition occasioned much debate amongst Genevan thinkers 
influenced by both Leibniz and the natural law tradition. 
Emer de Vattel, for example, sided with Leibniz over Barbeyrac by arguing that 
obligation arising from the will of a superior is devoid of all foundation.
166
 According to Vattel, 
for the foundations of natural law ‘we would not wish to look further than in the essence and 
nature of man and things in general.’
167
 Similarly, Burlamaqui thought that Barbeyrac had not 
done enough to defend Pufendorf from the charge of Hobbism, thus he argued that obligation 
and justice are derived from the very nature of things. Against Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui insisted 
that reason alone and not the will of a superior provides the first and sufficient source of 
obligation.
168
 
Arguments against positivistic and conventional accounts of justice (associated with 
Hobbes) remained prominent in eighteenth-century French thought, not just in thinkers such as 
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Malebranche, Leibniz and even Montesquieu,
169
 but also in modern natural law theory as it 
developed in Geneva.
170
 Modern thinkers drew on ancient sources to claim that justice and right 
must be in accordance with the nature of things and it is well to note that Burlamaqui quoted 
Cicero in support of his position: 
law in the proper sense is right reason in harmony with nature. It is spread through the 
whole community, unchanging and eternal, calling people to their duty by its commands 
and deterring them from wrong-doing by its prohibitions.
171
  
 
Cicero’s account of law and justice is of particular interest given that he attempted to combine 
Roman civil law with Stoic natural law.
172
 Similarly, Rousseau sought to provide a republican 
account of political law that was also in accordance with nature as a transcendent normative 
standard. In The Laws, Cicero argued that the nature of law and justice must be derived from the 
nature of man, for only then would they be in accordance with the nature of things.
173
 
Contesting positivistic and relativistic interpretations of justice,
174
 Cicero insisted that ‘the 
origin of justice must be derived from law. For law is a force of nature, the intelligence and 
reason of a wise man, and the criterion of justice and injustice.’
175
 Rousseau was certainly 
familiar with The Laws and his own understanding of nature, law and justice is well elucidated 
by way of comparison with Cicero.
176
 
 In the Geneva Manuscript Rousseau stated that ‘law comes before justice and not 
justice before law’.
177
 The chapter from which the quote is taken was concerned only with civil 
justice, yet some commentators have nevertheless drawn on the statement to argue that 
Rousseau held a positivistic understanding of all justice as conformity with positive law.
178
 This, 
however, is not the most plausible reading and it is here that comparison with Cicero serves to 
illuminate a more satisfactory interpretation. For Rousseau, much as for Cicero, justice may be 
secondary to law but the law in question is grounded transcendentally in accordance with the 
nature of things and of man. As Rousseau’s discussion of illegitimate contracts in the Second 
Discourse made abundantly clear, he did not consider that any laws were legitimate but only 
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those that preserved man’s inalienable gifts of nature; his life and freedom. Justice would only 
follow from good laws, directed by the general will towards the common interest. Such laws 
would be in accordance with nature, for ‘never do good laws change the nature of things; they 
only follow it, and only such laws are obeyed.’
179
 
To this reading it might be objected that at the beginning of Book I Rousseau claimed 
that the social order does not come from nature and is therefore based on conventions. This 
comment, however, is set out explicitly in the context of examining illegitimate justifications for 
the social order.
180
 In the Second Discourse Rousseau had already shown that the social order 
does not come from nature, at least to the extent that man is not born for society and that the 
onset of social relations arose from contingent factors.
181
 Society cannot be based on nature in a 
descriptive sense because the state of nature was asocial; rather, it must be based on conventions. 
Yet Rousseau still insisted that his principles, in contrast to those he deemed illegitimate, ‘are 
derived from the nature of things, and are based on reason.’
182
 
The most compelling evidence in support of nature supplying a normative standard in the 
Social Contract is to be found in the chapter ‘On Law’, where Rousseau repeated the opening 
lines from the chapter of the Geneva Manuscript entitled ‘On the Nature of Laws and the 
Principles of Civil Justice’: 
Whatever is good and in accordance with order is so by the nature of things, independently 
of human conventions. All justice comes from God; He alone is its source. But if we knew 
how to receive it from on high, we would need neither government nor laws. There is 
without doubt a universal justice emanating from reason alone; but to be acknowledged 
among us, this justice must be reciprocal. Considering things from a human point of view, 
the laws of justice are ineffectual among men for want of a natural sanction.
183
 
 
Conventions are required for men to know that justice is mutually recognised and to obligate 
them reciprocally; yet not just any conventions will do, they have to be in accordance with the 
nature of things. Rousseau’s understanding of law and justice was thus set out in direct 
opposition to the positivism associated with Hobbes. It should be stressed at this stage that this 
was largely a straw Hobbes, although one widely accepted at the time. Indeed Rousseau’s 
remark that when considering ‘things from a human point of view, the laws of justice are 
ineffectual among men for want of a natural sanction’
 
would have easily been endorsed by 
Hobbes, who opened his chapter in De Cive on the causes and generation of a commonwealth 
by arguing that ‘The natural laws are not enough to preserve Peace.’
184
 Neither Hobbes nor 
Rousseau denied that obligation was owed to the laws of nature qua laws of nature. Yet both 
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realised that an appeal to right would prove insufficient if men did not also have an interest in 
observing the laws of nature, and this was the problem that their political philosophies were 
concerned to address. This is not to say that either thinker abandoned nature or natural law as a 
standard of justice, but only that both realised that conventions and artifice are also required if 
justice is to obtain between men in civil society.
185
  
Even if it is granted that Rousseau thought legitimate conventions and law had to be in 
accordance with the nature of things, the claim that his political solution was based on man’s 
nature faces another strong challenge from the role of denaturing. Commentators who have 
appreciated the significance of nature in Rousseau’s thought have nevertheless insisted that the 
role of the legislator in deceiving and transforming men is a source of ‘massive 
contradiction’,
186
 and it is usually accepted that the legislator’s purpose is to defy nature.
187
 
Whilst describing the passage from the state of nature to the civil state, Rousseau stated that it 
‘produces a remarkable change in man,’
188
 the implications of which are only fully realised in 
the chapter on the legislator, in a passage which has occasioned great controversy: 
One who dares to undertake the founding of a people should feel that he is capable of 
changing human nature, so to speak; of transforming each individual, who by himself is a 
perfect and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole from which the individual receives, 
in a sense, his life and being; of altering man’s constitution in order to strengthen it; of 
substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence we 
have all received from nature.
189
 
 
Rousseau’s language of denaturing must be taken seriously, not least because in his 
contemporaneously published Emile he likewise asserted that good ‘social institutions are those 
that best know how to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him in order to give 
him a relative one and transport the I into the common unity’.
190
 For Rousseau, however, 
denaturing could somewhat paradoxically be in accordance with nature, as man is by nature 
perfectible. What is lost in this transformation is man’s independent and solitary existence, yet 
this was only ever a descriptive aspect of his condition in the state of nature; it was never 
constitutive of his God-given nature. Even when man is denatured, he retains his inalienable 
gifts of nature, his life and his freedom. Indeed consideration of the legislator serves to elucidate 
Rousseau’s understanding of how the people remain free and how civil society can be in 
accordance with nature; problems more comprehensively addressed in the next chapter. 
The legislator only drafts the laws and has no legislative right himself. For the laws to 
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be accepted it is necessary that the people, freely assembled, vote on them. The legislator has 
recourse to neither force nor reason, rather he must ‘persuade without convincing.’ To do this he 
needs to speak to the citizens’ hearts rather than their minds, it is thus his wisdom and ‘great 
soul’ that lead the citizens to believe that the gods speak through him.
191
 According to Rousseau, 
all justice comes from God and the laws of nature are written on the hearts of all men. The 
surpassing problem, however, is to devise constitutional laws in accordance with nature. If the 
legislator is capable of both doing so and persuading the citizens to accept the laws that he 
proposes then it is more his wisdom than his allegedly deceitful invocation of the gods that 
warrants his quasi-divine status. 
The legislative right, it should be stressed, remains with the people, who simply give 
their assent to the proposed laws. The laws do not emanate from the people in the sense that the 
people deliberate and propose their own laws; Rousseau thought this beyond the abilities of 
most people, at least with respect to the constitutional laws drafted by the legislator.
192
 
Nonetheless, the people remain free simply by giving or withholding their assent. For Rousseau, 
man’s free will was only ever the consciousness of acquiescing in or resisting the voice of 
nature and likewise the people would only be free in the body politic by consciously 
acquiescing in or resisting the voice of the quasi-divine legislator. 
The role of the legislator is in accordance with man’s freedom and, even though man is 
denatured, it is also in accordance with the order of nature. For Rousseau, the contradiction 
between man and citizen, or the individual and society, was the source of human misery and 
would lead to the death of the body politic. The law, by contrast, is a ‘celestial voice’ that 
teaches each citizen ‘not to be in contradiction with himself.’
193
 The role of the legislator, in 
drafting the laws, was to transform man so that he would no longer think of himself as an 
isolated individual but only as an integral part of the larger moral person constituted by the body 
politic. Rousseau foresaw the criticisms to which his approach would lead, yet was adamant that 
rather than abandoning nature he had only ever reasserted the rights of nature in the social order, 
which he saw vanishing all around him: ‘I found in our social order which – at every point 
contrary to nature, which nothing destroys – tyrannizes over nature constantly and constantly 
makes nature demand its rights.’
194
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Unity and civil religion 
 
In many respects the political problems that Rousseau confronted were similar to those with 
which Hobbes was occupied. At this stage it is well to summarise the ways in which, although 
Rousseau’s political thought started from very Hobbesian concerns, he sought to arrive at 
conclusions largely opposed to Hobbes’s. By way of concluding this chapter, Rousseau’s 
invocation of Hobbes in his discussion on civil religion is then briefly considered. This proves 
to be the most remarkable reference to Hobbes in Rousseau’s œuvre, and reveals the extent to 
which they were both concerned with the importance of unity as a political concept, a concern 
that sets the scene for the discussion in the following chapter. 
As early as the Second Discourse the ills that Rousseau diagnosed in modern society 
resembled those of Hobbes’s state of nature theory. For Rousseau, as for Hobbes, the 
progression of unbridled individualism and the development of factitious passions placed men 
in contradiction with one another, from which a miserable condition ensued and the necessity 
for political institutions arose. Even if men shared a common interest, it would only ever be 
advanced by individuals forsaking their private interests, for which there must be mutual 
assurance that others would do likewise. These are the problems with which political society is 
faced and as such a satisfactory political philosophy must not only delineate principles of 
political right but also show men their interest in being just. Nowhere is Rousseau’s acceptance 
of the Hobbesian problematic more evident than in the Geneva Manuscript and, even if this was 
less apparent in the Social Contract, his problem nevertheless remained that of uniting right and 
interest so that justice and utility would not be at variance. 
Even if Rousseau agreed with Hobbes regarding the problems that political society had 
to overcome, he disagreed about what was required to render the social order legitimate. Where 
Hobbes had been concerned primarily with securing man’s self-preservation, Rousseau insisted 
that it was not just man’s life but equally his freedom that had to be preserved in the social order. 
This meant radically inverting the Hobbesian account of sovereignty, so that it always resided in 
the people and was incapable of being alienated or represented by the will of a superior. In 
arguing thus, Rousseau once again collapsed the prevalent bifurcation between Hobbes and his 
critics in the modern natural law tradition, all of whom had, by Rousseau’s standards, proposed 
accounts of sovereignty and obligation that involved freedom being renounced.  
For Rousseau, freedom could only be preserved if the law was placed above man. 
Citizens would need to freely will the general will and thereby be dependent only on the law (as 
the articulation of their general will) and not the will of other men. The general will that each 
individual possesses qua citizen must prevail over any contrary private will. Indeed for the 
political order to be in accordance with nature as a normative standard any opposition between 
the private and general will would have to be transcended, so that the citizens would not suffer 
from the contradictions that cause human misery. Yet at a more basic level the opposition 
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between conflicting wills posed a threat to the stability and longevity of the body politic. 
Rousseau was, therefore, greatly concerned with the importance of political unity for the 
survival of the state; a concern that he shared with Hobbes.  
One way in which this shared concern played out was in their accounts of sovereignty, 
as both Hobbes and Rousseau maintained that it would be self-defeating for individuals to hold 
rights against the sovereign, thus the will and the judgment of the sovereign had to be absolute. 
For Rousseau, the problem was particularly acute as on the one hand he thought that any 
legitimate conventions would have to be in accordance with nature as a normative standard, for 
only then could any social order ever be judged illegitimate. Yet on the other hand, as with 
Hobbes, he recognised that for civil purposes citizens could not appeal to natural law over the 
will and judgment of the sovereign. To resolve this potential tension Rousseau argued that the 
sovereign is only properly so called when legitimately constituted, that is, when sovereignty 
remains in the people and only pertains to the passing of general laws. Rousseau’s sovereign 
was thus absolute in power but limited in the form of its actions. 
Another way in which their shared concern with political unity played out was in their 
ideas regarding the role of religion in society; indeed on this issue Rousseau explicitly identified 
Hobbes as his main precursor. Rousseau’s chapter on civil religion has occasioned much 
scholarly interest, yet this has mainly been directed at whether or not it should be taken as 
indicative of his alleged totalitarianism.
195
 Critics of the totalitarian reading have quite rightly 
pointed out that the chapter is no less tolerant than John Locke’s Letter on Toleration,
196
 that in 
Geneva it was in fact criticised for being too tolerant,
197
 and even that Rousseau’s argument 
resembles John Rawls’s idea of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines.
198
 Less attention, however, has been directed towards Rousseau’s invocation of 
Hobbes, yet this proves to be one of the most striking passages of the whole chapter: 
Of all Christian Authors, the philosopher Hobbes is the only one who correctly saw the evil 
and the remedy, who dared to propose the reunification of the two heads of the eagle, and 
the complete return to political unity, without which no State or Government will ever be 
wisely constituted.
199
 
 
To appreciate the boldness of this passage it is worth recalling Hobbes’s reputation at the time. 
Hobbes’s principles were widely decried by Rousseau’s contemporaries, thus it was rare to find 
any explicit endorsement of his political ideas, especially those concerning the relationship 
between religion and politics. To claim that Hobbes was the only Christian author to understand 
the problem of religion was all the more remarkable, given that he was widely portrayed as an 
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atheist whose ideas were destructive of all religion and morality. What is more, the very 
association of Hobbism, as Rousseau was well aware, was enough to discredit or even condemn 
an author or theory, as was well illustrated by the fate of Helvétius’s De l’Esprit. Upon its 
publication in 1758 the archbishop of Paris, Christophe de Beaumont, issued a condemnation of 
the work in which he compared Helvétius to Hobbes. Where Hobbes had at least disguised his 
abominable system, Helvétius was accused of openly attacking Christianity.
200
 Helvétius’s 
principles then, so Beaumont claimed, ‘are the same as those of Hobbes; they tend to destroy all 
the foundations of justice and probity; to efface all the notions that have until now been held of 
virtue and the duties that it imposes.’
201
  
Whether or not Rousseau was aware of the exact charges levelled against Helvétius, he 
certainly followed the controversy surrounding the work closely and as a result declined to 
publish his own critique of De l’Esprit.
202
 Rousseau’s own religious views would later be 
condemned by Beaumont and the chapter on civil religion was severely rebuked in Geneva, as 
Rousseau had argued that Christianity – being ‘a totally spiritual religion, uniquely concerned 
with Heavenly matters’ – is  incompatible with love of fatherland.
203
 Christianity was, therefore, 
only a religion of man and not of the citizen, and Rousseau insisted that this was the conclusion 
at which Hobbes should have arrived. Rousseau could hardly have been surprised that invoking 
Hobbes in support of his already controversial account of Christianity would provoke such a 
hostile reaction, and given this context the audacity of the passage cannot be understated. Yet 
this is not the only reason why it is of interest, for it also suggests that Rousseau had recently 
changed his opinion of Hobbes. 
Rousseau’s earliest discussion of civil religion is to be found in his Letter to Voltaire, 
where he wrote that ‘all human Government is limited by its nature to civil duties; and whatever 
the Sophist Hobbes might have been able to say on this, when a man serves the State well, he 
does not owe an account to anyone of the manner in which he serves God.’
204
 Similarly, in his 
earlier draft of the chapter on civil religion, Rousseau only mentioned Hobbes once in order to 
criticise his intolerance,
205
 a criticism that was omitted from the final version. Some scholars 
have argued that Hobbes grew on Rousseau throughout the 1750s, perhaps suggesting that he 
re-read Hobbes.
206
 Examination of the chapter on civil religion certainly supports this 
conclusion and indicates more precisely that the change in opinion occurred between the 
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completion of the Geneva Manuscript and the publication of the Social Contract. That Rousseau 
should have revised his opinion is not all that surprising, however, as his affinities with 
Hobbes’s views on religion predate the Social Contract, even if Rousseau had previously been 
unaware of them as such. 
In the Geneva Manuscript Rousseau argued that religion would be insufficient to prevent 
men from fighting one another, as in developed societies only the force of civil laws could 
secure peace. Moreover, religion was more likely to instigate conflict and sedition than to quell 
discord, as Rousseau stressed in a passage that echoed the arguments advanced by both Hobbes 
and Pierre Bayle: 
The whole earth would be covered with blood and the human race would soon perish if 
Philosophy and laws did not hold back the furies of fanaticism and if the voice of men was 
not louder than that of the Gods.
207
 
 
It is well to note that the passage is from the chapter of the Geneva Manuscript in which 
Rousseau endorsed the Hobbesian problematic of the state of nature. Rousseau, along with 
Hobbes and Bayle, thought that religious allegiances tend to prove a cause of war rather than 
peace and that in states where the clergy forms a body independent of the civil person there are 
consequently ‘two powers, two Sovereigns’.
208
 Rousseau maintained that there could only ever 
be one absolute sovereign body and that if another body attempted to usurp or challenge its 
power then the body politic would be close to ruin.  
Although Rousseau was in agreement with Hobbes and Bayle that there should be no 
conflict in a state between civil and ecclesiastical powers, he explicitly rejected Bayle’s claim 
that a society of atheists could live peacefully together.
209
 Indeed it is somewhat ironic that 
Rousseau’s chapter on civil religion offered the most sympathetic interpretation of Hobbes’s 
religious views since Bayle’s Dictionary article, yet then proceeded to criticise Bayle’s position. 
Whilst Rousseau agreed with Bayle that there must be no contradiction between religious and 
political authority, he also deemed religion essential for good morals and virtue.
210
 
According to Rousseau, the sovereign had the right to establish ‘a purely civil 
profession of faith… not exactly as Religious dogmas, but as sentiments of sociability’. One 
purpose of the sovereign establishing this profession of faith was akin to Hobbes’s arguments 
for the sovereign being the authoritative interpreter of Scripture.
211
 For Hobbes, the reason that 
the ‘two heads of the eagle’ has to be reunified, to use Rousseau’s phrase, was primarily 
negative. Political unity would only ever be secured by removing any challenges to the civil 
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sovereign’s authority that could lead to discord, namely those propagated by ecclesiastical 
powers that tend to excite sedition.  
For Rousseau, however, the purpose of a civil religion was also to cultivate citizenship, 
for ‘it matters greatly to the State that each Citizen have a Religion that causes him to love his 
duties’.
212
 Political unity would only ever be sustained if citizens came to love the laws, their 
duties and the fatherland with a patriotic zeal. One way that this could be achieved would be by 
establishing the religion of the citizen, where the citizens’ love for God would be one with their 
love of fatherland. In his chapter on civil religion, just as with his discussion of the legislator, 
Rousseau indicated how in an ideal body politic the citizens’ passions might be ordered towards 
love of fatherland. This required the development of public mores and the cultivation of virtue, 
topics which Rousseau only fully explored elsewhere in his œuvre. 
 
 
                                                 
212
  Rousseau, Social Contract, CW4:222/ OC3:468. 
 134 
Ordering the Passions 
 
All human establishments are based on the human passions and preserved by 
means of them.
1
 
 
In the Social Contract Rousseau famously began by taking ‘men as they are and laws as they 
might be.’
2
 Yet this was only ever half of his political project for, as he wrote in the Discourse 
on Political Economy, if ‘it is good to know how to use men as they are, it is better still to be 
able to make them what one needs them to be.’
3
 For Rousseau, the task of making men what one 
needs them to be involved ordering their passions and forming their will. In this way the 
contradictions of the social system and the opposition between private and general wills could 
be overcome, and men could once again enjoy the harmonious existence that is lost in modern 
societies. This could only be achieved in a well-ordered republic with institutions capable of 
cultivating love of fatherland and rendering it man’s ‘dominant passion’.
4
  
In developing his vision of a well-ordered republic Rousseau combined a classical 
republican discourse with an understanding of the passions and an analysis of the different 
varieties of love that was indebted to neo-Augustinian French thought. As was often the case, 
Rousseau sought to employ contrasting political discourses in a complementary manner to 
support his own ideas. This chapter focuses on Rousseau’s understanding of the passions and 
the problem of ordering them towards the right type of love that was so central to the 
Augustinian tradition of moral philosophy. The following chapter then examines the conditions 
requisite for cultivating virtue in the body politic and speaks more generally to Rousseau’s 
republicanism. 
In the previous chapters the focus has been on examining Rousseau’s response to 
Hobbes, or to Hobbism as it was understood in eighteenth-century French thought. This has 
largely entailed locating that response within its historical context in order to discern exactly 
what Rousseau thought he was doing by engaging with Hobbes. In this chapter and the next a 
broader intellectual context is considered, hence the emphasis falls less on Rousseau’s direct 
engagement with Hobbes and more on disclosing the wider philosophical affinities and 
differences between their political theories. 
Both Hobbes and Rousseau were centrally concerned with the importance of 
establishing political unity. This involved developing a unified political will that was realised in 
the person of the sovereign. Yet both thinkers also recognised that what men will is in large part 
determined by the passions that move them. For political unity to be preserved, men would have 
to come to identify their own life as being inextricably bound up with, or secured by, the life of 
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the body politic. Such identification could not be ensured solely by showing men their rational 
interest in adhering to the laws of the body politic. For peace and unity to be sustained, 
individuals would have to identify at a much deeper level; their passions, as much as their 
reason, would have to attach them to the body politic. 
One of the central political problems for both Hobbes and Rousseau then – perhaps 
more so than for any other modern political philosopher – was that of ordering the passions to 
secure political unity. This might initially seem like a surprising claim but it appears less so 
once the problems that their theories were set out to overcome are considered. For Hobbes, 
famously, the natural condition of mankind was a war of all against all and this, so he claimed, 
was an ‘Inference, made from the Passions’.
5
 Similarly, for Rousseau, the necessity for political 
institutions arises at the point when our ‘needs bring us together in proportion as our passions 
divide us’.
6
 Both thinkers were acutely aware of the problems that men’s inflamed passions and 
the unbridled individualism developed therewith posed to the stability of society. In examining 
their respective accounts of the passions some of the most important resemblances and 
distinctions between their political philosophies are thus elucidated.  
First and foremost, however, the aim of this chapter is to build on the interpretation of 
Rousseau that has been advanced heretofore, and, in doing so, address the problematical 
relationship between nature, free will and the passions. The cultivation of the passions in 
Rousseau’s ideal republic may initially seem in tension with the significance that he attached to 
nature as a normative standard and to the importance of free will in rendering any social body 
legitimate. To resolve these tensions the precise nature and bearing of the concepts must be 
explicated, which in large part rests on dispelling the proto-Kantian readings of Rousseau that 
abound. This is especially significant given that some of the commentators who have taken the 
role of free will most seriously in Rousseau’s thought have closely associated the concept with a 
Kantian notion of autonomy.
7
 In addition, a proto-Kantian account of virtue has being attributed 
to Rousseau, where men’s inclinations and duties are in a perpetual state of war and virtue 
entails the triumph of the latter.
8
 Such readings, however, are in marked contrast to the 
importance that Rousseau placed on harmony and unity for rendering man’s life happy and in 
accordance with nature. 
To indicate from the outset where the proto-Kantian readings go astray, it is well to recall 
the challenges that Rousseau thought political society had to overcome. One of the greatest 
problems that Rousseau identified with the development of modern commercial society was that 
man’s naturally harmonious and ordered existence had been lost and his life is consequently rife 
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with contradiction. Nowhere was this made more explicit than in an unpublished fragment on 
the public happiness, which has already been quoted but bears being repeated: 
What causes human misery is the contradiction between our conditions and our desires, 
between our duties and inclinations, between nature and social institutions, between the man 
and the citizen. Make man united and you will make him as happy as he can be. Give him 
entirely to the state or leave him entirely to himself; but if you divide his heart, you tear him 
to pieces.
9
 
 
This contradiction manifested itself in many forms. In addition to those mentioned in the 
passage, the contradictions between the private will and the general will and between man’s 
primitive amour de soi-même and his socially acquired amour-propre may be added. The latter 
of these is of great significance when considering Rousseau’s theory of the passions, not least 
because in the second part of the Second Discourse he recounted how these two types of love 
became opposed to one another. The golden age for man was one in which amour-propre was 
active but tempered by pity,
10
 from which man’s existence was rendered progressively miserable 
to the extent that his amour-propre developed in opposition to his amour de soi-même.
11
  
For man to recover a harmonious existence in developed societies this contradiction 
would have to be overcome and the positive potential of amour-propre would have to be 
realised, much as Rousseau indicated as early as 1755, when he wrote of ‘combining the force 
of amour-propre with all the beauty of virtue’ to make it ‘the most heroic of all the passions.’
12
 
For Rousseau, political virtue would only ever be attained by cultivating men’s passions over 
their reason, thus rather than reading him as a forerunner of Kant, it is best to proceed from an 
examination of the intellectual context within which he developed his own account of the 
passions in general and of amour-propre in particular. 
 
Neutralising amour-propre 
 
Rousseau famously argued that amour-propre could lead to either virtue or vice because as a 
passion it was ‘naturally neutral.’
13
 However, to claim that amour-propre was anything other 
than a vicious passion that was the source of man’s depravity was to oppose a strong trend of 
French moral thought that was only beginning to be challenged towards the end of the 
seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century.
14
 This tradition of thought was Augustinian 
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in origin and centred on the problem of the right type of love. It is only with this context in mind 
that Rousseau’s own account of the passions can be fully understood, in which he would attempt 
to harmonise amour de soi-même and amour-propre through love of fatherland.  
For Augustine, man’s purpose was to love God according to God, rather than according 
to man, and only when man was so disposed could he be said to have a good will. Augustine 
called this disposition charity (caritas) or love (amor), and what mattered was the type of love 
with which man loved God. In a sentence that captures well the problem that would be at the 
heart of much seventeenth and early eighteenth-century French moral philosophy, Augustine 
wrote that a ‘righteous will, then, is a good love; and a perverted will is an evil love.’
15
 This evil 
love was self-love, or pride, which was the cause of Original Sin and man’s fall, which, in turn, 
resulted in the opposition between the earthly city of men and the heavenly city of God. These 
two cities could be characterised accordingly by the types of love that prevailed in each, thus ‘in 
the one city, love of God has been given pride of place, and, in the other, love of self.’
16
 
Augustine’s influence on the development of early modern philosophy and theology 
loomed large, especially in Catholic countries; indeed it has even been argued that an 
‘Augustinian moment’ characterised European thought from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-
eighteenth century.
17
 This characterisation certainly reflected much seventeenth-century French 
thought, most notably through the influence of Saint-Cyran and Cornelius Jansen, who brought 
Augustinianism to the Port-Royal community. However, Augustinian ideas were not confined to 
what later came to be called Jansenism, and they permeated the moral philosophy of thinkers 
such as Senault, La Rochefoucauld and even Malebranche. Rousseau was well versed in this 
tradition of French thought and read widely within it during the 1730s under the guidance of 
Madame de Warens. This was a formative period in his philosophical development, during 
which he attempted to equip himself with ‘a storehouse of ideas’, before comparing and judging 
them to form his own convictions.
18
 Rousseau was so occupied with the writings of Port-Royal 
and the Oratory that he even described himself as ‘half Jansenist’.
19
 
In what is now the most comprehensive historical examination of amour-propre in 
seventeenth-century France, Charles-Olivier Stiker-Métral identifies the 1640s as the turning 
point when the distinctively Augustinian interpretation of the passion became established.
20
 
Around this time Augustine’s self-love (amor sui) was translated into French as either amour-
propre or amour de soi. The former was always used pejoratively and even though the latter 
could be used neutrally, both were opposed to charity (la charité) or pure love (pur amour), 
                                                 
15
  Augustine, City of God, Book XIV, Chapter 7, p. 592. 
16
  Augustine, City of God, XIV.13, p. 608; XIV.28, p. 632. 
17
  Wright, The Counter-Reformation, pp. 1-33. 
18
  Rousseau, Confessions, CW5:199/ OC1:237. Of the thinkers discussed in this section the only one to 
whom Rousseau never explicitly referred in his published writings was Senault. However, even if 
Rousseau was unfamiliar with Senault’s work, it nevertheless merits being examined given Senault’s 
influence in transmitting the language of Augustinian amour-propre to later French moralists. 
19
  Rousseau, Confessions, CW5:203/ OC1:242. 
20
  Stiker-Métral, Narcisse contrarié, pp. 69-137. 
 138 
which represented Augustine’s love of God according to God.
21
 One of the earliest and most 
influential moralists to use the concept of amour-propre in the Augustinian sense that was to 
become prominent in much later seventeenth-century thought was Jean-François Senault. 
Following Augustine, Senault affirmed that the only passion that moves man is love, 
even if it takes on disguised forms,
22
 thus the problem with which he was centrally concerned 
was that of directing love towards its rightful object. Senault argued that the disorder of man’s 
passions was occasioned by Original Sin. The passions of pre-lapsarian man were no less 
natural than those of man after the fall; the only difference being that in the state of innocence 
man’s passions were well-ordered.
23
 In this state charity and amour-propre were mixed together 
as one, and the natures of the two loves only changed and became opposed to one another 
through Original Sin, by which man forgot what he owed to God and rather made a god of 
himself.
24
 This idea, that amour-propre was only rendered evil by Original Sin, would prove to 
be the characteristic feature of a distinctively Augustinian analysis of amour-propre throughout 
much seventeenth-century French thought.
25
 
In man’s fallen state, according to Senault, only the combination of grace and reason 
can govern the passions. Reason alone is insufficient for ‘if grace does not assist us, amour-
propre betrays us’.
26
 With the assistance of grace, reason may direct and moderate the passions; 
man cannot banish them from his heart but reason might direct his love towards legitimate 
objects and thereby ‘render it virtuous by an innocent deception.’
27
 Although Senault thought 
that the passions could be directed towards virtue, he maintained that amour-propre itself was 
always inimical to charity, piety and justice. Senault, then, firmly consolidated the idea that the 
nature of amour-propre was unequivocally negative, yet by the end of the seventeenth century 
this idea was beginning to be challenged. Indeed even amongst those who accepted that the 
passion was itself a vice, the positive social effects to which it could give rise were increasingly 
emphasised as the century progressed. 
The idea that man’s vices might imitate the effects of virtue was commonplace amongst 
much of the most widely read moral thought of the latter half of the seventeenth century. For 
instance, Blaise Pascal wrote that we ‘have used concupiscence as best we can to make it serve 
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the common good. But that is only pretence, and a false picture of charity.’
28
 Similarly Jean de 
La Bruyère claimed that there ‘is no vice which does not bear a misleading likeness to some 
virtue, and take advantage of this’,
29
 and François de La Rochefoucauld opened the fourth and 
fifth editions of his Maxims with the epitaph ‘Our virtues are, most often, only vices in 
disguise’.
30
 La Rochefoucauld even went as far as to claim that amour-propre imitates the 
effects of virtue, although the maxim in which he did so was removed from the final edition: 
We are so thoroughly biased in our own favour that, most often, what we take for virtues are 
really only vices which resemble them, and which amour-propre has disguised from us.
31
 
 
In the final and most widely read edition of the Maxims La Rochefoucauld did not explicitly 
state that amour-propre has beneficial effects, although this could have easily been inferred. 
Instead La Rochefoucauld employed the less pejorative term of self-interest (l’intérêt), which 
‘puts on display all kinds of virtues and vices’ and ‘often deserves to be praised for our good 
deeds.’
32
 Only in an unpublished maxim did La Rochefoucauld suggest how closely self-interest 
and amour-propre are related, in which he claimed that ‘Self-interest is the soul of amour-
propre.’
33
 
The notion that amour-propre could imitate the effects of virtue found its strongest 
expression in the work of Pierre Nicole, which in many respects marks the culmination of the 
tradition of French neo-Augustinian moralists who argued, foreshadowing Mandeville, that 
men’s vices lead to public benefits. This is evident from the opening lines of Nicole’s essay 
dedicated to the topic, ‘Of Charity and of amour-propre’: 
Although there is nothing so opposed to charity, which relates all to God, than amour-
propre, which relates all to itself, there is nevertheless nothing that so resembles the effects 
of charity as those of amour-propre
34
 
 
Nicole maintained that charity and amour-propre were completely opposed to one another, yet 
as the sole difference between these two loves was dispositional ultimately only God could 
distinguish between them.
35
 A society founded on amour-propre nonetheless remained corrupt 
despite the civil benefits that flow from the passion being enlightened. Nicole even supported 
his Augustinian theory of human nature with a Hobbesian account of man, the origins of civil 
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society and the means by which men’s passions could be directed so that peace might be 
procured. This line of thought was later taken to its logical conclusion by Pierre Bayle, who 
argued that if enlightened amour-propre leads men to live together in peace and if love of God 
is superfluous for civil purposes then a society of atheists could subsist perfectly well.
36
 
If Nicole was the first to comprehensively neutralise the effects and political implications 
of amour-propre, it was arguably Nicolas Malebranche who first neutralised the nature of the 
passion. The most important concept in Malebranche’s morality was love of order, under which 
he subsumed love of God, or charity.
37
 Where Nicole had insisted that amour-propre remained 
inherently evil despite the civil benefits that flow from its enlightenment, Malebranche argued 
that the passion was neither virtuous nor vicious. Equating amour-propre with the desire of 
being happy, Malebranche claimed that ‘amour-propre in itself is not bad: God unceasingly 
produces it in us.’
38
 The problem was rather to enlighten it so that it would be in harmony with 
love of order: 
Nonetheless when amour-propre is enlightened, when it is regulated, when it is in accord 
with love of order, one achieves the greatest perfection of which one is capable.
39
 
 
Where for Nicole enlightened amour-propre would only ever imitate charity, for Malebranche it 
could be in genuine agreement with love of order and therewith love of God. Indeed 
Malebranche claimed that amour-propre is ‘the natural motive to virtue’ and only in wicked 
men becomes the motive to vice; as such it is ‘the motive which should make us love God, unite 
ourselves with Him, [and] submit ourselves to [His] law.’
40
 It is also worth noting that 
Malebranche was as much indebted to Cartesian philosophy as he was to Augustinian moral 
thought, both of which may have influenced his theory of the passions. Descartes had attempted 
to provide a scientific examination of the passions, explaining them only as ‘a Physicist’ and not 
‘as an Orator, or even as a moral Philosopher.’
41
 Eschewing any theological account that would 
render man’s post-lapsarian passions inherently sinful, Descartes concluded that the passions 
‘are all in their nature good, and that we have nothing to avoid but misuses or excesses of 
them’.
42
 For Malebranche too, it was only the misuse of the passions that led to vice and 
although he still adhered to the Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin – whereby man’s fall was 
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37
  Malebranche, Traité de Morale, Œuvres, XI, p. 41. 
38
  ‘l’amour propre en lui-même n’est pas mauvais : Dieu le produit sans cesse en nous.’ Malebranche, 
Traité de Morale, Œuvres, XI, p. 101. 
39
  ‘Néanmoins lors que l’amour propre est éclairé, lors qu’il est reglé, lors qu’il est d’accord avec 
l’amour de l’ordre, on est dans la plus grande perfection dont on soit capable.’ Malebranche, Traité de 
Morale, Œuvres, XI, p. 45. The idea that amour-propre could be turned to good use if in accordance with 
love of order, usually associated with Malebranche, may well have also been familiar to Rousseau from 
Bernard Lamy’s Entretiens sur les sciences [1683], see Lee, ‘The Platonic Education of Amour-propre’. 
40
  ‘c’est le motif naturel de la vertu, & qui devient dans les pécheurs le motif du vice… [Il] est le motif 
qui doit nous faire aimer Dieu, nous unir à lui, nous soumettre à la loi.’ Malebranche, Traité de Morale, 
Œuvres, XI, p. 270. 
41
  Descartes, The Passions of the Soul [1649], Preface, p. 17. 
42
  Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, Article 211, p. 132. 
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the result of corrupt love – he emphasised the disorder of this love rather than its origin in 
amour-propre, thus eliding the prevalent bifurcation between amour-propre and love of God 
and rendering the passion morally neutral.
43
  
As the eighteenth century progressed the notion that amour-propre was unequivocally 
negative was increasingly challenged, especially by thinkers who repudiated the Augustinian 
theory of man’s post-lapsarian state for a more positive account of human nature. For example, 
Malebranche’s neutralised account of amour-propre was adopted by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre 
(whose works Rousseau would have known especially well given that he was responsible for 
editing and abridging them).
44
 Saint-Pierre followed Malebranche in arguing that amour-propre 
is the source of both all vices and all moral virtues, and proceeded to distinguish between 
innocent, virtuous and unjust amour-propre.
45
 By the middle of the eighteenth century the neo-
Augustinian moralists of the previous century were coming under sustained criticism. For 
instance, the Marquis de Vauvenargues had Pascal and especially La Rochefoucauld in his 
sights when he provocatively asked: ‘Is it against reason or justice to love oneself? And why do 
we always want amour-propre to be a vice?’
46
 Similarly, Charles Pinot Duclos set out his highly 
acclaimed Considerations on the Mores of this Century against those who began their writings 
on morality by condemning man for his miserable and corrupt state: 
Men are, it is said, full of amour-propre and attached to their interest. Let it be so. These 
dispositions have nothing vicious in themselves, they [only] become good or evil by the 
effects that they produce.
47
 
 
Even amongst those who denied that amour-propre was inherently sinful, however, its negative 
implications were still retained and its propensity to lead towards vice still emphasised. It is 
well to remember that Malebranche was reticent about the passion’s positive effects and 
criticised Hobbes for having founded all justice on amour-propre.
48
 This line of criticism 
persisted throughout much eighteenth-century French thought – reinforced by Barbeyrac’s 
translations of Pufendorf – and underwrote the association of Hobbes with Epicureanism,
49
 
                                                 
43
  More generally see Stiker-Métral, who similarly argues that Malebranche’s Traité de Morale represents 
the rupture between the moral thought of the Oratory and the Augustinianism of Port-Royal, precisely 
because Malebranche retained the Augustinian framework but re-evaluated the place of amour-propre 
within it, Narcisse contrarié, especially pp. 285-295. 
44
  The Marquis de Mirabeau suggested this project (via Madame Dupin), and Rousseau worked on it 
from the mid 1750s. For details see Rousseau’s Confessions, CW5:342/ OC1407. 
45
  For Malebranche’s influence on Saint-Pierre’s account of amour-propre see Keohane, Philosophy and 
the State in France, pp. 365-369.  
46
  ‘Est-il contre la raison ou la justice de s’aimer soi-même? Et pourquoi voulons-nous que l’amour-
propre soit toujours un vice?’ Vauvenargues, Réflexions et Maximes, maxim 290, Œuvres, vol. II, p. 432. 
The Réflexions et Maximes were first published alongside the Introduction à la Connaissance de l’Esprit 
Humain in 1746. 
47
  ‘Les hommes sont, dit-on, pleins d’amour-propre, & attachés à leurs intérêt. Partons de-là. Ces 
dispositions n’ont par elles-mêmes rien de vicieux, elles deviennent bonnes ou mauvaises par les effets 
qu’elles produisent.’ Duclos, Considérations sur les Mœurs de ce Siecle [1751], p. 7. 
48
  See Chapter One, ‘Malebranche’s critique of Hobbes’. 
49
  See Chapter One, ‘Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui and natural law’. 
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charges of which Rousseau would have been concerned to avoid. 
With this context very briefly sketched out it is worth returning to the distinction 
between amour de soi-même and amour-propre that Rousseau first drew in a note to the Second 
Discourse, in which he claimed that the former is ‘a natural sentiment’, whereas the latter ‘is 
only a relative sentiment, artificial and born in Society’.
50
 The note is to a passage where 
Rousseau criticised Hobbes for (supposedly) holding that man is naturally evil because he had 
attributed an inflamed variety of amour-propre to man’s nature; indeed Rousseau’s own account 
of natural goodness was set out against both Hobbesian and Augustinian conceptions of man. 
These conceptions were very similar, as is evident from the ease with which Nicole employed a 
Hobbesian theory of man and the origins of society to support his Augustinian account of man’s 
post-lapsarian state.
51
 Read in this context, then, Hobbes was criticised in the Second Discourse 
for adhering to an Augustinian account of man and amour-propre that Rousseau himself 
repudiated.
52
 
Just as for many neo-Augustinian moralists man’s amour-propre was only rendered evil 
by Original Sin, so too for Rousseau amour-propre was only rendered evil by the onset of 
illegitimate social relations. To the extent that the Second Discourse may be read as a 
secularised account of the specifically Augustinian story of man’s fall,
53
 Original Sin is recast in 
terms of the development of entrenched relations of inequality and the onset of luxury. Yet, for 
Rousseau, amour-propre itself was not a vice, for man’s post-lapsarian state was not a necessary 
consequence of social relations and if inequality and luxury could be avoided then amour-
propre could be rendered positive. In Emile, which was ‘nothing but a treatise on the original 
goodness of man,’
54
 Rousseau could thus argue that amour-propre is naturally neutral. 
Rousseau opened his first discussion of amour-propre in Emile by restating his principle 
of natural goodness, setting down as ‘an incontestable maxim that the first movements of nature 
                                                 
50
  Rousseau, Second Discourse, CW3:91/ OC3:219. The linguistic distinction was not entirely original to 
Rousseau and he may well have been influenced by the distinction that Jacques Abbadie emphasised 
between amour-propre and amour de nous-mêmes. For Abbadie, amour de nous-mêmes was a natural 
inclination, innocent in itself and of divine origin, whereas amour-propre was its corrupt variant, L’art de 
se connoître soi-mesme [1692], especially pp. 102-104, 202-206. This distinction proved influential and 
occasioned much praise amongst those who were opposed to the neo-Augustinian picture of human 
nature, such as Vauvenargues, Connaissance de l’Esprit Humain, Œuvres, vol. I, pp. 227-228. Rosenblatt 
suggests that Mandeville was an important source for the development of Rousseau’s account of amour-
propre (Rousseau and Geneva, pp. 73-74, 81-82) and it is tempting to compare Mandeville’s distinction 
between self-liking and self-love with Rousseau’s distinction between amour-propre and amour de soi-
même; see Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 465; Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment, pp. 
392-393. Although there are conceptual resemblances, it is well to point out that in the French translation 
of The Fable of the Bees Mandeville’s terminology was actually the inverse of Rousseau’s. Mandeville’s 
self-liking, which is akin to Rousseau’s amour-propre, was translated as ‘Estime de soi-même’, whereas 
Mandeville’s self-love, which is akin to Rousseau’s amour de soi-même, was translated as ‘Amour-
propre’, Mandeville, La Fable des Abeilles [1740], vol. 3, p. 179. 
51
  More generally on the affinities between Augustinian and Epicurean traditions of thought (with 
Hobbes usually located in the latter) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see Force, Self-Interest 
before Adam Smith, pp. 48-90; Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment, especially pp. 126-130; 
Stiker-Métral, Narcisse contrarié, pp. 377-400. 
52
  The importance of this point is explored more comprehensively below, ‘Of love and fear’. 
53
  See Brooke, ‘Rousseau’s Political Philosophy’, pp. 110-112. 
54
  Rousseau, Dialogues, CW1:213/ OC1:934. 
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are always right’. He then proceeded to claim that the ‘sole passion natural to man is amour de 
soi or amour-propre taken in an extended sense.’
55
 By its nature, then, amour-propre is not 
opposed to amour de soi-même; indeed it is rather an extended form of this natural passion. 
Amour de soi-même is the passion that concerns man with his own preservation and well-being. 
This is also true of amour-propre, the difference being that amour-propre only becomes active 
once man begins to think that his preservation and well-being are dependent on other men; 
hence amour de soi-même concerns man solely with himself, whereas amour-propre makes 
comparisons with other men.
56
 In this sense, amour-propre is the natural extension of amour de 
soi-même once man becomes a social being, and therefore the passion ‘becomes good or bad 
only by the application made of it and the relations given to it.’
57
 The important point to stress 
presently, however, is simply that by their nature amour de soi-même and amour-propre are not 
in contradiction with one another and if these two types of love could remain in harmony then 
the order or nature could be preserved in the civil state. 
 
The right type of love 
 
If the depravity that man suffers in modern commercial society is a result of the contradiction 
between his amour de soi-même and amour-propre, then an ideal body politic would have to 
bring these two passions into harmony with one another. Rousseau’s most developed account of 
the psychology of amour-propre is to be found in Emile, which more generally provides the 
most comprehensive elucidation of his theory of the passions. Nominally, at least, Emile was a 
treatise on education and similarly Rousseau thought that republican education was necessary to 
cultivate the right type of love and order men’s passions towards virtue. Yet Emile was not to be 
educated in the ideal republic that Rousseau proposed elsewhere, but rather in modern states 
such as eighteenth-century France where all the contradictions of the social system were rife. 
Rousseau distinguished between three types of education: one coming from nature, one 
from men and one from things. A child could only be raised well when these three types of 
education are in agreement.
58
 However, given the contradictions pervading modern societies, 
‘their harmony is impossible. Forced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must 
choose between making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time.’
59
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  Rousseau, Emile, CW13:225/ OC4:332. 
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  Rousseau, Emile, CW13:364/ OC4:495. 
57
  Rousseau, Emile, CW13:225/ OC4:332. To be sure, Rousseau’s position in Emile is not quite consistent 
with his earliest distinction between amour de soi-même and amour-propre drawn in the Second 
Discourse, where he described them as ‘two passions very different in their Nature and their effects’, 
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  Rousseau, Emile, CW13:162/ OC4:247. 
59
  Rousseau, Emile, CW13:163/ OC4:248. It is important to stress that the opposition between the 
different types of education is a result of the contradictions within modern societies, and thus not all types 
of education – such as those suitable for republics – are forced to combat either nature or social 
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Rousseau thus distinguished between domestic and public education, and was only concerned 
with the former in Emile, since his setting was one where public education ‘can no longer exist, 
because where there is no longer fatherland, there can no longer be citizens.’
60
 
From the outset of Emile, then, Rousseau made it clear that in modern states a good 
education was limited by the contradiction between nature and the social institutions, at least 
one of which Emile’s education would have to oppose. Emile’s education would therefore be 
incapable of overcoming the contradiction between amour de soi-même and amour-propre, 
rather the aim was to delay Emile’s exposure to social relations for as long as possible in order 
to prevent amour-propre from becoming inflamed.
61
 Even though Rousseau did not propose an 
education of the citizen in Emile, there are nevertheless affinities with the public education that 
he recommended for states like Poland and Corsica. In both cases education should be negative; 
since man is naturally good it suffices if education simply prevents the vices from developing.
62
 
More generally, the theory of the passions developed in Emile proves instructive for 
understanding how republican institutions could order citizens’ passions and cultivate the right 
type of love. 
One potential problem with examining Rousseau’s theory of the passions is that he was 
not entirely consistent in distinguishing between sentiments and passions. Most notably, he 
sometimes referred to amour de soi-même as man’s most natural sentiment and sometimes as a 
passion. In Emile Rousseau often (although not exclusively) referred to passions as only arising 
with developed social relations,
63
 thus he claimed that amour-propre is ‘the first and most 
natural of all the passions’.
64
 This need not prove too much of a problem, however, once it is 
remembered that amour-propre is only an extended form of amour de soi-même.
65
 Indeed 
sentiments and passions are very closely related; the main distinction is that when Rousseau 
wrote about their corruption he usually referred to the effect on the passions rather than on the 
sentiments. Yet the passions could remain in conformity with the order of nature to the extent 
that they did not oppose man’s natural amour de soi-même, from which they all derived: 
The source of our passions, the origin and the principle of all the others, the only one born 
with man and which never leaves him so long as he lives is amour de soi – a primitive, 
innate passion, which is anterior to every other, and of which all others are in a sense only 
                                                                                                                                               
institutions. This point is frequently overlooked, which has important implications for the way that nature 
and citizenship are understood in Rousseau’s thought. For example see Cooper, Rousseau, Nature and the 
Problem of the Good Life, pp. 49-50, and the discussion of his position below. 
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  Rousseau, Emile, CW13:165/ OC4:250. Although public education is not a possibility in Emile, 
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  For extended analysis of Emile’s domestic education as a remedy for the problem of amour-propre see 
Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love, pp. 171-183. 
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  Rousseau, Considerations on Poland, CW11:181/ OC3:968; Emile, CW13:226/ OC4:323. 
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  For example, Rousseau quite remarkably claimed that when the adult Emile fell in love with Sophie 
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any kind.’ Emile, CW13:600/ OC4:778. 
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  Rousseau, Emile, CW13:359/ OC4:488. 
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  Rousseau, Emile, CW13:225/ OC4:332. 
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modifications. In this sense, if you wish, all passions are natural… amour de soi-même is 
always good and always in conformity with order.
66
 
 
Given the close relationship between amour de soi-même and amour-propre, it is not all that 
surprising that Rousseau alternated between using the two terms in Emile to indicate how the 
passions could be cultivated in political society. For example, Rousseau claimed that ‘Love of 
men derived from amour de soi is the principle of human justice’,
67
 and also that we should 
‘extend amour-propre to other beings. We shall transform it into a virtue, and there is no man’s 
heart in which this virtue does not have its root.’
68
 In a well-ordered republic man’s amour-
propre, as a natural extension of his amour de soi-même, could be channelled towards political 
virtue. The possibility of doing so, however, was only fully explored in the political writings 
where Rousseau examined the role of public education in forming citizens. 
Rousseau considered that public education is ‘one of the fundamental maxims of popular 
or legitimate government.’
69
 The role of education was nothing less than that of forming the 
souls of citizens from childhood 
so that they will be patriots by inclination, by passion, by necessity. Upon opening up its 
eyes a child ought to see the fatherland and until death ought to see nothing but it. Every 
true republican imbibes the love of the fatherland, he lives only for it; as soon as he is alone, 
he is nothing: as soon as he has no more fatherland, he no longer is, and if he is not dead, he 
is worse than dead.
70
 
 
Although this passage is to be found in one of Rousseau’s last political works, written around 
1771-1772, it is consistent with the ideas on republican education that he had developed as early 
as 1755,
71
 when he wrote that if citizens  
are trained early enough never to consider their persons except as related to the body of the 
State, and not to perceive their own existence, so to speak, except as part of the state’s, they 
will eventually come to identify themselves in some way with this larger whole; to feel 
themselves to be members of the fatherland; to love it with that delicate feeling that any 
isolated man feels only for himself; to elevate their soul perpetually towards this great 
object; and thereby to transform into a sublime virtue this dangerous disposition from which 
all our vices arise.
72
 
 
Rousseau argued in Emile that a child only begins to think of himself as an individual through 
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the development of his memory, by which he ‘extends the sentiment of identity to all the 
moments of his existence’.
73
 If, however, the earliest sentiments that the child experiences are 
associated with the fatherland, then he may come to identify his whole existence with the 
fatherland and consider his life to be inseparable from it. A child’s identity is formed by the 
development of his memory and imagination, and education has the power to affect this 
development to the extent that a child may come to identify himself either as a solitary 
individual or as a part of a larger whole. Education serves to order the passions by way of the 
imagination as even though the ‘source of all the passions is sensibility; imagination determines 
their bent.’
74
 In this way public education could denature man in much the same way that the 
legislator is supposed to in the Social Contract, by transforming the individual into a citizen so 
that ‘each individual believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no longer feels 
except within the whole.’
75
 
To preserve political virtue citizens would have to love the fatherland with the same 
love that isolated individuals feel only for themselves. In this sense man’s natural amour de soi-
même could be extended – or generalised – to the larger moral self constituted by the body 
politic.
76
 Amour de soi-même would thereby be transformed into love of fatherland, as instead of 
citizens having the perception of themselves as individual selves, they would associate their self 
only with the larger body of the republic.
77
 
Rousseau’s public education aimed to inculcate love of fatherland in children from the 
earliest possible age, for which it was also necessary to cultivate their amour-propre. Where the 
domestic education proposed in Emile had been centred on delaying the onset of amour-propre, 
the public education that Rousseau advocated for republics involved activating children’s 
amour-propre in order to accustom them ‘to living under the eyes of their fellow citizens and to 
desiring public approval.’
78
 Even in adulthood this ‘patriotic intoxication’ would only be 
sustained if ‘all Citizens feel themselves incessantly under the public’s eyes… [and] depend so 
much on public esteem, that no one can do anything, acquire anything, [or] succeed in anything 
without it.’
79
 In addition to being a generalised form of amour de soi-même, then, love of 
fatherland would also be derived from man’s amour-propre.
80
 In his Plan for a Constitution of 
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Corsica Rousseau drew a distinction between pride and vanity, these being ‘the two branches of 
amour-propre.’ Where vanity is based only on false prejudices, pride is more natural as ‘it 
consists in esteeming oneself based on truly estimable goods’. Moreover, where vanity concerns 
individuals solely with themselves, the object of pride can be general. To make citizens active 
and laborious, governments need to appeal to their pride – the positive branch of amour-
propre – by providing them with ‘great desires, great hopes, [and] great positive motives for 
acting.’
81
 
The object of citizens’ pride should be the glory of the fatherland, yet for this ‘to be kept 
incessantly before their eyes’ it is important to attach rewards and honours to virtuous acts,
82
  so 
that ‘public testimony of a man’s virtue is the sweetest prize he can receive for it’.
83
 Love of 
fatherland would thus be derived from citizens’ amour-propre, as every citizen would esteem 
and approve of those who acted virtuously. If all of the citizens loved virtue then any individual 
citizen would be sure to satisfy his own amour-propre by acting virtuously.  
In a well-ordered republic virtue could be cultivated by generalising man’s amour de 
soi-même and channelling man’s amour-propre through love of fatherland. In doing so, the 
contradiction between the citizens’ amour de soi-même and their amour-propre would be 
overcome, as both passions would be directed towards the same object. Indeed if the social law 
could be placed at the bottom of men’s hearts then they would be ‘Civil men by their nature and 
Citizens by their inclinations, they will be united, they will be good, they will be happy, and 
their felicity will be the Republic’s.’
84
 What is more, it is not only the contradiction between 
amour de soi-même and amour-propre that would be transcended in the ideal republic but also 
that between the private will and the general will.
85
 According to Rousseau, ‘virtue is only the 
conformity of the private will to the general’, and where love of fatherland flourishes ‘we 
willingly want what is wanted by the people we love.’
86
 To the extent that citizens perceive of 
themselves as being only a fractional part of the larger unity constituted by the body politic, 
they will come to perceive of their own interest as being inextricably bound up with the interest 
of the republic and a citizen would never willingly contravene the general will if he loved the 
fatherland as he loved himself. 
Public education, so essential to the survival of the republic, would thus continue the 
work that the legislator was charged with commencing at the origin of societies, that of 
denaturing the individual. Denaturing, for Rousseau, was a process of transforming man’s 
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existence from a solitary individual into a citizen whose identity is only a fractional part of the 
larger unity constituted by the body politic. The denaturing of man, then, should be understood 
as the transformation within man from the perspective of the particular to that of the general. 
This idea is most famously articulated in the concept of the general will as a generalised form of 
man’s individual will, yet it is not only man’s will but also the object of his passions that are 
generalised in the body politic. Man is naturally good and social institutions have the potential 
to either corrupt this goodness, as shown in the Second Discourse, or to generalise it in the body 
politic by cultivating the virtuous citizen. 
Even though the transformation of men into citizens would require a process of 
denaturing, the life of the citizen would, paradoxically, be in conformity with nature as a 
normative standard. The citizen would be free from the contradictions that cause human misery 
and regain the ordered and harmonious existence that Rousseau thought had been lost in modern 
commercial societies. The idea that any form of social life could be in conformity with nature is 
one that many Rousseau scholars would resist, however, the present line of interpretation has 
been comprehensively pursued by Laurence D. Cooper. Cooper quite rightly argues that the 
main polarity in Rousseau’s thought is not between nature and society (or artifice), but rather 
between living in accordance with nature or in contradiction with nature. Yet Cooper still finds 
that although nature and society are compatible, ‘Nature and citizenship are roads that do not 
meet.’ For Cooper, the citizen does not live in accordance with nature, even if his soul is well-
ordered in a kind of correspondence with nature.
87
 
According to Cooper, whatever preserves amour de soi-même ‘is natural in the civil 
state’,
88
 and although he recognises that rightly ordered amour-propre is essential in the republic, 
he argues that civic virtue is not in conformity with nature as it is a species of amour-propre, 
which is opposed to amour de soi-même.
89
 Cooper’s interpretation of the role of nature in 
Rousseau’s thought is one of the most nuanced in the literature; however, it nonetheless 
presupposes the permanency of the very contradiction that Rousseau sought to obviate. The 
reason that the citizen’s life is in accordance with nature as a normative standard – even by 
Cooper’s own criteria – is that he does not suffer from the contradiction between his amour de 
soi-même and amour-propre; rather amour de soi-même is preserved in the civil state by being 
generalised.  
The claim that Rousseau sought to overcome the contradiction between amour de soi-
même and amour-propre is further supported by keeping the Augustinian context in mind, where 
man’s love was only innocent in his pre-lapsarian state and where corrupt amour-propre is the 
dominant passion of man’s post-lapsarian state. Rousseau, however, aimed to show that as man 
is naturally good there need not be any contradiction or disorder between his amour de soi-
même and amour-propre. This contradiction only arises when man is corrupted by social 
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institutions, but republican institutions could instead cultivate the right type of love by ordering 
both these passions towards love of fatherland. Indeed to the extent that Rousseau’s 
republicanism was concerned with cultivating the right type of love, it may be described as a 
form of Augustinian republicanism. 
The association of republican virtue with a variety of love was by no means unique to 
Rousseau. For example, Montesquieu famously defined political virtue as love of fatherland and 
the laws, which in a republic requires a continuous preference for the public interest over any 
private interest.
90
 Moreover, he argued that the most powerful republics were those where the 
laws were observed ‘not through reason, but through passion’,
91
 and that amongst the Romans 
amour de soi-même, love of one’s family and love of fatherland were indistinguishable.
92
 More 
generally, thinkers such as Charles de Saint-Evremond and Henri d’Aguesseau had suggested 
that love of fatherland could be a species of amour-propre.
93
 However, none of these thinkers 
provided the comprehensive account of the development of the passions in general, and of 
amour-propre in particular, that is to be found in Rousseau’s thought, which directly challenged 
the Augustinian association of amour-propre with vice. 
The idea that any thinker could advance a form of republicanism in part developed from 
an Augustinian tradition may seem somewhat paradoxical. These two traditions – republican 
and Augustinian – would appear to be firmly opposed to one another, given Augustine’s concern 
with the heavenly city of God over the earthly city of men. Indeed Rousseau had even averred 
that Christianity and republicanism are incompatible, arguing that the former’s focus on spiritual 
matters detracts from the latter’s focus on preserving love of fatherland.
94
 However, by 
repudiating Original Sin the earthly body politic need not be one occupied only by sinful, post-
lapsarian men. For Rousseau, there was no need to transcend the mortal life for the right type of 
love to prevail, as this could be realised in the republican polity. Or, to put in Augustinian terms, 
by insisting on man’s natural goodness Rousseau elided the bifurcation between the city of men 
and the city of God, and instead proposed the city of the virtuous citizen where the right type of 
love is love of fatherland. 
 
Free will and virtue 
 
In an ideal republic citizens would enjoy a harmonious existence free from the contradictions of 
the social system that cause human misery. Their amour de soi-même and amour-propre would 
be ordered towards love of fatherland and their private and general wills would be in agreement. 
Man is naturally good and if his nature could be generalised by republican institutions before it 
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is corrupted by the onset of luxury and inequality then the life of the citizen would remain in 
accordance with nature as a normative standard. However, the public education proposed for 
republics may seem inimical to nature in another respect, for Rousseau also insisted on the 
importance of man’s inalienable gifts of nature, his life and his freedom. Even if man’s life is 
secured in the republic, it may appear that the institutions requisite for cultivating virtue are 
opposed to the emphasis that Rousseau placed on man’s free will being an inalienable gift of 
nature. This charge is more frequently levelled at the domestic education outlined in Emile, 
which is worth considering in order to evaluate the extent to which it also applies to Rousseau’s 
proposals regarding public education. 
A recurring criticism of Emile is that the child’s freedom was only ever illusory, hence 
Jean Starobinski argued that ‘Emile feels free but really is not… [He] is caught in a 
sophisticated trap.’
95
 Similarly, it has recently been concluded that ‘Emile’s childhood 
establishes the illusion of freedom as an appropriate substitute for actual freedom’,
96
 and it has 
long been maintained that Rousseau was content only with the appearance and not the reality of 
free will.
97
 There are a number of passages that are sometimes cited in support of this claim, the 
most forceful of which is where Rousseau advised Emile’s governor to  
Let him always believe he is the master, and let it always be you who are. There is no 
subjection so perfect as that which keeps the appearance of freedom. Thus the will itself is 
made captive… Doubtless he ought to do only what he wants; but he ought to want only 
what you want him to do.
98
 
 
Taken in isolation this certainly seems to support the conclusion that Emile’s freedom was only 
ever illusory, yet the passage appears less conclusive once it is set in its wider context. The 
passage describes the ‘opposite route’ to most educations where ‘the master commands and 
believes he governs’, and it was only this opposite route that Rousseau insisted would leave 
Emile ‘master of his will’. The development of the human will from infancy is one of the central 
themes of Emile, since no man is born with a fully developed adult will. This development is 
shaped by education, which can either come from nature, things, men, or a combination of the 
three.
99
 For Rousseau, then, education was by its very nature a process of will-formation and the 
problem was simply that of how such will-formation could be in accordance with freedom. 
According to Rousseau, man’s unhappiness consists ‘in the disproportion between our desires 
and our faculties.’ To make man happy and well-ordered thus entailed ‘diminishing the excess 
of the desires over the faculties and putting power and will in perfect equality.’
100
 From this 
followed Rousseau’s ‘fundamental maxim’, which states that the ‘truly free man wants only 
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what he can do and does what he pleases.’
101
 
To realise this ideal of freedom it would be necessary to order Emile’s surroundings in 
such a way as to ensure that his desires would not surpass his power and that his will would not 
be opposed to the wills of other men. Emile’s education would therefore necessarily entail 
directing his will towards certain objects or goals, for which Rousseau considered that two 
different routes could be pursued. One route would involve the governor directly opposing and 
correcting Emile’s will whenever it errs, whereas the other would involve the governor setting 
the conditions in order that Emile’s will does not err, or so that when it does Emile is able to 
correct it himself. Rousseau thought that only the latter of these options was compatible with 
freedom; indeed he claimed that this ‘well-regulated freedom’ was the only appropriate 
instrument for Emile’s education.
102
 
Rousseau argued that this education was ‘well-regulated freedom’ because Emile would 
only ever be dependent on nature or things and never on the will of other men; dependence on 
men being the only type of dependence incompatible with freedom.
103
 To this it might be 
objected that Emile was never really free because his freedom was orchestrated and his 
‘education never came from things, it came from prearranged things.’
104
 Similarly, it might be 
thought that the only difference between Emile and the character of Jean-Jacques in the 
Dialogues is that Emile feels himself to be free and his own master, whereas Jean-Jacques feels 
himself to be enslaved, but in both cases their freedom (or lack thereof) is arranged by others.
105
 
These observations are accurate up to a point. However, they ultimately prove unsatisfactory as 
they fail to do justice to Rousseau’s understanding of freedom. More specifically, the criticism 
that Rousseau abandoned man’s freedom relies on misunderstanding his conception of free will. 
The reason that Emile would remain free despite the role of the governor is that his will 
would never be in opposition to the will of any other men, and if it were to be then Emile’s will 
would have to prevail. For Rousseau, it was precisely the opposition between human wills that 
restricts human freedom. If the governor was to adopt the opposite method of education and 
correct Emile’s will when it erred then Emile would constantly feel himself to be dependent on 
the governor’s will and thus not free. Instead, Emile’s governor goes to great lengths to ensure 
that there is never any opposition between his will and Emile’s, as any such conflict between 
their wills would diminish Emile’s freedom. Emile would thus think of his freedom as only ever 
being bound by necessity and not the will of other men, including that of his governor. Indeed, 
to the extent that Emile realises that his governor has orchestrated the choices with which he is 
faced, he remains free to choose either way without being dependent on the governor’s will.
106
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To be sure, the formation of Emile’s will depends on his experiences, yet he is no less free 
because those experiences are planned.
107
 Emile always retains the sentiment of free will as all 
his actions are performed willingly and his will is never in opposition to – or its determination 
perceived as being dependent on – the will of any other man. The sentiment or consciousness of 
man’s freedom rests in being able to choose and not being dependent on the will of another man 
when making that choice; it does not entail being free to determine the circumstances and 
conditions under which such choices are to be made.  
The domestic education that Rousseau proposed for Emile thus required a process of 
will-formation and the same was also true of public education, for to make the laws beloved it 
would be necessary to have recourse to the ‘most absolute authority… which penetrates to the 
inner man and is exerted no less on his will than on his actions.’
108
 The role of the legislator in 
forming the will of citizens is analogous to the role of the governor in Emile,
109
 and the criticism 
that Emile does not understand the true basis of his supposed freedom may also be extended to 
the citizens of a well-ordered republic.
110
 Yet the citizen remains free in precisely the same 
manner that Emile does, since his actions are consciously willed even if the formation of his 
will has largely been shaped by the social environment in which he has been brought up. 
Moreover, to the extent that the citizen wills generally, his will never comes into contradiction 
with anyone else’s and he is never dependent on any will other than his own.
111
 
In the Social Contract Rousseau defined moral freedom as ‘obedience to the law one 
has prescribed for oneself’,
112
 and it is tempting to read him as developing a strongly 
autonomous notion of freedom as self-mastery and self-legislation.
113
 However, for Rousseau, 
man’s free will only entailed consciously resisting, acquiescing in, or choosing between his 
inclinations, and these inclinations were in turn determined by his passions or sentiments. The 
role of the legislator and social institutions in cultivating men’s passions thus suggests that 
Rousseau’s understanding of free will was consistent with a high level of socially determined 
will-formation, providing that citizens always retain the conscious judgement of acquiescing in 
or resisting their inclinations, for it is in this judgement that the consciousness of one’s freedom 
is manifest. 
Rousseau’s understanding of freedom, then, was not one closely bound up with a 
strongly autonomous idea of self-determination or self-mastery; a point worth stressing in order 
to dispel the proto-Kantian readings of his thought. This is all the more significant given that 
amongst the commentators who have emphasised the importance of free will for Rousseau, 
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many have read the concept in proto-Kantian terms and associated freedom too closely with a 
strong notion of autonomy.
114
 For example, Patrick Riley identifies the problems that Rousseau 
supposedly faced throughout his work by attempting ‘to retain will as a source of right while 
seeking to control or sometimes even obliterate it… through a process of socialization and 
education that lessens the autonomy of individuals.’
115
 This is only a problem, however, if 
stressing the moral significance of free will necessarily entails a commitment to an 
understanding of autonomy that is opposed to a process of socialisation that largely shapes 
men’s wills by way of their passions. This may have been Kant’s position but it was not 
Rousseau’s. 
The proto-Kantian reading of free will and autonomy extends to the idea of virtue, thus 
Timothy O’Hagan finds in Rousseau’s thought a tension between a naturalistic pole and a 
deontological pole, where the latter is characterised by a Kantian struggle between duty and 
inclination such that ‘the realm of virtue… is always ‘a state of war’.’
116
 There are two 
interrelated polarities that are often presupposed by the Kantian reading of virtue: the struggle 
between duty and inclination and the struggle between reason and the passions.
117
 The first 
opposition, between duty and inclination, may be briefly examined presently, before considering 
the relationship between reason and the passions in the following section. 
The idea that Rousseau’s understanding of virtue entailed the triumph of duty over 
inclination is not confined to those who have read him through Kantian lenses. For example, 
Montesquieu famously claimed that political virtue required ‘renunciation of oneself, which is 
always a very painful thing’,
118
 and this idea of civic virtue as self-renunciation has in turn been 
attributed to Rousseau.
119
 More generally, a number of commentators have interpreted virtue as 
the victory of duty over inclination, which has led to the conclusion that the life of virtue is not 
in accordance with nature.
120
 The proto-Kantian readings of virtue are not without some textual 
support. Rousseau associated virtue with strength or a strong will,
121
 and at times employed the 
Kantian language of duty winning out against inclination, especially in his late autobiographical 
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works.
122
 Yet these instances all occur in writings where the person in question suffers from all 
the contradictions of the social system, which are rife in modern commercial societies. In 
societies where the common good is placed in constant opposition to one’s private interest and 
where deceit and fabrication prove advantageous, the virtuous man would have to suppress his 
own inclinations and passions to advance the general interest.
123
 In such cases virtue would 
certainly involve the triumph of duty over inclination, yet Rousseau’s discussion of virtue was 
not confined to these cases.
124
 In a well-ordered body politic a citizen’s duty would also be his 
inclination, since the opposition between the individual and society would have been overcome. 
Rousseau frequently associated virtue with the preference for the general will,
125
 yet only in 
corrupt societies did this require the suppression of conflicting desires and inclinations. In a 
well-ordered republic, by contrast, the general will would also be each citizen’s private will and 
the realm of virtue would cease to be a state of war. 
Virtue certainly required the right use of man’s freedom; indeed it was only by giving 
man free will that God gave him ‘the right to virtue.’
126
 Virtue thus entailed consciously willing 
the public good or the general will, yet this would not prove particularly challenging for citizens 
brought up in a well-ordered republic. The virtue of the citizen does not correspond to a strongly 
autonomous sense of self-mastery, since it would be less the individual citizen than the social 
institutions in which he is raised that master his will.
127
 For Rousseau, social institutions and 
education always have an effect on forming the will of men; this was simply a fact of social 
relations, which was not necessarily incompatible with the possibility of free will and virtue. If 
the social institutions were those of a well-ordered republic then citizens would freely acquiesce 
in the life of virtue, motivated to do so by both duty and inclination.
128
 Free from the 
contradictions of the social system their life would be in accordance with nature, for not only 
would they enjoy an ordered existence but their inalienable gifts of nature – their life and their 
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freedom – would also be preserved. 
 
Reason and the passions 
 
If republican institutions could cultivate the citizens’ passions then virtue would not require the 
triumph of duty over inclination, for both would be ordered towards love of fatherland. The idea 
that virtue presupposes a conflict between duty and inclination is often associated with another 
conflict between reason and the passions, where duty involves acting from right reason and 
inclination is determined by the sway of the passions. This position is plausibly attributed to 
Kant, who held that the pure thought of the moral law determined by reason alone has ‘an 
influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives, which may be 
summoned from the empirical field, that reason, in the consciousness of its dignity, despises the 
latter and can gradually become their master’.
129
 The notion that reason can master all other 
incentives – in this case, passions and inclinations – certainly lies behind some of the proto-
Kantian readings of Rousseau. Most notably, in his seminal study of the intellectual relationship 
between the two thinkers, Ernst Cassirer wrote that Rousseau ‘ended up with the most resolute 
belief in reason’, which he passed on to Kant.
130
 
The idea that man’s reason and passions are in a constant struggle with one another by 
no means originated with Kant, however, and would have been familiar to Rousseau. For 
example, Pascal wrote that man’s post-lapsarian state is characterised by the ‘Internal war in 
human beings between reason and passions… So they are always divided and in contradiction 
with themselves’.
131
 More generally, the notion that the goal of reason was to overcome the 
passions was often associated with Stoicism, especially by neo-Augustinian moralists who 
sought to attack this position. It is thus well to return to this context and the challenges levelled 
at Stoicism in order to elucidate Rousseau’s understanding of the relationship between reason 
and the passions. 
In some respects it is tempting to view Rousseau’s thought from a Stoic perspective, 
especially given the emphasis that has hitherto been placed on man living a harmonious, ordered 
existence, in accordance with nature. Yet to the extent that Rousseau’s political theory was Stoic 
it was far from conventional, thus one commentator has described it as ‘a strikingly original 
piece of secular Augustinian Stoicism.’
132
 The most comprehensive account of Rousseau’s 
Stoicism remains that provided by Kennedy Roche, who maintains that the ‘Stoic identification 
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is: God, Nature and Reason. This seems to be Rousseau’s also.’
133
 However, this claim seems 
hard to sustain given that in the Second Discourse Rousseau argued that for natural law to be 
natural at all its precepts must be known ‘anterior to reason’ by reflecting on the ‘first and 
simplest operations of the human Soul’. According to Rousseau, reason is only later forced to 
re-establish the principles of natural right ‘upon other foundations when, by its successive 
developments, it has succeeded in stifling Nature.’
134
 
Rousseau did not think that reason and nature could simply be equated and, similarly, he 
did not adhere to a Stoic understanding of the relationship between reason and the passions (or 
at least to the interpretation of this relationship that was often attributed to Stoicism at the time). 
Seneca famously claimed that ‘reason is not a slave to the senses but a ruler over them… Virtue 
is nothing else than right reason’,
135
 and Stoic virtue was often interpreted – especially in the 
Augustinian tradition – as entailing the eradication of men’s passions by the right use of reason. 
Augustine had argued that the passions have to ‘be moderated and bridled and turned to 
righteous use’; an argument that he set out explicitly against the Stoics who, he claimed, always 
count passions as vices, even those like compassion,
136
 which it is well to remember was the 
‘sole Natural virtue’ according to Rousseau.
137
 The Augustinian critique of Stoicism was 
prevalent amongst the French moralists of the seventeenth century, and typical here was the 
opening discourse of Senault’s Of the Usage of Passions, entitled ‘Apology for the Passions 
against the Stoics’, in which he asserted that the Stoics held that one cannot be passionate 
without being criminal.
138
 This criticism remained prominent well into the eighteenth century, 
with thinkers such as Vauvenargues arguing that so far from our passions being disorders of the 
soul, as suggested by the Stoics, they are rather ‘the whole foundation and the whole substance 
of our soul.’
139
 Similarly, Rousseau averred that annihilating the passions would be contrary to 
the order of nature: 
Our passions are the principal instruments of our preservation. It is, therefore, an enterprise 
as vain as it is ridiculous to want to destroy them – it is to control nature, it is to reform the 
work of God. If God were to tell men to annihilate the passions which he gives him, God 
would will and not will; he would contradict himself.
140
 
 
The passions in themselves are not evil, thus it is not the role of reason to overcome them; to 
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this extent Rousseau concurred with the Augustinian critique of Stoicism.
141
 The role of reason 
was rather one of ordering the passions that we do have, for the problem was not that reason and 
the passions were in conflict with one another but rather that certain passions may conflict with 
other passions and in such cases one ‘has a hold on the passions only by means of the 
passions.’
142
 This interpretation is borne out by briefly considering the place that Rousseau 
accorded to reason in his theory of knowledge and of the will. 
Rousseau accepted the Lockean critique of innate ideas and similarly thought that all of 
man’s knowledge is derived from his sensations.
143
 However, Rousseau deemed that his 
contemporaries had taken Locke too far and was particularly concerned to refute those such as 
Helvétius who (unlike Locke) reduced reason and judgement to mere sensation.
144
 Instead, 
Rousseau argued that whereas man’s sensations are purely passive, his perceptions and ideas are 
formed by an ‘active principle which judges.’
145
 This principle is human reason, which is simply 
the faculty of comparing sensations among themselves, so that reason is nothing other than 
judgement.
146
  
By insisting on the distinction between passive sensations and active judgement, 
Rousseau aimed to refute the reductive materialism of Helvétius, which left no place for free 
will. Rousseau did not deny that man’s will is largely determined by his education, surroundings 
and the sensations he receives from external stimuli. However, he also insisted that man’s 
actions can be guided by an active principle that judges and, most importantly, this active 
judgement is not simply reducible to the passive sensations that man receives from his senses. It 
has already been stressed that, for Rousseau, man’s free will only entailed consciously resisting, 
acquiescing in, or choosing between his inclinations. To this may now be added that this 
conscious willing renders man an active being, as opposed to passive beings that act from 
instinct or responses to external stimuli alone. In this respect man’s freedom is related to his 
reason, since it is only by choosing or judging that man is free. Yet this is not to say that reason 
operates abstractly, without being influenced by sensations caused by external stimuli, for the 
object of reason or judgement is always some sensation or inclination. 
Even if the distinction between sensations and judgement served Rousseau’s account of 
free will well, the Lockean rejection of innate ideas posed further challenges. Malebranche, for 
example, had objected to the empiricism of Hobbes and Locke on the grounds that it would lead 
to the most dangerous Pyrrhonism due to the fallibility of any knowledge derived from the 
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senses.
147
 Rousseau, however, sought to evade the moral implications of empiricism by denying 
that man’s knowledge of good and evil is derived from either his senses or his reason alone. 
Instead, Rousseau insisted that man has conscience, which is ‘an innate principle of justice and 
virtue’ that resides in the depths of man’s soul. Rousseau claimed that the ‘acts of conscience 
are not judgements but sentiments’,
148
 and it is by way of this interior voice – distinct from both 
reason and sensation – that nature speaks to man and allows him to know God’s law. For 
Rousseau, then, the challenge that empiricism posed to morality when taken to its sceptical 
extreme was not to be met by appealing to either innate ideas or abstract reason, but rather by 
invoking conscience, which is an innate feeling or sentiment. If this sentiment could be made 
active through the will then conscience could guide man’s judgment and the possibility of 
morality and virtue would remain. Indeed, Rousseau’s theodicy entailed that God had given man 
‘reason to discern what is good, conscience to love it, and freedom to choose it.’
149
 
Rousseau equated conscience with love of order, but order could only be attained 
through the right use of man’s reason or judgement, thus conscience and reason would have to 
work together.
150
 Rousseau defined reason as ‘the faculty of ordering all the faculties of our soul 
suitably to the nature of things and their relations with us’, and in this comprised ‘the whole of 
human wisdom in the use of the passions’.
151
 Reason could not operate independently of man’s 
passions or sentiments, since the role of reason is only that of ordering the passions in 
accordance with nature and it is only by the activity of the passions that man’s reason is 
perfected.
152
 In this respect Rousseau may be viewed as having held an instrumental 
understanding of reason, since reason could not determine its own ends independently of man’s 
passions and sentiments.
153
 The right use of reason could serve to order the passions in 
accordance with nature, whereas the misuse of reason could result in conflicting passions 
rendering man’s life miserable. Strictly speaking, however, reason and the passions could not be 
opposed to one another, thus reason could never master or overcome the passions. It is 
important to stress this point in order to dispel the Stoic and proto-Kantian readings of Rousseau, 
where virtue entails the triumph of reason over the passions or inclinations. 
It is often thought that ‘Kant is the best interpreter of Rousseau’,
154
 yet the differences 
between the two thinkers are arguably far more important than the similarities. Most importantly, 
Rousseau did not share Kant’s faith in reason. This may be partly explained by showing that 
Rousseau and Kant did not share the same understanding of reason.
155
 For Rousseau, reason and 
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the passions were not two opposing sources that could determine man’s will, and, as such, a free 
and virtuous will could not be one motivated purely out of respect for a law given by reason 
alone. Rousseau thought that man’s will was largely shaped by his passions and inclinations, yet, 
providing that man retained his active judgement – that is, the consciousness of acquiescing in, 
resisting or choosing between his inclinations –  he would remain free. There is, however, also a 
second and equally important sense in which Rousseau did not share Kant’s faith in reason. 
Rousseau had little faith in the ability of men to use their reason to order their passions 
themselves and instead thought that men’s actions could only be guided by appealing directly to 
their passions, a point which carries important consequences for the way that he thought about 
politics. 
The problem that pervaded modern commercial societies, according to Rousseau, was 
that man had been rendered in constant contradiction with both himself and others in society. 
Not only were the various passions of individual men internally contradictory, but the passions 
of society as a whole were equally opposed to each other and without order. Only in an ideal 
republic could order be retained by cultivating the citizens’ passions, which is why Rousseau 
held that the problem of politics was as much one of speaking to men’s hearts as it was one of 
formulating principles of political right. This is well attested by considering his criticisms of the 
political works of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, which Rousseau deemed superficial precisely 
because Saint-Pierre had adopted ‘that false principle of perfected reason’, which led him to 
think ‘that men were led by their enlightenment rather than by their passions.’ Consequently, he 
‘worked only for imaginary beings while thinking that he was working for his 
contemporaries.’
156
 
In contrast to Saint-Pierre, Rousseau thought that politics had to work with man’s 
passions, as reason alone is inactive and ‘it is only passion which makes us act.’
157
 It was not the 
development of public reason, then, but rather the cultivation of the passions that would lead to 
a well-ordered republic. One of the problems within modern societies was that the very 
language of politics was inadequate for this purpose, as over time it had become ‘more precise 
and less passionate’ so that ‘it no longer speaks to the heart but to reason.’
158
 For Rousseau, the 
idea that citizens could become attached to political society by an appeal to their reason was a 
fallacy that rested on the ‘false principle of perfected reason’. Reason does not motivate men, 
thus to form citizens it would be necessary to make ‘the language of the mind pass through the 
heart, so that it may make itself understood.’
159
 
Rousseau famously sought to unite ‘what right permits with what interest prescribes’,
160
 
but to show men their interest in being just it was not enough to enlighten their reason. In a 
                                                 
156
  Rousseau, Confessions, CW5:354-355/ OC1:422. 
157
  Rousseau, Emile, CW13:331/ OC4:453. 
158
  Rousseau, Essay on Languages, CW7:296/ OC5:384. 
159
  Rousseau, Emile, CW13:492/ OC4:648. 
160
  Rousseau, Social Contract, CW4:131/ OC3:351. 
 160 
well-ordered republic it would be the role of the government, the legislator and public education 
to cultivate love of fatherland in order to preserve the unity of the body politic. For Rousseau, 
politics was about appealing to the hearts of citizens by way of their passions and the passion to 
be reckoned upon, was love. 
 
Hobbes and fear 
 
The reading of Rousseau advanced throughout this chapter may initially seem quite unrelated to 
Hobbes. Although Rousseau first formulated his distinction between amour de soi-même and 
amour-propre in opposition to Hobbes, there is little evidence to suggest that his theory of the 
passions was influenced by Hobbes any further. Yet there are at least two interrelated respects in 
which it is of particular interest to view Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s theories of the passions in 
juxtaposition to one another. The first is the extent to which they both thought that the passions 
had to be ordered in political society to sustain political unity, and the second, considered in the 
following section, is the extent to which their accounts of man’s nature shaped the possibilities 
available for ordering the passions. 
A further preliminary reason why it is worthwhile to compare Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s 
theories is that they shared a similar understanding of the relationship between reason and the 
passions. To be sure, Hobbes sometimes employed language implying that reason and the 
passions were in conflict with one another, such as in De Cive where he wrote that ‘within the 
commonwealth is the empire of reason’, whereas the state of nature is ‘the empire of the 
passions’.
161
 Bernard Gert has even argued – against those who read Hobbes as a forerunner of 
David Hume – that Hobbes thought that reason has its own ends and thus his ‘view is 
diametrically opposed to that of Hume.’
162
 Given the interpretation of Rousseau that has been 
advanced thus far, it might be inferred that if this is true then Hobbes’s view was also 
diametrically opposed to Rousseau’s.  
Gert is right to argue that the laws of nature, as dictates of right reason, have self-
preservation as their end, since self-preservation is the foundation of natural right, from which 
Hobbes derived the first natural law of seeking peace where peace can be had. However, to 
claim that self-preservation is an end with which reason is concerned is not the same as 
claiming that self-preservation is an end given by reason alone, which would have to be the case 
to support the opposition with Hume’s position. In both the Elements and De Cive, Hobbes 
argued that as the ‘necessity of nature’ makes men desire that which is good for themselves and 
avoid that which is hurtful then it is not against reason for man to do everything that he can to 
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preserve himself. The right of nature, therefore, stipulates ‘that every man may preserve his own 
life and limbs with all the power he hath.’
163
 Hobbes thus arrived at self-preservation being the 
right of nature by examining the desires (or passions) that man has by the ‘necessity of nature’. 
Hobbes defined reason in terms of reckoning or, somewhat abstractly, as the adding and 
subtracting of the consequences of names or definitions. Scientific knowledge is derived 
deductively from definitions; thus the ‘Use and End of Reason’ is to begin at ‘first definitions, 
and settled significations of names… and proceed from one consequence to another.’
164
 Hobbes 
claimed to be developing a science of politics which proceeded from an account of man and he 
defined man, or at least the voluntary motions of man, in terms of the passions (which, in turn, 
are determined by the imagination).
165
 The consequences (or conclusions) that Hobbes derived 
from his account of man included the right of self-preservation, but this consequence, although 
arrived at by reason, was deduced from his account of man’s passions. The right of self-
preservation, then, was not an end given by reason alone but rather a deduction from the account 
of the passions. Moreover, Hobbes thought that certain passions could never be eradicated from 
man, a point he stressed in the introduction to Leviathan where he wrote of the ‘similitude of 
Passions, which are the same in all men,’ namely desire, fear and hope.
166
 These passions could 
never be overcome by reason, but they could be ordered towards certain objects in such a way 
that peace might be secured. 
It thus seems problematical to maintain, with Gert, that Hobbes’s and Hume’s views 
were diametrically opposed to one another. Although attention is often focused on his famous 
claim that ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,’ Hume’s argument was set 
out against thinkers who ‘talk of the combat of passion and of reason’. Contesting this view, 
Hume argued that a passion could only be unreasonable in the sense that it is ‘founded on false 
suppositions’ or ‘chooses means insufficient for the end’, but in such cases it is really the 
judgement and not the passion that is unreasonable. Indeed reason still has a great influence 
over man’s volition or will since the ‘moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or 
the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition.’
167
 
Hume’s argument was not that reason was passive in determining man’s volition, but only that 
as reason cannot determine its own ends without an antecedent passion or impulse, reason and 
passion could never strictly speaking be in combat with one another. In this respect, at least, 
Hume’s position resembled Hobbes’s quite closely.
168
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Hume’s famous account of the relationship between reason and the passions in fact 
bears strong resemblances to the positions developed by both Hobbes and Rousseau, at least to 
the extent that they all thought that reason and the passions could not be in conflict with one 
another. What is more, the theme of ordering men’s passions to create unity in the body politic 
was arguably just as important for Hobbes as it was for Rousseau. 
For Hobbes, the state of nature was one where the passions of men were in disorder, thus 
war reigned, whereas in the commonwealth the reign of reason could bring order to the passions. 
In this sense the laws of nature may be well understood as the dictates of right reason that would 
order men’s passions towards peace, much as Hobbes indicated in Leviathan: 
The passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are 
necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their industry to obtain them. And Reason 
suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. 
These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature
169
 
 
Although Hobbes appealed to man’s fear, desire and hope, it is the former of these passions that 
proved most prominent in his account of the generation and preservation of the commonwealth, 
since men will not live together in peace and follow the laws of nature ‘unless compelled to do 
so by a common fear.’
170
 According to Hobbes, sovereignty could be generated by either 
institution or acquisition, the only difference being that ‘men who choose their Soveraign, do it 
for fear of one another, and not of him who they Institute’.
171
 In each case, however, men are 
moved to covenant by the fear of death from remaining in the state of nature with either other 
men or an existing sovereign. Much of Hobbes’s political thought was set out to demonstrate, 
first, that covenants entered into out of fear are legitimate,
172
 and, second, that the perpetual fear 
of death and the state of nature should lead all men to consent to the sovereign’s power.
173
 The 
problem, then, was that of ordering fear towards its rightful object, which could only be 
achieved by affecting man’s imagination and thereby determining his passions. 
Hobbes famously stated that the ‘Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear’, yet he was 
concerned that the object of men’s fear was too often ‘the power of spirits invisible’,
174
 which 
moved men to sedition and civil disobedience:  
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If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams, 
false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which, crafty ambitious 
persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil 
Obedience.
175
 
 
One of the central aims of Hobbes’s political works was to show men that they ought to be 
moved to obedience by fear of death, since this is the most rational object of fear for individuals 
concerned with their self-preservation. To achieve this Hobbes had to dispel the idea that there 
is anything greater to be feared than the immanent and violent death that should be expected in 
the state of nature. The last two books of Leviathan were thus largely concerned with effacing 
the pervasive religious imagery from the minds of men, which Hobbes thought had led men to 
disobey the civil sovereign ‘and sometimes to Destroy a Commonwealth’, since ‘the fear of 
Darknesse, and Ghosts, is greater than other fears’.
176
 For example, Hobbes’s interpretation of 
scripture aimed to refute the idea of everlasting suffering in a lake of fire and other heathen 
ideas of Hell, in order to reduce the fear of eternal torment to nothing more than fear of a second 
death.
177
 In doing so, Hobbes sought to show men that the fear of suffering in this life was far 
greater than that in the next life, a purpose which his great adversary Bishop Bramhall surmised 
well when he wrote that Hobbes ‘hath killed the great infernal Devil, and all his black angels, 
and left no devils to be feared, but devils incarnate, that is, wicked men.’
178
 
Richard Tuck has argued that a central purpose of Hobbes’s eschatology was to relieve 
men of fear, and has even extended this idea to the whole of Hobbes’s philosophy.
179
 Whilst 
Tuck’s reading of Hobbes’s eschatology is certainly informative, it is less clear that Hobbes 
thought that fear could ever be completely overcome.
180
 Rather Hobbes sought to re-orientate 
men’s fear towards the state of nature, the fear of returning to which should pervade the 
imagination of men the moment they entertain notions of disobedience or rebellion. Indeed 
Hobbes’s account of the state of nature is presented in such a way that, if accepted, would lead 
to the realisation that there is nothing more miserable than living without civil laws. The state of 
nature should prove the most prominent object of men’s fear and such fear would ensure that 
men obey the sovereign, thereby securing peace. 
According to Hobbes, then, the commonwealth could only be preserved if man’s fear 
was rightly ordered, for fear is the passion above all else that ensures that men keep their 
covenants and obey the laws. Yet fear is not the only passion that Hobbes thought remained in 
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all men; he also included desire and hope amongst the similitude of the passions. Although less 
prominent in his account of how peace could be sustained, Hobbes recognised the importance of 
ordering these passions towards their rightful object as well. For example, in De Cive Hobbes 
wrote that ‘Ambition and longing for honours cannot be removed from men’s minds, and 
sovereigns have no duty to attempt to do so’; rather sovereigns need to direct men’s ambition 
with rewards and punishments towards obedience.
181
 Nonetheless, Hobbes did think that if a 
commonwealth was generated along the lines he proposed there could be a radical 
transformation in the way that the passions move men, a point that is well illustrated by 
considering the law of nature forbidding pride. 
Hobbes compared the sovereign to the ‘great power of Leviathan’ from the book of Job, 
who is ‘King of all the children of pride’,
182
 and there is some justification for thinking that 
pride was the central problem of human life for Hobbes.
183
 Hobbes defined pride as glory 
disliked.
184
 Glory is one of the three principal causes of war, which makes men invade ‘for 
Reputation’, since ‘every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he 
sets upon himselfe’.
185
 Pride involves having an exaggerated opinion of one’s own power or 
worth, thus in Leviathan Hobbes equated pride with ‘great vaine-Glory’.
186
 In generating the 
commonwealth pride could be overcome providing that all men realised that they were equal 
under the sovereign. It was therefore crucial that natural equality be acknowledged by all men, 
and pride was the name given to the breach of this precept.
187
  
For Hobbes, the acknowledgment of equality was imperative for developing humility 
and the practice of modesty amongst men, which would be necessary to ensure the stability of 
the commonwealth.
188
 Hobbes insisted that pride could never be made lawful and, as with many 
of the laws of nature, the law commanding the recognition of equality amongst men was set out 
in opposition to one of the passions that lead men to war. Where the laws of nature forbid 
ingratitude, injustice, pride and iniquity, which always lead to war, they command the moral 
virtues of justice, gratitude, modesty, equity and mercy, the practice of which always preserves 
life and ensures peace.
189
  
Given the emphasis placed on eradicating passions like pride from the commonwealth, 
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some commentators have argued that Hobbes ‘was in effect proposing nothing less than a 
transformation of the human psyche’,
190
 or that he thought his civil philosophy would lead to 
‘deep features of human nature [being] transformed’.
191
 Such transformation could only occur 
by reforming education, thus Hobbes advised the sovereign to have Leviathan taught in the 
universities, since ‘the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of 
Youth in the Universities’.
192
 To understand Leviathan would be to understand that the practice 
of the laws of nature – when assured that others would also practice them – is the only way to 
secure peace and thus rationally in accordance with the desire for self-preservation that all men 
have by natural necessity. In this sense, performance of the moral virtues would be in 
accordance with an individual’s enlightened self-preservation. There is, then, good reason to see 
Hobbes’s project as one of correcting the epistemic foundations of the passions that otherwise 
lead to war.
193
 Yet this project involved an appeal directly to the passions of men by way of their 
imagination. Hobbes was largely concerned with directing men’s fear towards its rightful object, 
and the lessons of political education would have to include teaching people why they ought 
constantly to fear returning to the state of nature.
194
 Indeed, the preservation of the 
commonwealth depended on appealing to men’s fear above all else, for it would always remain 
the case that the passion that ‘enclineth men least to break the Lawes, is Fear.’
195
 
For Hobbes, just as for Rousseau, the necessity for political institutions arose due to the 
disorder of men’s passions, which brings men into conflict with one another. The generation of 
the commonwealth would involve ordering men’s passions towards peace and even if this did 
not involve men ceasing to think of themselves as individuals (as it did for Rousseau),
196
 it did 
involve mitigating the passions associated with the unbridled individualism of the state of nature. 
For Hobbes, the unity of the body politic could only be preserved providing that men realise that 
their own preservation is inextricably bound up with the preservation of the commonwealth. The 
ordering of the passions in political society thus primarily involved ensuring that the fear of 
breaking the law and returning to the state of nature was men’s dominant passion. Both Hobbes 
and Rousseau thought that an appeal to the passions was necessary for the preservation of 
political society; for Hobbes, this required ordering man’s fear towards its rightful object, 
whereas for Rousseau it was man’s love that had to be well-ordered. 
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Of love and fear 
 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to build on the interpretation of Rousseau that has 
been advanced throughout the thesis in order to elucidate the precise relationship between free 
will, nature and the passions, which otherwise might seem problematical and has troubled many 
scholars. In part, this has rested on dispelling the proto-Kantian readings of freedom, virtue and 
reason that many commentators have attributed to Rousseau. Yet it has also been important to 
draw attention to the Augustinian context in order to appreciate the centrality of the problem of 
cultivating the right type of love in Rousseau’s political thought. For Rousseau, the right type of 
love involved generalising man’s natural amour de soi-même to the level of the body politic and 
channelling man’s socially acquired amour-propre through love of fatherland, thereby 
overcoming the contradiction between these two types of love that otherwise causes human 
misery. By insisting on man’s natural goodness and repudiating the notion that amour-propre is 
always sinful, Rousseau elided the necessary antithesis between the earthly city of men and the 
heavenly city of God and instead argued that the right type of love could prevail in a well-
ordered republic. To this extent, somewhat paradoxically, Rousseau may well be viewed as 
having developed a peculiar form of Augustinian republicanism. 
It is important to keep the Augustinian context in mind precisely because it speaks to 
one of the most fundamental distinctions between Hobbes and Rousseau and serves to reveal 
how their accounts of the nature of man shaped the very possibilities available for their political 
theories. It is well to remember that Rousseau’s account of man’s natural goodness was set out 
against both Augustinian and Hobbesian accounts of man’s nature. This is not to say that 
Hobbes intended to present an Augustinian conception of man’s nature, but only that his 
depiction of man in the state of nature in many respects resembled the Augustinian account of 
man’s post-lapsarian state. Hobbes, of course, thought that the ‘Desires, and other Passions of 
man, are in themselves no Sin’,
197
 whereas the Augustinian theory assumed that such disordered 
passions characterised man’s sinful nature and lost innocence. Rousseau, however, appears to 
have read Hobbes as adhering to an Augustinian conception of man’s nature, which is why he 
warned against concluding with Hobbes that man is naturally evil. Although Hobbes in fact 
denied that man is naturally evil, he presented precisely the post-lapsarian account of man’s 
passions that Rousseau’s principle of natural goodness was intended to refute. 
The resemblances between Hobbesian and Augustinian accounts of man are of 
historical as well as philosophical interest, since some of Hobbes’s ideas were adopted by 
prominent neo-Augustinian thinkers in the late seventeenth century, most notably Pierre Nicole, 
who is well viewed as having proposed an Augustinian interpretation of Hobbes’s philosophy.
198
 
To recall, Nicole alluded to Hobbes’s depiction of the state of nature in support of his account of 
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man’s post-lapsarian state and insisted that the order of society is disturbed by men’s unruly 
passions. Peace could only be secured if such passions were regulated, for which it was 
necessary to enlighten men’s amour-propre by showing them their interest in obeying the civil 
laws and practising the moral virtues. Indeed at his most Hobbesian, Nicole averred that the 
‘fear of death is thus the first bond of civil society, and the first brake on amour-propre’.
199
 The 
reason to keep the Augustinian context in mind, then, is due to the extent to which Hobbesian 
ideas were adopted and incorporated into the Augustinian tradition of French moral philosophy 
towards the end of the seventeenth century; a tradition in which Rousseau was well versed.  
In many respects Hobbes and Rousseau were in agreement about the type of problems 
that political society had to overcome; problems brought about by the development of the 
passions associated with unbridled individualism. Moreover, they both thought that it was not 
enough to advance principles of political right that appealed only to man’s reason; rather the 
passions must be cultivated in order to attach men to the body politic and preserve its unity. Yet 
they differed regarding their diagnoses of the greatest threats to the unity of the body politic. For 
Hobbes, the central problem was that individuals took themselves to be judges of right and 
wrong and mistakenly thought that they should be able to influence the government and hold the 
sovereign to account. For Rousseau, by contrast, the problem was that individuals were 
insufficiently engaged with their civic activities, lacking virtue or love of fatherland and thus 
becoming disengaged with the republic. Consequently, the two thinkers were in marked 
disagreement over the question of to which passions politics should appeal, and, just as 
importantly, Rousseau’s rejection of man’s post-lapsarian state resulted in him eschewing an 
appeal to the same passion that had been all important for Hobbes. 
The passion to which Hobbes’s political philosophy appealed, above all else, was man’s 
fear. It is worth noting that by the middle of the eighteenth century it would have been 
particularly controversial to emphasise the importance of this passion in preserving political 
society given that Montesquieu had famously claimed that fear is the principle of despotic 
governments.
200
 Although Rousseau did not deny that fear could be an appropriate instrument 
for governing men in some instances, he thought its use was only restrictive and would fail to 
excite men; its purpose ‘is not to lead people to do good but to keep them from doing evil.’
201
 
Where this may have served Hobbes’s purposes well, it would not suffice for Rousseau.  
For Hobbes, just as for Nicole later, fear could serve to enlighten man’s amour-propre 
and counter its worst consequences by restraining man’s pride and vain-glory. Although for 
Hobbes the goal of lasting peace should never be undervalued, for Hobbesian thinkers like 
Nicole peace was only the best that could be hoped for given man’s post-lapsarian state in 
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which the right type of love could not prevail to bind society together. In this respect, the 
Hobbesian approach to politics was viewed as a second best solution for societies occupied by 
post-lapsarian men. It has been said of Pufendorf that his morality was that of the fallen man,
202
 
and, on Nicole’s and Rousseau’s readings at least, the same could be said of Hobbes. The 
question of whether fear or love should guide men in civil life thus largely turned on whether 
man’s natural condition was one of pre-lapsarian original goodness or a post-lapsarian state of 
war. 
If man was naturally good then the aim of political society would not be to restrain 
man’s inflamed individualistic passions, but rather to channel his passions towards love of 
fatherland before they are corrupted. This entailed cultivating man’s amour-propre by focusing 
his pride on the attainment of political virtue. Where for Hobbes and neo-Augustinian thinkers 
man’s pride was one of the central problems of human life and the cause of man’s miserable 
condition, for Rousseau it was the positive branch of amour-propre that could support a well-
ordered republic. What is more, according to Rousseau, amour-propre itself was not a sinful 
passion and, rightly cultivated, could lead to genuine virtue. If political society could be based 
on the pre-lapsarian passions then man’s love could be ordered into the republic; his natural 
amour de soi-même and socially acquired amour-propre into harmony with one another by 
directing both towards love of fatherland. 
These distinctions serve to emphasise just how much rested on the contrasting accounts 
of the state of nature and the nature of man presented by Hobbes and Rousseau, and why the 
question of whether or not man is naturally good was of such great significance for Rousseau. 
Only post-lapsarian men need to be governed by fear, whereas naturally good men may be 
governed by love. To be sure, Rousseau was well aware of the potential for social relations and 
institutions to corrupt man’s passions, thereby rendering man evil. In his secularised genealogy 
of man, then, Original Sin was replaced by the onset of luxury and the entrenched relations of 
inequality that permeate modern commercial societies. This point cannot be understated, since 
Rousseau’s republican vision was only suitable for naturally good men who were yet to feel the 
full force of modern social and economic conditions. For this very reason his political vision 
could only ever be of limited application, a point that ought to be kept in mind for those who 
want to draw lessons from Rousseau’s political theory for modern times. It is with these 
implications of Rousseau’s thought for contemporary political philosophy generally, and 
modern republicanism more specifically, that the following chapter is concerned.  
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Republican Challenges 
 
There are things that are possible in one age, but no longer remain so in another. 
This truth is often neglected, and never without danger.
1
 
 
Few thinkers have suffered as much at the hands of history as Rousseau. The crimes to which 
his thought is purported to have given rise include the Terror of the French Revolution, Nazism 
and twentieth-century totalitarianism.
2
 These allegations are largely based on the ways in which 
his ideas have been (mis-)appropriated by subsequent thinkers, whilst neglecting Rousseau’s 
own abhorrence of tyranny and the importance he accorded to checks against the abuses of 
power.
3
 Conversely, Rousseau is now more frequently read as an important thinker for modern 
liberals. This probably owes much to the influential work of John Rawls, who did not hesitate to 
acknowledge Rousseau as a major inspiration for some of his own ideas; most notably, that his 
conception of public reason was originally contained in Rousseau’s notion of the general will.
4
 
More recently, contemporary theorists have turned to Rousseau to ground accounts of liberal 
loyalty and egalitarian democracy.
5
 Yet as the totalitarian readings of Rousseau neglect his 
concern with checking the abuses of power, so too his liberal readers frequently overlook 
aspects of his thought that might give them cause for concern. 
Rousseau was neither a liberal nor a totalitarian; he was a republican, perhaps more 
explicitly so than any other major thinker between Machiavelli and the French Revolution. 
Indeed Rousseau insisted that every ‘legitimate Government is republican’.
6
  In the last chapter 
it was argued that Rousseau’s republican vision was only suitable for naturally good men, yet to 
be corrupted by the onset of luxury and entrenched relations of inequality that permeate modern 
states. The present chapter supports this interpretation by examining Rousseau’s republicanism 
in more detail.  
This chapter serves to complete the reading of Rousseau’s political thought advanced 
throughout the thesis and turns to address the more general question of whether or not it could 
serve as inspiration for contemporary political theorists. This question is not only pertinent with 
respect to the renewed emphasis that liberals, following Rawls, have placed on Rousseau, but 
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also due to the position that he has been accorded as one of the ‘big names’ in a tradition of 
modern republicanism that supposedly offers a rival political theory to liberalism.
7
 As will 
become apparent, however, Rousseau’s political vision is one that proves challenging for the 
way that republicanism is often understood in contemporary political philosophy. Some of the 
challenges that Rousseau posed were unique to the way that he articulated his republican 
thought, yet others speak more widely to the problems with recovering classical republican 
ideas for modern states. With this in mind, the chapter evaluates the revival of republicanism in 
modern political theory by examining aspects of the tradition upon which it draws.  
Republicanism, of course, is a term with a much contested history and it remains an 
open question whether or not a coherent republican tradition can even be recovered that does 
justice to the nuances of the many different thinkers who wrote about republics. For present 
purposes, however, the focus is simply on republicanism as it is understood in much 
contemporary political theory following the seminal work of Philip Pettit. According to Pettit, 
there was a republican tradition unified across time by deference to the same textual authorities, 
an enthusiasm for the lessons of republican Rome, an emphasis on both the empire of law rather 
than men and a mixed constitution, recognition of the importance of civic virtue, and, most 
importantly of all, an understanding of freedom as non-domination.
8
 Along with Quentin 
Skinner, who adopts a more historical approach to the subject, Pettit has been foremost in 
attempting to recover a republican conception of freedom distinct from the negative form 
associated with liberalism,
9
 and the viability of this characterisation of the republican tradition 
occupies much of the present chapter. More specifically, attention is focused on pre-
revolutionary French and Genevan republican thought. This proves to be a particularly 
important context for evaluating rival liberal and republican traditions given that it was largely 
the French form of classical republicanism against which prominent nineteenth-century liberals 
such as Benjamin Constant set out their own ideas. 
Although the eighteenth-century French context proves informative for understanding 
Rousseau’s republicanism, it is also instructive to juxtapose his position with Hobbes’s views on 
republics in order to argue that they each pose distinctive challenges to both the way that the 
modern republican tradition understands its history and the prospects for reviving republican 
ideas in modernity. There are two important reasons for focusing on Hobbes in this context: the 
first is that he is often taken to be the bête-noire of the republican tradition, having allegedly 
opposed a distinctively republican conception of liberty as non-domination with a new 
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definition of liberty as non-interference that would later be adopted by liberals in the nineteenth 
century.
10
 The second reason is that the criticisms that Hobbes levelled at republicanism mirror 
some of those employed by Montesquieu who, in turn, set the terms of debate for important 
aspects of Rousseau’s republicanism. This is not to claim that Hobbes’s criticisms of 
republicanism directly influenced Rousseau (although they may well have done), but rather that 
Hobbes’s challenge was one that speaks to the very type of project with which Rousseau was 
engaged. To begin with, then, it is well to elucidate the nature of Hobbes’s challenge. 
 
Hobbes’s challenge to republicanism 
 
There is good reason to view Hobbes as one of the most important opponents of republicanism, 
yet it is well to specify with some precision the exact nature and bearing of the challenge that he 
posed. The greatest evidence that Hobbes sought to challenge republican ideas is to be found in 
Chapter XXI of Leviathan, where he famously asserted that there is no less liberty under a 
monarchy than under a democracy and that people were no less free in Constantinople than in 
Lucca.
11
 This argument is usually taken – especially by advocates of republican liberty – to 
demonstrate the extent to which Hobbes was engaged with refuting and undermining the claims 
of republicans.
12
 Indeed Hobbes’s contemporaries read the chapter as a polemic against the 
classical republican tradition of the civitas libera found in Machiavelli and Livy,
13
 and the great 
English republican James Harrington set out his understanding of liberty in direct opposition to 
Leviathan and sought to refute the equivalence between the Lucchese and Turks.
14
 Even if 
Rousseau was unaware of the famous chapter from Leviathan, he too averred that Hobbes’s 
‘principles are destructive of every republican Government’.
15
 
The most comprehensive analysis of Hobbes’s challenge to republicanism is now Quentin 
Skinner’s Hobbes and Republican Liberty, thus it is well to begin by evaluating Skinner’s 
arguments in order to reveal specifically what that challenge entailed. Skinner meticulously 
traces the alterations to Hobbes’s analysis of liberty throughout the different recensions of his 
political theory and argues that these represent a substantial change in the character of his moral 
and political thought. Of particular importance presently is the change that takes place in 
Leviathan. This was the first enumeration of Hobbes’s political theory in which he defined 
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liberty as absence from ‘external’ impediments to motion. Skinner maintains that this change 
was of the utmost significance and offers two reasons for the redefinition: first, it resolved a 
number of tensions present in Hobbes’s previous formulations of his account of liberty; and, 
second, it was a response to the political context in which republican arguments were 
increasingly being deployed following the execution of Charles I.
16
 The new definition of 
liberty allowed Hobbes to refute the prevalent republican understanding of what it is to be a free 
man. Where, for republican theorists, liberty involved being free from the possibility of 
arbitrary interference and from living in dependence on the will of other men, for Hobbes it only 
entailed being free from interference as a matter of fact. Skinner concludes that Hobbes 
is thus the first to answer the republican theorists by proffering an alternative definition in 
which the presence of freedom is construed entirely as absence of impediments rather than 
absence of dependence.
17
 
 
According to Skinner, Hobbes’s redefinition of liberty as absence of impediments or 
interference was epoch-making since, despite being initially discredited by his contemporaries, 
it is now ‘widely treated as an article of faith’.
18
 There are, however, two problems of note with 
Skinner’s interpretation, which merit consideration. The first is the stress that he places on the 
extent of the change brought about by adding the word ‘external’ to the definition of liberty as 
absence of impediments to motion. Although Leviathan marked the first appearance of this 
addition in Hobbes’s political theory, he had originally formulated his redefinition six years 
earlier in his debate with Bishop Bramhall over liberty and necessity, a context quite distinct 
from that regarding republican liberty.
19
 If, as Skinner argues, the addition of ‘external’ entailed 
a significant alteration in the definition of liberty that rendered Hobbes’s position more coherent, 
then it seems strange that it did not appear in the revised edition of De Cive that was published 
in 1647, especially given the evidence indicating that some of the revisions to the 1647 edition 
were added in light of Bramhall’s other criticisms.
20
 Skinner recognises that Hobbes first 
introduced his redefinition in response to Bramhall, but does not offer an explanation as to why, 
if this was so significant, he omitted the revision from the 1647 edition of De Cive.
21
 A plausible 
alternative explanation would simply be that Hobbes did not consider the addition of ‘external’ 
to be a significant enough change to merit revising the text of De Cive and that its addition in 
Leviathan merely clarified the position that he adhered to in the earlier work.
22
 
The second and more important reason to take issue with Skinner’s interpretation is that 
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it only emphasises one aspect of Hobbes’s criticisms of the republican understanding of liberty. 
At the beginning of Chapter XXI Hobbes provided his definition of the proper signification of 
liberty or freedom as the absence of external impediments to motion. He then proceeded to give 
his definition of a free man as ‘he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able 
to do, is not hindred to doe what he had a will to’, as well as recasting his famous arguments 
that liberty and necessity are consistent, as are fear and liberty. Hobbes thus claimed that ‘all 
actions which men doe in Common-wealths, for feare of the law, are actions, which the doers 
had liberty to omit.’
23
 It is important to stress this point, as Hobbes confirmed that the laws of 
the commonwealth are not external impediments to motion and therefore do not hinder liberty 
properly understood. Skinner rightly highlights the polemical force behind the conclusion drawn 
from Hobbes’s definition of a free man, which, contrary to the republican understanding, would 
render men free so long as they were not physically prevented from realising their will, 
irrespective of the passions that determined the will (such as fear) in the first place.
24
 This is 
certainly a significant point, yet it is equally important to recognise that this understanding of 
liberty was not central to the remainder of the chapter in which Hobbes advanced his most 
forceful criticisms of republican liberty. 
In order to understand the argument of the chapter it is well to bear in mind that Hobbes 
used liberty in at least two distinct ways in Leviathan.
25
 In addition to defining corporeal liberty 
as absence from external impediments to motion, Hobbes also defined liberty in 
contradistinction to obligation. This tied into Hobbes’s definition of the right of nature in terms 
of the liberty of each man, which he distinguished from the laws of nature that men are under an 
obligation to follow.
26
 Yet it is not evident that Hobbes’s opposition between liberty and 
obligation necessarily followed from his definition of corporeal liberty. Instead Hobbes argued 
that obligations amongst men only arise when someone renounces or transfers one’s right or 
liberty. At this point one is obliged or bound not to hinder those to whom the right was granted 
because it would be contradictory and absurd to voluntarily undo that which was voluntarily 
maintained from the beginning.
27
 In other words, when men covenant they wilfully transfer their 
liberty (or right) and are thus under an obligation to perform in accordance with that will. It 
would be contradictory and therefore against reason to retain the liberty to revoke that will and 
act otherwise, or to transfer a right and then later try to exercise that right. However, this is not 
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because in covenanting men lose the corporeal liberty to revoke their will; rather they are 
prohibited from doing so by logical contradiction, and not by any external impediments to 
motion.  
It is crucial to keep these two different conceptions of liberty in mind when examining 
the argument of Chapter XXI of Leviathan on the ‘Liberty of Subjects’, in which Hobbes most 
explicitly drew the distinction between the proper signification of liberty as corporeal or natural 
liberty, and the improper or artificial liberty of subjects. That Hobbes would discuss the liberty 
of subjects at all comes as something of a surprise, since he had earlier claimed that those who 
talk of ‘A free Subject’ utter ‘words without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.’
28
 However, Hobbes 
clarified that it only makes any sense to talk about the liberty of subjects in relation to the 
‘Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes… In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak 
now, of the Liberty of Subjects.’ The liberty of subjects pertains to ‘all kinds of actions, by the 
laws praetermitted, [in which] men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall 
suggest, for the most profitable to themselves.’
29
 This liberty is suited only for artificial bodies 
such as the commonwealth, in contrast to the corporeal liberty of natural bodies which can only 
be opposed by physical impediments to motion. The ‘Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes’, it 
is well to reiterate, only hinder the artificial liberty of subjects and not their corporeal liberty. 
It is in his discussion of the liberty of subjects that Hobbes employed the famous 
example comparing Constantinople and Lucca and argued against those who have been 
deceived and led to sedition ‘by the specious name of Libertie’, which they have misunderstood 
from reading too much Aristotle, Cicero, and other Greek and Roman authors.
30
 Those authors 
had confused the liberty of particular men with the liberty of commonwealths and it is against 
this understanding of liberty that Hobbes aimed to elucidate ‘the particulars of the true Liberty 
of the Subject’. These particulars include, firstly, all of the rights stemming from man’s 
inalienable right of self-preservation that can never be covenanted away, and, secondly, the 
liberties that ‘depend on the Silence of the Law.’ The liberties of the subject do not include the 
corporeal liberty to break the civil laws (unless such laws contravene the right of self-
preservation), since such liberties are to be understood in contradistinction to the obligation that 
all subjects are under to obey the law. This obligation arises only from the covenant that all 
subjects have entered into in order to generate the sovereign power.
31
 
Hobbes’s argument against the republican account of the liberty of subjects, then, was 
primarily based on his definition of artificial liberty as absence of obligation and not on his 
definition of corporeal liberty as absence of external impediments to motion.
32
 Indeed this point 
was appreciated by some of his contemporary critics, who in turn sought to defend the very 
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understanding of liberty that Hobbes deemed so ill-conceived. For example, George Lawson 
claimed that Chapter XXI of Leviathan reveals that Hobbes ‘never understood what liberty is… 
In the Civil Law, and Politicks, its opposed to servitude and bondage, not simply and meerly to 
obligation by Laws, as he fancieth’.
33
 For Hobbes, then, much to his critics derision, the amount 
of liberty in a commonwealth was limited by the extent of the laws and not the means by which 
such laws are formed, hence his opposition to all those who thought that men could only be free 
in democracies. Moreover, it is far from apparent that the specious misunderstanding of liberty 
that Hobbes sought to discredit can simply be understood in terms of non-domination, since he 
consistently argued against those who confused liberty and power, as is clear from a passage in 
De Cive that anticipates the arguments later developed in Chapter XXI of Leviathan: 
When private citizens, i.e. subjects, demand liberty, what they are demanding in the name 
of liberty is not liberty but Dominion; but in their ignorance they never see this… those 
citizens who deplore loss of liberty in a Monarchy are only annoyed because they are not 
called to play a role in the government of the Country.
34
  
 
Hobbes’s objection was not to a specific conception of liberty as non-domination, but rather to 
the idea that liberty could only be found in democracies or popular governments; that is, to a 
conception of liberty that entailed popular sovereignty.
35
 Hobbes thought that the ‘democratical 
gentlemen’ who associated democracies with liberty and monarchies with tyrannies were one of 
the principal causes of the sedition and discord that resulted in civil war,
36
 thus it was these 
associations that he sought to repudiate.
37
 This analysis suggests that Hobbes’s challenge to a 
republican conception of liberty involved more than Skinner suggests in two important respects. 
First, it was the definition of liberty as absence of obligation and not as absence of external 
impediments of motion that was set out against the republican interpretation of the liberty of 
subjects. Second, the conception of liberty that Hobbes sought to contest was not liberty as non-
domination but rather liberty as popular sovereignty. 
If Chapter XXI of Leviathan was not primarily concerned with refuting an understanding 
of liberty as non-domination, then it is worth further examining to what extent the republican 
critique of Hobbes is valid. Central to this critique is the idea that Hobbes sought to legitimise 
arbitrary rule, thus Pettit claims that ‘Hobbes’s sovereign is not bound to act on any particular 
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matter in the perceived interests of the subject; sovereignty permits quite arbitrary behaviour.’
38
 
Similarly, Skinner states that, for Hobbes, ‘the mere presence of arbitrary power within a civil 
association does nothing to subvert our liberty.’
39
 These interpretations are not without textual 
support, for Hobbes claimed to have shown that the ‘want of an Absolute and Arbitrary 
Legislative Power’ leads to the dissolution of commonwealths.
40
 However, it is important to 
recognise that Hobbes understood arbitrariness quite differently from his modern republican 
critics.
41
 For Pettit, liberty as non-domination is defined in contradistinction to arbitrary power, 
and arbitrary power is understood as that which does not track the interests of those upon whom 
it is exercised.
42
 This involves a certain level of contestability that is certainly not to be found in 
Hobbes, but it is well to stress one very important sense in which the laws of a Hobbesian 
sovereign do track the interests of the subjects. Hobbes thought that the existence of the 
sovereign and civil laws was absolutely necessary in order to ensure that peace is preserved. In 
Leviathan the fundamental law of nature is ‘to seek Peace, and follow it’,
43
 and it is the interest 
that all men have in seeking peace and thereby ensuring their self-preservation that leads to the 
generation of the commonwealth. Indeed if there is one interest that all individuals have it is an 
interest in their own preservation, thus their obligation to the sovereign lasts only as long as this 
interest is tracked (to use Pettit’s terms), or as Hobbes more famously put it: 
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, 
than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. …The end of Obedience is 
Protection;
44
 
 
The obligation of the subjects, then, lasts only as long as the sovereign ensures their protection, 
thus satisfying their overriding interest in peace and self-preservation. To the extent that Hobbes 
considered the question of legitimacy at all, it was couched in terms of when and why certain 
obligations exist in the commonwealth. In Leviathan Hobbes explicitly claimed that the 
obligation of subjects exists only to the extent that peace is secured, for where ‘our refusal to 
obey, frustrates the End for which Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: 
otherwise there is.’
45
 In addition, for any law to be obligatory it would have to be clearly 
promulgated by the sovereign and the sovereign remains obligated under natural law to provide 
subjects with not just ‘a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life, which every 
man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to 
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himselfe.’
46
 Hobbes thought it imperative that the sovereign ensure the security of his subjects, 
for which it is essential ‘that they have nothing to fear but penalties which they can anticipate or 
expect’;
47
 thus the punishments that follow from the breach of the law are not arbitrary.
48
 What 
is more, the idea that the obligation of the subjects ceases when the sovereign does not secure 
their preservation was attacked for giving too much liberty to subjects by absolutists such as 
John Bramhall and Robert Filmer, with the latter insisting that this doctrine is ‘destructive to all 
government whatsoever, and even to the Leviathan itself’.
49
 In the dedication to Leviathan, 
Hobbes wrote of how, ‘in a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great Liberty, 
and on the other side for too much Authority, ’tis hard to passe between the points of both 
unwounded.’
50
 The reception history of Leviathan proves testimony to the truth of this claim, 
with Hobbes’s absolutism being criticised on the one side for justifying arbitrary rule and on the 
other side for supplying a ‘Rebells catechism’.
51
 
If Hobbes did not justify obligation to arbitrary rule in the way that Pettit understands 
arbitrariness, then it is well to consider what he meant when he insisted upon the necessity of 
arbitrary power. Hobbes equated an ‘Arbitrator’ with a ‘Judge’, whose role was to resolve 
controversies between men.
52
 In the state of nature there would be no such authoritative 
arbitrator (a principal cause of the state of war), hence an arbitrator would be required in the 
civil state to perform ‘the act of defining what is Just.’
53
 It was consequently a law of nature that 
those who ‘are at controversie, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator.’
54
 An 
individual with arbitrary power, then, was someone whose will could authoritatively resolve 
disputes and controversies and the existence of such arbitrary power was a precondition of 
living in peace rather than war. If the sovereign’s judgement could be legitimately challenged 
then it would cease to be authoritative and, by definition for Hobbes, cease to be sovereign. 
Indeed this is one reason why Hobbes thought that the division of sovereignty amounted to its 
eradication, resulting in civil war.
55
  
It is important to stress that Hobbes did not consider arbitrary power to be opposed to 
either the consent or representation of the people.
56
 The obligation that subjects are under 
depends on them each having willingly subjected their will to that of the sovereign; in this 
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respect the Hobbesian sovereign represents the will of the people. 57  In Leviathan this is 
presented as an act of authorisation, with the consequence that the will of the sovereign is in fact 
the will of each individual subject.
58
 Given that the law is nothing other than the will of the 
sovereign, it could even be argued that, pace Rousseau, the law actually emanates from the will 
of every individual.  
Hobbes insisted that Aristotle had been mistaken to think that in a commonwealth ‘not 
Men should govern, but the Law.’ Against this seditious idea, he maintained that behind any law 
there is always either the will of one man or the will of an assembly of men (be it aristocratic or 
democratic), and ‘without such Arbitrary government, such Warre must be perpetuall’.
59
 
According to Hobbes, then, all legislative power was arbitrary by definition, since it would 
always be dependent on the will of the sovereign. The importance of this point cannot be 
understated. Although primarily in response to Filmer rather than Hobbes, Algernon Sydney 
even confessed towards the end of his Discourses Concerning Government that the ‘Legislative 
Power is always Arbitrary’, since ‘the establishment of Government is always an arbitrary Act, 
wholly depending on the will of men.’
60
 For Sidney of course, in opposition to absolutists, the 
necessary arbitrariness of the legislative power was one more reason why it should only ever be 
trusted to those who are bound to obey the laws that they make, yet he nonetheless accepted the 
Hobbesian point that the law is always dependent on the will of men. 
For republicans such as Rousseau, by contrast, it was imperative that the law could be 
conceptually distinguished from the will of particular men, as only then would dependence on 
the law be in accordance with freedom (whereas dependence on the will of other men would 
always be opposed to freedom).
61
 Rousseau realised that this was a problem akin to that of 
squaring the circle in geometry and could only be achieved providing that sovereignty always 
remained with the people. Hobbes’s greatest challenge to republicans, or the ‘democratical 
gentlemen’ as he called them, was simply to argue that this is to confuse sovereignty and liberty. 
This challenge would be reiterated by Montesquieu, yet examination of early eighteenth-century 
French thought also reveals that the question of political liberty was far from central to the 
republican language of the time. 
 
Montesquieu and French republicanism 
 
Montesquieu is generally recognised as having occupied a pivotal role in the development of 
eighteenth-century republicanism, even if the intricacies and implications of what that role 
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entailed remain greatly contested.
62
 There is little doubt that Montesquieu was a significant 
influence on Rousseau’s political thought,
63
 and he also proves to be an important figure in the 
way that modern republicans have come to understand the tradition upon which they draw. In 
general this is due to the impact that his work had on the founding fathers in America, thus Paul 
Rahe argues that Montesquieu was the first to break with classical republicanism and lay the 
foundations for the modern commercial republic.
64
 Montesquieu is also central to Pettit’s revival 
of republicanism. In addition to supposedly being one of the ‘big names’ of the modern 
republican tradition, Montesquieu’s understanding of liberty as security or tranquillity of spirit 
is adopted by Pettit in support of his own conception of liberty as non-domination.
65
 Even if 
Montesquieu lends support to Rahe’s and Pettit’s interpretations of modern republicanism, it is 
important to reveal how differently his views on republics appear when situated in the pre-
revolutionary French context; this being the context in which Rousseau read and responded to 
Montesquieu. 
As the eighteenth century progressed the famous quarrel between the ancients and 
moderns took a decidedly political turn. At the heart of this debate was the question of whether 
or not the virtues associated with ancient polities such as Sparta and Rome should, or could, be 
revived in eighteenth-century Europe. Following Machiavelli, histories of Rome had become a 
prominent genre of political argument in the early modern period, central to which were issues 
concerning what the rise and decline of Rome could reveal about the prospects for modern 
states. These histories often emphasised the prevalence of civic virtue in sustaining the glory of 
republican Rome and cast its corruption in terms of the development of the individualistic 
passions associated with the onset of luxury. Typical here is Charles de Saint-Evremond, whose 
influential work towards the end of the seventeenth century introduced a number of themes that 
would later characterise both Montesquieu’s thought in particular and the discussion of 
republican ideas in eighteenth-century France more generally.
66
 Saint-Evremond argued that at 
its height Rome was a true community where private interests were subsumed under the order 
and interest of the republic. Yet he also stressed that such virtue was not suited to large states 
and would only last in small polities where poverty is respectable.
67
 The corruption and decline 
of Rome commenced as the spirit of individualism developed and the bonds of society were felt 
to be burdensome.
68
 At this stage love of fatherland was lost, for ‘this esteem, this inclination, so 
noble for virtuous men, seemed ridiculous to people who wanted to consider nothing other than 
                                                 
62
  For a critical overview of the debate see Douglass, ‘Montesquieu and Modern Republicanism’. 
63
  Indeed Rahe even suggests that Rousseau owed his very interest in politics to Montesquieu, Soft 
Despotism, especially pp. 77-81, and more generally pp. 116-140. 
64
  Rahe, Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty. 
65
  Pettit, Republicanism, pp. 71, 273. 
66
  See Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France, pp. 229-237.  
67
  Saint-Evremond, ‘Réflexions sur les divers génies du peuple Romain dans les divers temps de la 
République’, Œuvres, II, pp. 255-256. The earliest (authorised) edition of Saint-Evremond’s works was 
published in 1668 although the two volume edition edited by Desmaizeaux in 1705 was most frequently 
reprinted thereafter. 
68
  Saint-Evremond, ‘Réflexions’, Œuvres, II, pp. 307-309.  
 180 
themselves. Honour began to pass for a chimera, glory for purest vanity’.
69
 Despite his praise of 
republican Rome, then, Saint-Evremond was clear that the spirit of individualism that 
characterised large modern states was antithetical to the love of fatherland requisite for 
preserving virtue in small republics. 
The idea that modern commercial societies fostered an individualistic spirit opposed to 
virtue became increasingly accepted around the turn of the eighteenth century; the important 
question, therefore, was whether the ancient virtues should be revived or whether modern 
commerce and luxury should be embraced. Pierre Nicole famously argued that, given man’s 
fallen nature, genuine virtue was beyond the reach of political society and the best that could be 
hoped for was to enlighten man’s amour-propre, which could then imitate all the effects of 
virtue.
70
 This argument was more scandalously recast by Bernard Mandeville, who maintained 
that man’s private vices lead to public benefits and offered a sustained defence of the effects of 
luxury.
71
 These ideas became increasingly prominent in France with the development of doux 
commerce theory, especially in Jean-François Melon’s highly acclaimed Political Essay on 
Commerce, a work that owed much to Mandeville’s arguments.
72
 On the other side of the debate, 
most famously, was François de Fénelon. In his widely read Telemachus, Fénelon eulogised 
ancient virtue in contrast to the corruption that he associated with modern commercial societies, 
insisting that ‘luxury poisons a whole nation.’
73
 Even though the sort of government Fénelon 
supported was monarchical, it has come to be regarded as a republican monarchy precisely 
because of his exaltation of the ancient virtues.
74
 
Given the praise of Rome found in his Considerations on the Romans, it might be 
thought that Montesquieu would have come down against those who embraced modern 
commercial society. However, like Saint-Evremond before him, it was not evident from 
Montesquieu’s Considerations that the virtues that had sustained Rome at its height were 
applicable in modern states. Even if Montesquieu’s precise position regarding this debate is 
difficult to discern from the Considerations, it was much more apparent by the time The Spirit 
of the Laws was complete. In the later work Montesquieu sided with the doux commerce 
theorists – principally against Fénelon – by maintaining that commerce and luxury should be 
developed across Europe; indeed it is no overstatement to claim that the theory of doux 
commerce was at the heart of Montesquieu’s political thought.
75
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In the Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu provided a typology of the different forms of 
government in terms of their natures and their principles. The nature of a republic was defined 
in terms of the sovereignty of the people (in democracies) or of part of the people (in 
aristocracies).
76
 The principle of republics was political virtue, which Montesquieu equated with 
love of fatherland. In democracies this further entailed love of democracy, equality and frugality, 
whereas in aristocracies love of equality could be replaced with a spirit of moderation.
77
 
According to Montesquieu, most ancient governments had virtue for their principle, in contrast 
to modern peoples where such virtue is not to be found.
78
 This was largely due to the extent of 
commerce and the onset of luxury in modernity, which, although essential to monarchies, 
corrodes the principle of all republics, to the extent that ‘the less luxury there is in a republic, 
the more perfect it is.’
79
 
Although Montesquieu thought that luxury corrupts the principle of republics, the 
prospects for commercial republics appeared more promising when he turned to consider 
commerce in relation to the constitutions (and not the principles) of the different forms of 
government. Montesquieu distinguished between commerce founded on luxury and commerce 
founded on economy. The former is more appropriate for monarchies and the latter for republics, 
and he argued that great commercial enterprises are only likely to be pursued by republics.
80
 
Montesquieu praised the beneficial effects of commerce, which lead to the spread of gentle 
(doux) mores and serve to procure peace amongst trading nations. Yet he equally recognised that 
commerce sets individuals apart from one another and weakens pure mores, with moral virtues 
being performed only for money rather than for humanity’s sake.
81
 
In modern Europe the transition from commerce to luxury was almost inevitable since 
the extent of commerce was far greater than in ancient times, thus the ‘effect of commerce is 
wealth; the consequence of wealth, luxury’.
82
 Montesquieu thought that the principle of 
republics was incompatible with the onset of luxury, since the spirit of generality that must 
dominate in republics is replaced by that of particularity, inequality rises and political virtue is 
destroyed.
83
 By contrast, he considered that England was particularly well suited for commerce 
and luxury,
84
 hence he praised the nation’s spirit for having ‘always made its political interests 
give way to the interests of commerce.’
85
 Modern commercial states, like England, would not be 
sustained by the principle of republics but rather by that of monarchies, which was more 
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suitable for societies beset with luxury.
86
 The principle of monarchies was honour, the nature of 
which is to demand preferences and distinctions. Montesquieu equated this with ambition, 
which although pernicious in republics has good effects in monarchies; indeed it does not matter 
that such honour is really false honour, as it remains beneficial for ‘each person works for the 
common good, believing he works for his individual interests.’
87
 This principle is central to the 
prosperity of modern commercial states, in which even if men’s ‘passions inspire in them the 
thought of being wicked, they nevertheless have an interest in not being so.’
88
 
Montesquieu approved of both Nicole’s reflections on amour-propre and Mandeville’s 
ideas on commerce,
89
 and his own account of how false honour and ambition lead individuals to 
pursue the common good resembles the positive effects of enlightened amour-propre in his 
predecessors’ thought. Moreover, by arguing that commerce procures gentle (doux) mores that 
render political virtue superfluous, Montesquieu clearly sided with the doux commerce theorists 
over those who extolled the virtues of ancient polities. Indeed by denying the relevance of 
political virtue for modern commercial states, Montesquieu disavowed the central tenet of the 
classical republican discourse prevalent in France at the time, which was primarily concerned 
with protecting civic virtue against its imminent erosion by the development of individualism 
and self-interest.
90
 This has led to Montesquieu being viewed as one of the pivotal figures in 
repudiating classical republicanism in favour of a form of modern commercial republicanism.
91
 
Yet it is well to stress that, for Montesquieu at least, the proposals that he set forth for modern 
commercial states were not distinctively republican and were based on individuals displaying 
the passions associated with the principle of monarchies. 
When located in the context of pre-revolutionary French thought, then, Montesquieu is 
best viewed as an opponent of the prevalent republican discourse, precisely because he denied 
the relevance of lessons drawn from ancient polities for modern states. What is more, this is 
exactly how he was read by the next generation of republicans writing in French during the 
eighteenth century. Of these two are particularly significant when considering the context for 
Rousseau’s republicanism: the Abbé de Mably and Claude Helvétius.
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In his Observations on the Romans, Mably compared modern nations ‘where avarice 
and luxury have stifled all love of the public good’, with Rome in its poor and uncorrupted 
state.
93
 Mably accepted the argument, advanced by those following Nicole and Mandeville, that 
individuals who are vicious in private might realise their interest in putting on the mask of 
virtue in public; indeed he thought that this had been the case in Rome following its original 
corruption, leading it to flourish during a period of tranquillity.
94
 Yet Mably insisted that the 
lesson to be drawn from Rome was that this was merely a period of false prosperity that could 
only ever be short-lived before the inevitable decline that follows once a taste for luxury has 
developed, which always corrupts virtue. 
For Mably, however, it was ancient Sparta and not Rome that provided the model of the 
perfect republic, as the Spartans enjoyed all of the advantages arising from the union of love of 
freedom and love of fatherland in a purely popular state.
95
 Throughout Phocion’s Dialogues 
Lycurgus is taken as the legislator par excellence and Mably’s praise of Sparta and Lycurgus 
even surpassed that found in Rousseau. The glory of Sparta was largely due to its success in 
forestalling the onset of wealth and luxury, which ensured that the mores of the people remained 
pure and uncorrupted. In his most vehement attack on the effects of luxury, Mably stated that in 
modern states the ‘thirst for money that devours us has stifled love of fatherland. The luxury of 
the citizen refuses all of the duties of humanity.’
96
 
The praise of Spartan virtue and critique of modern luxury were also central themes in 
Helvétius’s political thought. For Helvétius, the question of whether luxury is beneficial to a 
nation supplied the paradigmatic case of ignorance (one of the two sources of erroneous 
judgements), with people only viewing one side of the debate. Although Helvétius nominally 
remained neutral on the question, his presentation of the arguments against luxury far 
outweighed his account of its benefits and the implication was clear: those who thought that 
luxury benefitted nations were ignorant of its effects and judged erroneously.
97
 Helvétius 
proceeded to confirm that he was far from thinking that luxury is beneficial for a state,
98
 a point 
he illustrated with reference to England. Where Montesquieu had praised the commerce of the 
English, Helvétius thought that their taste for luxury and effeminacy would soon lead to the 
demise of their principles of government and ensuing servitude as people come to prefer riches 
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over talent.
99
 
Helvétius considered that the development of luxury and effeminacy was one of the two 
sources of despotic power, as it results in people only being concerned with their private interest 
and not the public welfare.
100
 The ‘opium of luxury’, he insisted, allows despotism to flourish by 
numbing the passions of citizens, which are ‘the soul and the life’ of the state.
101
 Helvétius 
maintained that virtue is incompatible with commercial republics as commerce places the value 
of riches higher than that of honours,
102
 whereas honour is of much greater value in sustaining 
virtue and making people happy. Helvétius shared Mably’s admiration of Sparta and took 
Lycurgus to be the model legislator precisely because he knew how to cultivate virtue whilst 
also rendering the citizens happy in performing their duties, both of which were imperative 
‘since the force of virtue is always proportionate to the degree of pleasure assigned for its 
reward.’
103
 Helvétius thus averred that virtue only flourished in Greece and Rome when the 
legislators united private and public interest; in a note to the passage adding that it is ‘in this 
union that the true spirit of the laws consists.’
104
 Both Mably and Helvétius, then, eulogised the 
civic virtue of ancient Sparta in order to support their respective critiques of the degenerative 
effects of commerce and luxury. 
The emphasis on Sparta over Rome as the model republican polity serves to highlight 
one of the peculiarities of the French republican tradition around the middle of the eighteenth 
century; that is, that the significance of political liberty – for which republican Rome provided 
the model – was relatively neglected in comparison with the importance of inculcating civic 
virtue, as exemplified by Sparta. This is not to say that liberty was of no concern for French 
republican thinkers, but only that it was not the principal value that they associated with the 
republics of antiquity. Rather the definitive characteristic of the republican language of the time 
was the emphasis placed on cultivating civic virtue in opposition to the corrosive effects of 
modern commercial society. 
At this stage it is well to return to Montesquieu and note that he did not consider 
political liberty to be constitutive of either the nature or principle of republics (or of any other 
form of government). With this in mind, then, it is worth briefly considering the idea that 
Montesquieu advanced a republican understanding of liberty as non-domination, as Pettit has 
argued. Montesquieu thought that political liberty was only to be found in moderate 
governments (which include monarchies) and was exemplified by the English constitution, 
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which he deemed to be the only constitution that ‘has political liberty for its direct purpose.’
105
 
He defined political liberty in relation to the constitution as ‘the right to do everything the laws 
permit’, which consists ‘in having the power to do what one should want to do and in no way 
being constrained to do what one should not want to do.’
106
 In relation to the citizen, liberty 
consists in ‘that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security’, 
for which it is imperative that citizens do not fear one another.
107
 Whether or not Montesquieu’s 
definition of liberty quite entailed having ‘the capacity to stand eye to eye with your fellow 
citizens’,
108
 there is certainly some affinity between Pettit’s non-domination and Montesquieu’s 
security and tranquillity of spirit. What is not so clear is that Montesquieu perceived there to be 
anything distinctively republican about this conception of liberty. 
Montesquieu thought that political liberty could only be present ‘when power is not 
abused’, for which ‘power must check power by the arrangement of things.’
109
 It was primarily 
the division of legislative, executive and judiciary powers in the English system, then, that 
preserved its liberty. There is much debate as to whether or not Montesquieu thought that 
England was a republic, a position which is usually supported by his implicit reference to 
England as ‘a nation where the republic hides under the form of monarchy’.
110
 Without entering 
into the debate in detail presently, it is well to stress that in Book XI – which is concerned 
explicitly with political liberty – England is consistently treated as if it is a monarchy, albeit one 
with aristocratic elements. Montesquieu claimed that ‘the English have taken their idea of 
political liberty from the Germans’, and in the following chapters he explained that the 
monarchies known in modernity derived from the German nations that conquered the Roman 
Empire.
111
 These were unknown to the ancients and originated in a mix between monarchy and 
aristocracy. In an unpublished pensée on the history of England, Montesquieu even wrote that 
‘if they did not have a king in England, the English would be less free.’
112
 
Montesquieu nowhere indicated that the political liberty exemplified in the English 
constitution was secured by its republican elements, or that his definition of liberty as 
tranquillity of spirit was distinctively republican. Indeed the only time that he associated any 
type of liberty with republics it was for the purpose of refuting those who too readily associated 
political liberty with democratic governments. Montesquieu argued that the association of 
                                                 
105
  Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, XI.5, p. 156. Montesquieu took the constitution of England as an 
ideal type and was not concerned ‘whether at present the English enjoy this liberty or not.’ XI.6, p. 166. 
106
  Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, XI.3, p. 155. 
107
  Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, XI.6, p. 157; XII.1-2, pp. 187-188. However, in his Pensées 
Montesquieu suggested that this freedom is somewhat illusory. Living under good laws, such as in 
monarchies or wise and moderate aristocracies, is like being a fish in a large net, only thinking oneself 
free. Nonetheless, this ensures the citizen’s sense of security, unlike in despotisms, Mes Pensées, 1798-
1801, Œuvres, I, pp. 1430-1431. 
108
  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 5. 
109
  Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, XI.4, p. 155. 
110
  Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, V.19, p. 70.   
111
  Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, XI.6-8, pp. 165-168. 
112
  ‘S’il n’y avoit pas de roi en Angleterre, les Anglois seroient moins libres.’ Montesquieu, Mes Pensées, 
601, Œuvres, I, p. 1402. 
 186 
liberty with democracies was based on a misunderstanding of liberty that arises because ‘the 
power of the people has been confused with the liberty of the people.’
113
 This argument, it 
should be stressed, is the same as that which Hobbes employed against the ‘democratical 
gentlemen’ who conflated sovereignty with liberty. To be sure, there are important differences 
between Hobbes’s and Montesquieu’s definitions of liberty, yet they both targeted what they 
took to be the same erroneous conceptions and both rejected the idea that liberty could only be 
secured in a republic. Montesquieu even proceeded to challenge the great English republican 
and adversary of Hobbes, James Harrington, who had confused the idea of political liberty in 
Oceana and ‘sought this liberty only after misunderstanding it’.
114
 
Beyond the erroneous amalgamation of the people’s power and liberty, Montesquieu did 
not associate any form of liberty uniquely with republics. To the extent that Montesquieu’s 
analysis of political liberty supports Pettit’s conception of liberty as non-domination, then, it 
equally reveals how indistinctively republican that conception really is. Montesquieu’s idea that 
the English constitution provided the model of political liberty would later be challenged by 
Rousseau, yet there is little other evidence to suggest that questions regarding political liberty 
were central to the republican critiques of Montesquieu in France. Indeed Montesquieu’s 
analysis of republics was not primarily concerned with liberty at all and examination of his 
thought rather serves to sever the association between republican government and liberty as 
non-domination. 
Analysis of Montesquieu’s thought reveals him to have posed at least two challenges to 
republicanism as it was conceived by his contemporaries. Most significantly, by siding with the 
doux commerce theorists against those who sought to recover ideas from ancient polities, 
Montesquieu rendered political virtue – the principle of republics – beyond the reach of modern 
states. In addition, Montesquieu also challenged thinkers such as Harrington, who adhered to a 
confused conception of political liberty, by reasserting Hobbes’s criticism that those who 
associate liberty with democracies mistakenly conflate liberty and power. Indeed Montesquieu 
gave little indication that the form of political liberty that he prized was at all unique to 
republics. Both political liberty and civic virtue, however, would be central to Rousseau’s 
republican vision, and with the general context of French republicanism sketched out these may 
now each be examined in turn. 
 
Rousseau and republican liberty 
 
Even if political liberty was not central to the pre-revolutionary French republican discourse, the 
concept was of paramount importance for Rousseau. Rousseau defined a republic as any state 
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where the law was placed above men, for which the government must only be the minister of 
the sovereign.
115
 The division of executive and legislative powers was crucial to preserving the 
republic by ensuring that tyranny does not ensue, which would be the case if either the 
government or sovereign attempted to usurp the power of the other. Moreover, Rousseau 
thought that liberty involved not being dependent on the will of other men; dependence on the 
law being the only form of dependence compatible with liberty in the social order.
116
 A free state, 
then, was one governed by law and not by men, and Rousseau reformulated the classical 
republican idea that a free man is one who lives under laws to which he consents in his account 
of the moral freedom of the citizen who obeys only a law that he has prescribed for himself.
117
 
So far this may all seem to correspond quite closely with many republican accounts of political 
liberty.
118
 However, Rousseau’s vision of what republican liberty entailed is one that proves 
challenging for the prospects of securing such liberty in modern states. To this extent John 
Pocock’s description of Rousseau as ‘the Machiavelli of the eighteenth century’ is most apposite, 
‘in the sense that he dramatically and scandalously pointed out a contradiction that others were 
trying to live with.’
119
 
The contradiction that Rousseau pointed out with respect to securing republican liberty 
concerned the problems with squaring a notion of freedom that pertains to each individual 
citizen with the republican notion of a free state. Traditionally, for republicans, a free state was 
one governed by laws to which the people consent, paradigmatically understood in 
contradistinction to a state governed by the arbitrary will of an absolute monarch or a tyrant. 
Concomitantly, a free man consented to the laws under which he lived, in contrast to a slave 
who exemplifies living in dependence on the will of other men. Living under an absolute 
monarch, so republicans claimed, was therefore always akin to living in slavery; to be a free 
man presupposed living in a free state. However, the more challenging problems for republican 
theorists regard how the consent and freedom of the people taken as a whole relate to the 
consent and freedom of the individuals that constitute the people. If to be free is to consent to 
the laws by which one is governed, then to what extent and by what means does each individual 
have to consent to the laws of the state for the individual’s liberty to be realised? Or, in other 
words, does each individual need to participate actively in the legislative power in order to be 
free? By simply emphasising the contrast between free states and arbitrary monarchies these 
questions might be elided, yet they were questions that Rousseau confronted directly and his 
answers carry problematical implications for the prospects of realising republican liberty in any 
modern state. Most prominent amongst the challenges that Rousseau’s thought raises is the idea 
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that sovereignty could never legitimately be represented, for citizens could only be free from the 
dependence on the will of other men if they were all equally and directly members of the 
sovereign body. In Book III, Chapter XV of the Social Contract Rousseau thus famously argued 
that 
The English people thinks it is free. It greatly deceives itself; it is free only during the 
election of the members of Parliament. As soon as they are elected, it is a slave, it is nothing. 
Given the use made of these brief moments of freedom, the people certainly deserves to lose 
it.
120
 
 
This argument was probably set out with Montesquieu’s praise of the English constitution in 
mind,
121
 although Montesquieu was not alone in taking England as the model of political 
liberty.
122
 The reason that Rousseau thought that the English people were not free is that by 
appointing representatives to the sovereign body the people had alienated their sovereignty. 
Anyone who was not directly involved in the legislative body would therefore be dependent on 
the will of the representatives; that is, on the will of other men. At this point it is well to note 
that seventeenth-century English republicans had primarily been concerned to assert the rights 
of Parliament as the representatives of the people against advocates of absolute monarchy. 
Although they claimed that for a state to be free its laws must be enacted with the consent of all 
the citizens, they also argued that the people should be represented in an elected assembly to 
legislate on its behalf.
123
 Rousseau’s arguments concerning representation, however, would 
appear to render any form of representative sovereignty antithetical to the liberty of the people, 
precisely because it establishes dependence on the will of other men. It is thus well to examine 
how central the argument against representatives was to Rousseau’s account of republican 
liberty.  
The extent to which Rousseau was committed by principle to rejecting representative 
sovereignty is a matter of some debate. One reason to doubt Rousseau’s principled commitment 
is that in his recommendations for the government of Poland he took a more pragmatic approach, 
allowing for deputies in the legislative body. Rousseau was adamant, however, that this 
approach ‘has its evil and its goods, but the evil outweighs the good.’
124
 Poland was too large 
for direct legislation by the people, thus Rousseau was more concerned with how to ensure that 
the deputies would remain uncorrupted than with reforming the system in such a way that the 
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people could be sovereign. If the corruption of the deputies could be averted then the general 
will may still be realised and the citizens could be free as the laws would still ‘have the internal 
assent of their will.’
125
 It is also worth pointing out that Rousseau was writing for Poland as it 
was (not as it ought to have been constituted), where sovereignty did not reside in the people 
and was therefore no longer theirs to alienate. Rousseau noted his disapproval of the way in 
which the constitution of Poland and its legislative power had developed over time,
126
 yet he 
thought that is was quite unique in not yet having become corrupt, hence he sought only the 
means to forestall any future corruption. 
The contractual basis of the body politic was not central to Rousseau’s analysis of 
Poland and the work seems to imply that, even if only in rare circumstances, freedom could be 
preserved in states where there are representatives in the sovereign body as long as the general 
will prevails. In his seminal study on the topic, Richard Fralin thus argues that Rousseau was 
highly ambivalent towards representation and that his objections were mainly pragmatic, as is 
most evident from his analysis of Poland.
127
 Similarly, Joshua Cohen maintains that Rousseau’s 
reasons for rejecting representative sovereignty were not ones of principle and that 
representation was not a matter of basic political right. On Cohen’s reading, Rousseau preferred 
democratic sovereignty because of its motivational force, as the actual process of participating 
in the legislative body might have a civic and educative effect that would lead citizens to will 
generally.
128
 
Cohen’s argument about the educative effects of democratic sovereignty is convincing 
and coheres well with the importance that Rousseau attached to inculcating a level of civic 
virtue that would be necessary to secure the prevalence of the general will. However, the 
problem with maintaining that the objections to representative sovereignty were not ones of 
principle is, quite simply, that Rousseau consistently presented his argument as being one of 
principle. Indeed, Rousseau utilised the same principled argument when ridiculing the alleged 
liberty of the English as he had employed in Book II, Chapter I, entitled ‘That Sovereignty Is 
Inalienable’. Rousseau’s argument, on both occasions, was that sovereignty – being only the 
exercise of the general will – can only be represented by itself for the same reason that it cannot 
be alienated, that is, because the will is not capable of being transferred.
129
 This argument, in 
turn, rested on the importance that Rousseau attached to the will in constituting man’s moral 
nature and providing the basis for any legitimate social order.
130
 However, its importance has 
been vastly understated in analysis of Rousseau’s views on representation with, for example, 
Fralin stating that it ‘is either irrelevant or at best highly questionable as an argument against 
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representation.’
131
 
Irrespective of whether or not one accepts Rousseau’s argument, it was far from 
irrelevant to his purposes in demarcating the conditions requisite for a legitimate republican 
order. To be sure, taking Rousseau’s principled argument against representative sovereignty in 
the Social Contract seriously does not help to resolve the tension with the Considerations on 
Poland, although it is well to remember that even in the latter work he permitted representatives 
only as a necessary evil. Moreover, it might be thought that if the argument against 
representative sovereignty was premised on metaphysical and moral assumptions about the 
nature of the will then it need not trouble other republican theorists, unless they also share 
Rousseau’s metaphysical commitments. To some extent this point is valid, yet it is worth 
stressing that Rousseau’s claims about the nature of the will were crucial in order for him to 
maintain that a Hobbesian account of sovereignty is illegitimate. Indeed it was only by insisting 
that the will cannot legitimately be transferred that Rousseau could show why a Hobbesian 
sovereign was incapable of representing the will of the people.  
The paradigmatic contrast for republicans, to recall, was that between a free state where 
the law has the consent of the people (in whatever form they are represented) with a state 
governed by the arbitrary will of an absolute monarch. Hobbes’s point, however, was that an 
absolute sovereign could represent the people as every individual irrevocably transfers his will 
to the sovereign; each individual thus consents to (and in Leviathan authorises) all of the 
sovereign’s acts and laws.
132
 Moreover, in Leviathan at least, the unity that constitutes a 
people – in contradistinction to a multitude – only exists once represented by the sovereign, to 
the extent that it is mistaken to speak of there even being a people prior to the instigation of the 
sovereign.
133
 Rousseau’s argument against Hobbes (and those who followed Hobbes in thinking 
that sovereignty could be alienated) was to insist that it is a property of the will’s moral status 
that it cannot be transferred to another individual and therefore to transfer it irrevocably to 
another would always be illegitimate. The very reason why the people could not legitimately 
transfer this will to a single individual, such as a monarch, also precluded it being transferred to 
a body of individuals, such as a representative assembly. The will of the people (the general will) 
could only be represented by itself, thus sovereignty must always remain with the people as a 
collective body. 
It is well to point out that this aspect of Rousseau’s argument was only concerned with 
preserving the liberty of the people taken as a collective body, which would be lost if they 
transferred or alienated their will to another individual or group of individuals. The significance 
of Rousseau’s claims regarding why will cannot be transferred, then, was less to do with 
preserving the liberty of individual citizens than with showing why the sovereignty of the 
people could only be represented by the people as a whole. For the liberty of each individual to 
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be retained it would also be imperative that each citizen comes to realise that every expression 
of the general will qua law is in fact an expression of his own will. Only then could each citizen 
truly be said to consent to the laws and obey only a law that he has prescribed for himself.
134
 
However, the idea that sovereignty always remains with the people does not resolve the problem 
of representation altogether, since it remains necessary for the sovereign to represent itself in the 
legislative body. Rousseau’s argument for how this could be accomplished rests on premises 
about the equality rather than the liberty of citizens.
135
 The representation of the people by itself 
must preserve the moral and legitimate equality that is established by the social contract, which 
would only be the case if all the citizens had to assemble for the legislative body to pass laws. 
Rousseau claimed that, in entering the social contract, although each citizen ‘gives himself to all, 
he gives himself to no one… since there is no associate over whom one does not acquire the 
same right one grants him over oneself’.
136
 Each citizen must have an equal right within the 
legislative body, which could only be the case if sovereignty remained democratic and each 
citizen’s vote counted equally. A system of representatives within the sovereign body, by 
contrast, would violate this moral and legitimate equality as the representatives would have a 
greater share of the legislative right than the other citizens.  
On Rousseau’s analysis, representative sovereignty would violate both the inalienability 
of the people’s will taken as a collective body and the equality that must be preserved amongst 
the citizens within the legislative body as the moral and sovereign branch of the state. He 
maintained that this moral equality was necessary for liberty to flourish, insisting on the 
importance of ‘equality because freedom cannot last without it.’
137
 This close relationship 
between liberty and equality is a persistent theme within the republican tradition, from 
Machiavelli’s argument that republics were only suited to states where there was ‘notable 
equality’ and that inequality would render republics short-lived,
138
 to Pettit’s claim that to ‘want 
republican liberty, you have to want republican equality’.
139
 For Rousseau, dependence on the 
will of other men could only ever be rooted out of the social order if all citizens were equally 
dependent on the law as the expression of the general will of the people. Moreover, according to 
Rousseau, the equality of dependence on the law further required equality of legislative right 
amongst the citizens, as any inequality of legislative right would reintroduce dependence on the 
will of those with greater right.
140
 Only if both equality under the law (qua general will) and 
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equality of legislative right were secured could the general will truly be ‘general in its object as 
well as in its essence… it should come from all to apply to all’.
141
 
Given that Rousseau thought that the general will could prevail in Poland even with a 
system of deputies, the extent to which his criticisms of representative sovereignty should be 
taken to undermine any system of republican liberty remains an open question. However, it is 
important to stress that, for Rousseau, the principled objections to representative sovereignty 
were central to his arguments against a Hobbesian account of how the sovereign represents the 
will of the people. There are, of course, other non-Rousseauian reasons why it might be thought 
that a Hobbesian sovereign could never represent the will of the people,
142
 yet it remains 
incumbent upon the republican theorist to show why, if a Hobbesian account of representation is 
illegitimate, any form of representation where sovereignty does not remain directly with the 
people can be legitimate. Rousseau’s somewhat disquieting answer was that it cannot.  
Rousseau’s account of what is required for republican liberty challenges the prospects of 
realising such liberty in any modern state where representative sovereignty prevails. This 
conclusion should not appear all that surprising, since Rousseau insisted as early as the 
Dedication to the Second Discourse that liberty is only suitable for certain peoples: 
For freedom is like those solid and rich foods or those hearty wines, which are proper to 
nourish and fortify robust constitutions habituated to them, but which overpower, ruin, and 
intoxicate the weak and delicate who are unsuited for them.
143
 
 
In the Social Contract Rousseau thought that Corsica was the only state in eighteenth-century 
Europe capable of receiving good laws, and in his proposals for the Corsicans he recommended 
that they preserve the agricultural basis of their economy precisely because commerce is 
incompatible with liberty.
144
 The Social Contract was equally written for those few remaining 
free peoples who were yet to lose their liberty, hence Rousseau implored them to ‘remember this 
maxim: Freedom can be acquired, but it can never be recovered.’
145
 Principal amongst such 
states was his home city of Geneva,
146
 and it is well to note that when Rousseau spoke of the 
liberty of the ‘people’ and the ‘citizens’ he probably therefore only had a minority of the 
inhabitants of a well-ordered republic in mind.
147
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Rousseau’s thoughts on what republican liberty requires are not only of interest because 
they appear to render its attainment too demanding for modern states, but also because he 
occupies an important place in the way that competing traditions of liberty are often presented 
and understood in modernity. Pettit has sought to distance his conception of republican liberty 
from populist misunderstandings of the concept, which he suggests are based on some readings 
of Rousseau.
148
 However, this misunderstanding of republican liberty, if it is such, appears to 
have been prominent well before Rousseau, as both Hobbes and Montesquieu criticised those 
who conflated liberty and power and thus associated liberty only with democracies. In turn, 
Rousseau appears to have developed some of his own ideas concerning what liberty involves in 
response to Montesquieu’s discussion of political liberty and praise of the English constitution. 
Indeed, Rousseau may have been pivotal in consolidating the populist interpretation of 
republican liberty given that he maintained that sovereignty must always remain with the people. 
Yet it is well to stress that, for Rousseau at least, this conclusion was simply the consequence of 
seriously examining what is required in order to place the law above man and to root out all 
dependence on the will of men from the social order. 
Rousseau’s ideas were largely misappropriated for rhetorical ends in the French 
Revolution, yet his perceived influence may well have had some bearing on the reasons why the 
populist interpretation of republican liberty came under such attack in the revolution’s wake. It 
was this conception of liberty that Benjamin Constant famously thought inappropriate for 
modern times, when he argued – echoing Hobbes and Montesquieu – that the ‘abbé de Mably, 
like Rousseau and many others, had mistaken, just as the ancients did, the authority of the social 
body for liberty’.
149
 This is an important point, as it indicates that Constant’s modern liberty was 
not set out in opposition to a conception of liberty as non-domination but rather to a conception 
of liberty as popular sovereignty. The same could also be said of Isaiah Berlin’s famous 
distinction between positive and negative liberty. For Berlin, the French Revolution was 
characterised by ‘an eruption of the desire for ‘positive’ freedom of collective self-direction’, 
with Rousseau’s words serving as inspiration. According to Berlin, it was the association 
between liberty and sovereignty exemplified in the revolution to which Constant and other 
nineteenth-century liberals were opposed, leading them to insist on the importance of negative 
liberties.
150
 Rousseau’s understanding of what republican liberty required, then, may have 
inspired the fervor for what Berlin termed positive liberty in the French Revolution. The 
implications of these points for the way that competing traditions of liberty are understood merit 
further consideration, but first it is well to examine the other concept central to Rousseau’s 
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republican vision, that is, civic virtue. 
 
Rousseau and republican virtue 
 
Rousseau thought that republican liberty could only be preserved if the citizens remained 
virtuous. A well-ordered republic could only be sustained if the general will prevailed over any 
competing private wills, thus virtue required that man’s private will be brought into conformity 
with the general will.
151
 Rousseau’s recommendations for ensuring that republican virtue 
flourished, however, were no less demanding than his account of the conditions requisite for 
citizens to be free and for the law to be placed above men. These recommendations are well 
viewed in relation to Montesquieu and the French republican tradition outlined previously. 
Arguably Rousseau’s greatest debt to Montesquieu was the importance that he placed 
on the relationship between the government and the mores of the people, thus in Emile he wrote 
that the ‘necessary relations between morals and government have been so well expounded in 
the book The Spirit of the Laws that one can do no better than have recourse to this work to 
study these relations.’
152
 Rousseau followed Montesquieu in thinking that public education was 
crucial for preserving political virtue in republics, and he equally agreed that such virtue was 
only the characteristic of ancient peoples and had been largely lost in modern states. Indeed the 
complaint at the heart of Rousseau’s earliest political writings is well encapsulated by 
Montesquieu’s comment that the political men of antiquity who ‘lived under popular 
government recognised no other force to sustain it than virtue. Those of today speak to us only 
of manufacturing, commerce, finance, wealth, and even luxury.’
153
 
The all important difference between Montesquieu’s and Rousseau’s political thought, 
however, was that Montesquieu deemed political virtue superfluous for modern states and 
instead embraced commercial society. For Rousseau, by contrast, this was an uninspiring 
possibility, appropriate only for those already corrupted by luxury and inequality. Moreover, 
where Montesquieu had claimed that political virtue was only the principle of republics, 
Rousseau maintained that ‘the same principle ought to apply to every well-constituted State’.
154
 
If the only legitimate states were those in which the people remained sovereign then it was 
imperative that republican virtue flourish amongst them. The passions and mores that prevailed 
in modern commercial states were thus incompatible with a legitimate republican order. 
Rousseau – much like his contemporaries Mably and Helvétius – took ancient Sparta as 
the model of republican virtue and offered a Spartan inspired critique of modern doux commerce 
theory. This is evident as early as his First Discourse, in which he compared Sparta with Athens 
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and sided decisively with the former.
155
 Rousseau’s praise of Sparta, in turn, provoked criticism 
from defenders of commercial society, with Claude-Nicolas Lecat insisting that ‘all the laws of 
Sparta aimed at barbarism, at ferocity rather than virtue… How many great men we would have 
lost if we were as Barbaric as the Spartans!’
156
 Where the doux commerce theorists repudiated 
the austere militaristic mores of Sparta – which they associated with barbarism rather than with 
virtue – Rousseau repeatedly turned to Sparta to illustrate the conditions necessary for 
preserving love of fatherland and rendering citizens virtuous. In Emile, then, the model male 
citizen is portrayed as Pedaretus, who runs for the council of three hundred and upon defeat is 
delighted to realise that there were three hundred men worthier than himself in Sparta. Similarly, 
the model female citizen is the mother who gives thanks to the Gods for Sparta’s victory in war, 
even though her sons were all killed during the battle.
157
 More generally, Rousseau’s admiration 
of Sparta inspired his recommendations for inculcating virtue amongst the citizens in the few 
remaining states in eighteenth-century Europe where republican institutions remained viable.  
Central to Rousseau’s praise of Sparta was the idea that all luxury had been averted and 
consequently the inflamed individualistic passions that permeate modern commercial societies 
had not developed. Rousseau’s proposals for republics such as Corsica and Poland, then, drew 
on lessons from Sparta and were intended to prevent the development of vice in modern 
societies that he had recounted in the Second Discourse. If modern commerce and luxury were 
the source of man’s corruption then it was imperative that the onset of commerce be forestalled. 
Instead the economy of a well-ordered republic should ideally be based on agriculture.
158
 The 
problem with commerce of any sort is that it leads to the taste for money developing, which 
extinguishes love of fatherland as citizens strive only after their own wealth and not the glory of 
the republic.
159
 Rousseau thus opposed all systems of finance, insisting that the use of money 
should be kept to an absolute minimum and be held in contempt, to the extent that everyone 
‘must live and no one get rich. This is the fundamental principle of the nation’s prosperity’.
160
  
To ensure that the taste for wealth does not develop, Rousseau recommended keeping 
private property to a minimum, covering only the necessities of life and preventing individuals 
from accumulating more than they need. The property of the state should therefore be as great 
and strong as possible and that of the citizens as weak and small as possible.
161
 Rousseau had 
long argued that everything ‘beyond physical necessity is a source of evil’,
162
 and the economic 
systems that he proposed for republics were designed with a view to preventing the 
accumulation of individual wealth that breeds luxury. The government must ensure equality, or 
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at least minimal inequality, and in the long run this could only be achieved through the 
preservation of sound mores rather than by sumptuary laws or taxation. To this end Rousseau 
thought that statutory labour would be preferable to a system of taxation.
163
 
Rousseau was adamant that such economic systems would only ever be suitable for small 
republics and were inappropriate for larger territories.
164
 Moreover, such republics would only 
prosper providing that citizens remained active and laborious. It was therefore crucial that 
citizens have little leisure time left to themselves, and what time they have free from working 
would be well spent engaging in public festivities and games that honour the virtuous and kindle 
the citizens’ sense of community. The example to be followed was that provided by Lycurgus: 
He ceaselessly showed [the people] the fatherland in its laws, in its games, in its home, in 
its loves, in its festivities. He did not leave it a moment of relaxation to be by itself, and 
from that continuous constraint, ennobled by its object, was born in it that ardent love of 
fatherland that was always the strongest or rather the only passion of the Spartans, and 
which made of them beings above humanity.
165
 
 
The festivals proposed for republics would be opposed to modern art and leisure forms, such as 
the theatre, of which Rousseau greatly disapproved.
166
 In the theatre men only applaud the 
imitation of virtue. The great passions inspired by virtue would be reserved for the theatre alone 
and by enjoying them there men would cease to practice them in their actual lives. For Rousseau, 
genuine passions must be directed towards the public interest and the glory of the fatherland, 
which would only be achieved through Spartan style public games and festivals where honour 
was prized and only genuine virtue – and not the imitation thereof – was displayed: 
Thus did that Sparta, which I shall never have cited enough as the example that we ought to 
follow, recall its citizens by modest festivals and games without pomp… It is at Sparta that, 
in laborious idleness, everything was pleasure and entertainment; it is there that the harshest 
labours passed for recreations and that small relaxations formed a public instruction; it is 
there that the citizens, constantly assembled, consecrated the whole of life to amusements 
which were the great business of the State and to games from which they relaxed only for 
war.
167
 
 
Rousseau’s admiration of Sparta as the model of republican virtue was in marked contrast to his 
depiction of modern societies. Where the modern arts and sciences are born of men’s vices such 
as idleness, republican festivities should be based on the citizens’ virtues, their laboriousness 
and civic sprit. Where commerce and finance render men’s passions individualistic and corrupt, 
an agricultural society could instead engender general passions amongst the citizens that would 
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sustain love of fatherland. To be sure, Rousseau did not think that all hope was lost if the lessons 
from Sparta could not be applied in modern states. Writing with Geneva in mind, Rousseau 
insisted that ‘Ancient Peoples are no longer a model for modern ones’; Genevans are neither 
Romans nor Spartans but are rather ‘Merchants, Artisans, Bourgeois, always occupied with their 
private interests… for whom even liberty is only a means for acquiring without obstacle and for 
possessing in safety.’
168
 Yet this was not to praise Geneva, rather it was the development of 
commerce, wealth and the influence of modern art forms in the city that Rousseau thought was 
leading to moral decay and needed to be averted. Nonetheless, Rousseau still held out some 
hope for Geneva, for where the inhabitants of larger modern commercial states like France were 
irredeemably corrupt, it remained the case that ‘the Genevan is naturally good, he has a decent 
soul, he does not lack sense and he needs only good examples in order to be turned entirely to 
the good.’
169
 
Even if some hope remained for Geneva despite the commercial basis of its economy, it 
is important to stress that Rousseau viewed his political proposals as only being applicable to 
societies yet to feel the full force of modern commerce and luxury. Rousseau was adamant that 
as soon as society had been infected by the onset of luxury there was no turning back, since the 
taste for wealth and money profoundly changes the nature of man’s passions by giving them an 
individualistic bent that renders genuine love of fatherland unattainable. Rousseau’s proposals 
for inculcating civic virtue were necessarily ill-suited for modern states; indeed he went as far as 
to claim that these ‘two words, fatherland and citizen, should be effaced from modern 
languages.’
170
 
From his earliest works Rousseau insisted that ‘once a people has been corrupted, it has 
never been seen to return to virtue’,
171
 and down to his last autobiographical writings he 
affirmed that what he proposed ‘had been intended only for small republics’.
172
 Rousseau 
offered no solace for modern corrupt societies, since his political proposals were never intended 
for those states where commerce, luxury and inequality were rife.
173
 At his most cynical and in 
response to the suggestion that sumptuary laws could root out the evil of luxury once 
established, Rousseau thus remarked: ‘I am not unaware of the fact that when a man is dead 
there is no point calling Doctors.’
174
 
Rousseau’s account of republican virtue is one that proves incompatible with modern 
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commercial republicanism, since he viewed the prevalence of virtue and onset of luxury as 
being necessarily antithetical. Given the centrality that Rousseau accorded to the role of virtue 
in preserving a well-ordered republic and ensuring that the general will prevails, this appears to 
render his whole republican vision obsolete in modernity. To suggest that Rousseau’s republican 
vision is obsolete, however, is not to say the same about his republican critique of commercial 
society; a critique to which its defenders – most notably Adam Smith – felt obliged to 
respond.
175
 Yet this response was all the more necessary given that Rousseau’s own political 
proposals did not constitute a possibility for modern states once beset with luxury. Indeed 
Rousseau was arguably far more pessimistic about the prospects for republics than his 
contemporaries in Switzerland or France,
176
 a point that is well brought out by comparison with 
the Abbé de Mably, who was confident about the prospects for republican advancement in 
Europe and offered a programme for how to overthrow absolutism and replace it with a 
constitutional monarchy.
177
 To this extent Benjamin Constant was quite right to view Mably 
rather than Rousseau as the intellectual inspiration for the French Revolution,
178
 since although 
they both eulogised the republics of antiquity, it was only Mably who thought that classical 
republican ideas could be recovered in modern states such as eighteenth-century France.
 
 
 
Modern republicanism 
 
One of the aims of this chapter has been to evaluate whether or not Rousseau’s republican 
thought could serve as inspiration for contemporary political theorists. If the interpretation 
advanced thus far is accurate then there are at least two perhaps insurmountable problems with 
trying to apply Rousseau’s ideas to modern states. First, in the Social Contract at least, 
Rousseau argued that a legitimate social order was incompatible with representative sovereignty; 
instead sovereignty must always remain directly with the people. Even if elsewhere in his œuvre 
he conceded that representatives may be a necessary evil, he remained pessimistic about the 
chances of the general will prevailing in states where sovereignty had been alienated. Second, 
Rousseau thought that the development of inequality and luxury that permeated modern 
commercial societies was incompatible with sustaining republican virtue amongst the citizens. 
Given that the prevalence of virtue would be crucial in order for citizens to will generally, it is 
far from evident how a republican polity along the lines Rousseau proposed could remain well-
ordered and survive without virtue. It is often quite rightly thought that Rousseau’s vision of a 
pre-agricultural golden age where small societies of savages lived together in harmony presents 
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a lost ideal that modern man is unable to recover. In the few remaining city states of eighteenth-
century Europe Rousseau may have retained a glimmer of hope that his republican proposals 
could still be of some application. Today, however, Rousseau’s republican vision – much like 
his vision of the golden age – seems irrecoverably lost. 
Liberals and modern republicans alike, then, should be wary of drawing on Rousseau in 
support of their own political theories. More specifically, it is problematical to claim Rousseau 
as one of the ‘big names’ in a modern republican tradition,
179
 precisely because the form of 
republicanism that he extolled was distinctively anti-modern. For different reasons 
Montesquieu’s position within this tradition is also questionable. Where Rousseau’s 
republicanism was not modern, Montesquieu’s proposals for modern states were not 
distinctively republican. Indeed, when the eighteenth-century French context is examined, 
republicanism appears in a very different light to that cast by its modern proponents. 
The form of modern republicanism expounded by Philip Pettit stresses the centrality of 
a distinctively republican conception of liberty as non-domination. This understanding of liberty 
is presented in contrast to the supposedly liberal conception of liberty as non-interference. On 
Pettit’s account, the liberal conception finds its origin in Hobbes’s polemics against seventeenth-
century English republicans, which then lay dormant until the turn of the nineteenth century 
when it resurfaced to eclipse the republican conception. The liberal conception is exemplified in 
Constant’s modern liberty and Berlin’s negative liberty, thus the republican conception is 
presented in opposition to this ‘Berlin-Constant framework’.
180
 This way of characterising 
contrasting liberal and republican traditions has become a subject of much recent scholarly 
debate,
181
 to which the findings of the present chapter speak. 
The foregoing analysis goes some way to disentangling the conception of liberty as 
non-domination from a distinctively republican tradition of thought. In part, this involves re-
evaluating the precise nature of the challenge that Hobbes posed to republicanism. Rather than 
having opposed a republican conception of liberty as non-domination, Hobbes is better 
understood as having contested an understanding of liberty as popular sovereignty. This is the 
view that he attributed to the ‘democratical gentlemen’, who he thought had mistakenly 
concluded that there is more liberty in democracies than in monarchies. Arguably the most 
important aspect of Hobbes’s analysis of the liberty of subjects, then, was to break the link 
between the form of government under which subjects live and the amount of liberty that they 
enjoy. To be sure, Hobbes’s redefinition of liberty certainly served his polemical ends, but it also 
introduced an important analytical distinction by separating questions regarding the extent of 
liberty from questions about the form of government under which one lives. In this respect, at 
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least, Berlin followed in Hobbes’s footsteps, for one of the central purposes of his famous essay 
was to distinguish the question of what liberty is from the question of what political institutions 
might be necessary to realise such liberty in any given state.
182
 Similarly, he sought to 
disentangle liberty from other concepts that might be of value, since, for philosophical purposes 
at least, ‘nothing is gained by a confusion of terms… liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or 
justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience.’
183
 By contrast, for Pettit at least, 
the republican conception of liberty is meant to be all-encompassing, so that liberty as non-
domination is the only value that needs to be pursued and such liberty cannot be understood 
abstracted from the political institutions under which it may be secured.
184
 
Examination of the eighteenth-century French context also demonstrates that the idea of 
liberty as non-domination was not central to the republican debates of the time. To the extent 
that Montesquieu’s conception of political liberty can be understood in terms of non-domination, 
the association between liberty as non-domination and republicanism is actually severed. For 
Montesquieu, there was nothing distinctively republican about this conception of liberty, which 
could be found in any moderate government, be it monarchical or republican. What is more, 
Montesquieu reiterated Hobbes’s criticisms of those who too readily associated liberty with 
democracies for having confused liberty with power. The idea that both Hobbes and 
Montesquieu deemed mistaken – that liberty entails the sovereignty of the people in the 
legislative body – was later affirmed by Rousseau, this being for him the consequence of trying 
to refute a Hobbesian theory of representation whilst rooting out all dependence on the will of 
others from the social order by placing the law above man. It was this conception of freedom as 
popular sovereignty to which Constant’s modern liberty was set out in opposition. Indeed 
Constant’s modern liberty – so far from being opposed to a conception of liberty as non-
domination – entailed that every individual has ‘the right to be subjected only to the laws,’ free 
from ‘the arbitrary will of one or more individuals’,
185
 for which some influence on the 
administration of government (political liberty) was an indispensable guarantee.
186
 
To characterise rival liberal and republican traditions around either an adherence to or a 
rejection of liberty as non-domination thus appears misguided, at least with respect to Constant 
and the eighteenth-century debates to which he responded. Yet this is not to say that 
examination of the pre-revolutionary French context serves only to obfuscate any differences 
between republican and liberal traditions; rather the pertinent differences re-emerge from a 
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contrasting perspective with arguably greater clarity.
187
 Viewed from this perspective the 
dividing line between the two traditions falls on their respective attitudes towards the place of 
commerce, luxury and political virtue in modern states, and, more starkly, on the question of 
whether or not lessons drawn from the republics of antiquity could and should be applied in 
eighteenth-century Europe. On one side of the debate, the austere militaristic virtue of ancient 
Sparta provided inspiration for a critique of the luxury, inequality and individualism rife in 
modern states. On the other side, (proto-liberal) arguments were deployed in defence of 
commerce’s tendency to turn man’s individualistic passions to good use and to procure both 
gentle (doux) mores amongst the people and peace between states. The famous quarrel between 
the ancients and moderns is often thought to have peaked around the turn of the eighteenth 
century, yet its political manifestations shaped much French thought in the century thereafter. 
Indeed the idea that there is a deep irreconcilability between ancient and modern forms of 
politics permeates the work of thinkers from Montesquieu through Rousseau to Constant. 
This characterisation of rival liberal and republican traditions is tentative at best; that it 
captures well important elements of pre-revolutionary French debates is not to suggest that it 
should be extended any further. Liberal and republican traditions may appear quite differently 
and less antagonistically when viewed from elsewhere in eighteenth-century Europe or America. 
Nonetheless, one virtue of viewing contrasting republican and liberal traditions from this 
perspective is that it elucidates the context for understanding the form of liberalism that 
Constant advanced towards the beginning of the nineteenth century, pre-occupied as he was 
with understanding the French Revolution. Constant thought that the spirit of the ancients was 
characterised by war and usurpation, whereas that of the moderns was characterised by 
commerce. Different forms of liberty were thus appropriate to ancient and modern peoples, and 
in modern times he thought it imperative that individual liberty is not sacrificed in the name of 
ancient liberty.
188
 For Constant, the failure to appreciate this served in large part to explain the 
Jacobin Terror. Constant’s liberty of the moderns, then, was set out against a republican 
understanding of liberty, but it was an ancient republican idea of liberty as popular sovereignty 
rather than an idea of liberty as non-domination. 
The analysis of Constant, in turn, serves to shed some light on Berlin’s account of 
positive and negative liberty, although it is well to stress that he did not associate these 
conceptions with competing republican and liberal traditions. Berlin was concerned to trace the 
historical development of the two divergent conceptions of liberty to the point when they came 
into direct conflict with one another.
189
 It was Constant, according to Berlin, who most clearly 
saw and expressed this conflict in the wake of the French Revolution by stressing that the notion 
of the sovereignty of the people confused authority with liberty.
190
 For Berlin, the difference 
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between negative and positive liberty rested on ‘two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable 
attitudes to the ends of life’; advocates of the former ‘want to curb authority as such’, those of 
the ‘latter want it placed in their own hands.’
191
 Nineteenth-century liberals, for Berlin, were 
those who stressed the (necessarily limited) priority of the former over the latter; in this respect, 
if not many others, Berlin’s negative and positive conceptions of liberty map on to Constant’s 
modern and ancient liberty.
192
 On Berlin’s reading of nineteenth-century liberalism, the 
conception of liberty to which liberals were opposed was not one understood in terms of non-
domination, but rather one understood in terms of the sovereignty or authority of the people, 
which ran through Rousseau into the French Revolution. To present a distinctively republican 
conception of liberty as non-domination in contradistinction to a distinctively liberal conception 
based on a ‘Berlin-Constant framework’ is therefore bound to mislead, since it misconstrues the 
dichotomies with which both Constant and Berlin were concerned.   
The type of challenges that the present chapter has raised for modern republicanism are 
not just historical in character. If analysis of pre-revolutionary French thought challenges the 
coherence of a certain historical narrative regarding rival republican and liberal traditions, 
attention to Hobbes and Rousseau poses more specific problems with trying to realise 
republican ideals in modern states. Hobbes’s challenge to republicanism, on the present reading, 
was firstly in claiming that the idea of placing the law above men is ill-conceived, since all 
legislative power is by definition arbitrary; and, secondly, in arguing that the liberty of the 
subjects in a commonwealth is determined by the extent of the laws and not the subjects’ 
influence in determining those laws. By contrast, Rousseau’s challenge to republicanism, by 
way of advocate, was in arguing that the conditions requisite for republican liberty and virtue to 
flourish are deeply irreconcilable with modern commercial society. Challenges for modern 
republicans, then, are to be found as much from within as from outside of the tradition upon 
which they draw. 
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Conclusion 
 
Let no one say that I have said nothing new: the arrangement of the material is new. When 
playing tennis, both players hit the same ball, but one of them places it better.
1
 
 
For Rousseau scholars there is something consoling about Pascal’s pensée. Given the 
voluminous scholarship that exists on Rousseau it might initially seem very difficult to say 
anything new. Yet in many respects the challenge that scholars are presented with is one of 
arranging his ideas – that so often appear disparate and disjointed – into some sort of system or 
coherent order, which Rousseau maintained existed throughout his œuvre. Or, if this proves 
untenable, to at least expose the contradictions and tensions that ultimately render Rousseau’s 
work incoherent, even if the extent of these remained unbeknown to the author himself. To say 
something new about Rousseau, then, is frequently to arrange his ideas in such a way that 
elucidates hitherto neglected aspects of his thought and presents a different picture of his 
philosophy to those that abound in the extant scholarship. The hope, at least, is to capture 
something of Rousseau that is both true to his thought and has been missed previously. 
Rousseau was often concerned to defend his work against the charge of contradiction, 
yet at the same time he was quite happy to admit that he was a man of paradox. Paradoxes, for 
Rousseau, were not logical anomalies in thought but rather ideas that countered those 
commonly held; in this respect they are best understood in contradistinction to prejudices.
2
 The 
reading developed throughout this thesis supports Rousseau’s own conclusion, he was certainly 
a paradoxical thinker in the way that he understood the term. Given this, one way of 
approaching his thought is to recognise the extent to which it does not map onto the sets of ideas 
with which either his contemporaries or modern scholars often work. This is true with respect to 
both the historical context within which Rousseau’s writings should be situated and the 
conceptual interplay of certain ideas central to his thought. By way of conclusion, then, these 
may each be considered in turn. 
 
Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbes in context 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to provide a comprehensive examination of Rousseau’s 
engagement with Hobbes, but not an exhaustive one. To note that it is inexhaustive is, in one 
respect, to do no more than recognise the naivety of assuming that any piece of scholarship can 
pretend to have the final say on a subject of such enduring interest. More specifically, however, 
there is at least one topic that has attracted some attention amongst scholars that has not been 
addressed in any depth here. That is, Rousseau’s response to Hobbes in the State of War, and the 
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implications that it carries for their respective theories of international relations. Much has been 
written on this elsewhere and the present analysis of the two thinkers has little of note to add.
3
 
Yet, this exception aside, the aim has been to explore all of the other main avenues where there 
is evidence that Hobbes influenced Rousseau. 
If it is as important to report what one’s research fails to find as much as what it hopes 
to have established, then it is well to point out that it is far harder to discern Hobbes’s direct 
influence on Rousseau than might be expected. Indeed most of the evidence that Rousseau read 
any of Hobbes’s works is confined to the Second Discourse. Most notably, there is very little 
evidence to indicate conclusively whether or not Rousseau read anything apart from De Cive, 
assumedly in Samuel Sorbière’s French translation. This is an important conclusion in itself 
given the temptation to compare Rousseau’s Social Contract with Hobbes’s Leviathan, for it 
should not be assumed that Rousseau read Leviathan, rather the burden of proof falls on 
revealing him to have done so. More generally, the foregoing analysis has shown that Hobbes’s 
influence on Rousseau was more frequently an indirect one. Rousseau was certainly familiar 
with Hobbesian ideas, but it is often difficult to ascertain whether this familiarity was derived 
from reading Hobbes’s texts or from intermediary sources. 
One reason that discerning Hobbes’s direct influence proves difficult is precisely 
because of his considerable indirect influence on much French political thought during the first 
half of the eighteenth century. This is largely due to the significance of Pufendorf at the time, 
since he was arguably the most widely invoked authority on matters political, perhaps rivalled 
only by Montesquieu. For example, via Barbeyrac’s French editions of the most important 
modern natural law treatises, Pufendorf’s influence found its way into the political controversies 
that engulfed Geneva during the 1750s and into the political entries in the Encyclopédie. 
Pufendorf both adopted many Hobbesian ideas and also set out much of his own thought in 
opposition to Hobbes, and the same could be said of many of his followers in the mid-
eighteenth century, such as Burlamaqui. It is thus with the modern natural law context in mind, 
more than any other, that Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbes should be situated. 
Once the prominence of both Hobbesian ideas and criticisms of Hobbes in eighteenth-
century French political thought is recognised, it comes as less of a surprise that Rousseau’s 
engagement with Hobbes and Hobbism was so deeply polemical. Rousseau sought to collapse 
the prevalent bifurcation between Hobbesian Epicureanism and Pufendorfian sociability in order 
to show that the accounts of the state of nature, social pact and sovereignty offered by Hobbes’s 
critics remained indebted to a Hobbesian vision of politics. In particular, for Rousseau, they all 
rested on erroneously presenting man’s condition without civil laws as miserable and all 
developed accounts of the social pact that entailed man alienating his God-given freedom to a 
quasi-Hobbesian sovereign. It was not simply the case that some of the most important ideas in 
                                                 
3
  See principally Roosevelt, Rousseau in the Nuclear Age, pp. 34-39; Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, 
pp. 202-207. 
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Rousseau’s Second Discourse and Social Contract were directed against Hobbes, then, since 
they were further set out in order to show that Hobbes’s natural law critics were in fact no better 
than Hobbes.  
Closely related to the natural law context was that of doux commerce theory, in which 
modern commerce and luxury were justified due to their tendency to relieve man of his 
otherwise miserable and barbaric state. These arguments were made in response to Rousseau’s 
First Discourse and his replies, in turn, culminated in the Second Discourse. To claim that 
commercial society was required to remedy man’s barbarism was, according to Rousseau, 
implicitly to accept the Hobbesian account of the state of nature. Only if man was naturally 
inclined to competition and conflict would commerce be justified by its ability to turn such 
individualistic passions to good use. By adopting a Hobbesian picture of the state of nature, the 
doux commerce theorists had got the cause and effect the wrong way around. On Rousseau’s 
account, commercial society was the cause of man’s inflamed passions, not their remedy. 
The polemical nature of Rousseau’s invocations of Hobbes has not previously been 
examined in any depth, thus the present findings provide the first comprehensive exploration 
into this relatively neglected field. It is sometimes thought that Rousseau’s critique missed the 
point of Hobbes’s philosophy and to some extent this criticism is valid. However, it in turn rests 
on missing the point of Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes, which was as much about revealing the 
pervasive influence of Hobbes’s ideas on the political thought of the time as it was about 
showing Hobbes’s texts to be mistaken. To this end, Rousseau inverted the ways that Hobbes’s 
ideas were often presented by aligning them with positions to which they were commonly 
thought to be opposed. If the cost of doing so was to miss some of the nuances of Hobbes’s 
argument, it was a cost well worth paying to further Rousseau’s polemical ends.  
At the beginning of this thesis it was claimed that the problem hovering over much 
scholarship on Hobbes and Rousseau – never having been adequately resolved – is neatly 
encapsulated by Richard Tuck’s question: what exactly did Rousseau think he was doing?
4
 
Rousseau only invoked Hobbes explicitly on a few occasions, but the invocations were of some 
significance and were carefully chosen. The short answer to Tuck’s question then, by way of 
summary, is that Rousseau thought that he was showing that many of his contemporaries were 
far more Hobbesian than they would have ever admitted, whilst at the same time setting his own 
thought out in opposition to both. 
To stress the polemical force of Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbes is not to suggest 
that there were no deep philosophical disagreements between the two thinkers. Indeed two of 
these disagreements have been emphasised throughout the thesis: their contrasting accounts of 
human nature and their respective positions on the question of free will. What is more, it would 
not be too great an overstatement to suggest that many of the most important differences in their 
respective political philosophies can be traced back to their opposing accounts of the nature of 
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man and of the will. With this in mind, it is worth reviewing some of the broader philosophical 
interest in examining the two thinkers together.  
 
Oppositions and affinities 
 
Rousseau’s principle that man is naturally good was employed in order to show that the misery 
of man’s modern existence – which Hobbes had confused with man’s natural state – was only a 
contingent result of the development of certain types of social relations and institutions. Just as 
importantly, man’s modern state was not a necessary consequence of all social institutions. 
Rousseau thought that the view of political or commercial society endorsed in different ways by 
Hobbes, Pufendorf and the doux commerce theorists, ultimately rested on a post-lapsarian 
account of man’s nature and passions. Rousseau, however, found such political possibilities 
degrading and, repudiating this picture of human nature, instead proposed a republican vision 
for the naturally good man. Where Hobbes’s political philosophy commenced by positing men 
driven by inflamed individualistic passions, Rousseau’s political thought was largely concerned 
with forestalling the onset of such passions (even if he sometimes indicated that the necessity 
for political institutions does not arise until such passions have developed).
5
 Rousseau’s account 
of man’s nature thus allowed for a different political possibility to that entertained by Hobbes, 
precisely because it was a politics for the naturally good man, based on cultivating his pre-
lapsarian passions prior to their corruption by modern commercial society. Indeed if today 
Rousseau’s critique of commercial society seems to incriminate us all, then it is for the very 
same reason that his political proposals cease to be a possibility. 
As well as showing that man’s mortal state is not naturally sinful and vicious, Rousseau 
also thought that nature itself was in need of justification, since the likes of Hobbes and those 
who followed him had supposedly besmirched nature and denied its rights. Pufendorf has been 
described as having held a ‘non-purposeful conception of nature’,
6
 and the same could equally 
be said of Hobbes, or at least of his ideas as they were understood in much eighteenth-century 
French thought. In contrast to the positivism and conventionalism associated with Hobbism, 
Rousseau maintained that nature provided a transcendent normative standard, with which the 
social order would have to conform. The idea that what is good and just must be in accordance 
with the nature of things is a Ciceronian one, found also in thinkers such as Burlamaqui.
7
 Yet 
Rousseau’s conception of nature also appealed to a notion of order that reflected the influence of 
other sources, since for man’s life to be in accordance with nature he would have to enjoy a 
harmonious and ordered existence, free from the contradictions that cause human misery. 
                                                 
5
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6
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7
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Rousseau’s ideas on the importance of order are sometimes taken to be primarily political, 
reflecting the classical republican heritage of his thought.
8
 However, as was often the case, 
Rousseau appears to have assimilated ideas from a number of contexts in a complementary 
manner to support his own position. One was the neo-Augustinian view that the disorder of 
man’s passions characterised man’s post-lapsarian state, an idea which informed both 
Rousseau’s secularised recasting of the fall in the Second Discourse and his account of ordering 
the passions in the body politic. The notion of order was also central to Rousseau’s metaphysical 
commitments and theodicy, and in this respect the influence of Malebranche was considerable.
9
 
Indeed Rousseau followed both Malebranche and Leibniz in arguing that there is a harmony and 
order in the world and, even if man is unable to recognise this, everything is ‘regular in the eyes 
of nature’.
10
 
The idea that Rousseau succumbed to a Hobbesian account of natural right that 
characterises modern political thought rests on attributing to him a purely scientific and 
descriptive understanding of nature.
11
 Yet Rousseau’s conception of nature involved a strong 
normative dimension, supplying a transcendent standard that informed much of his philosophy, 
including his political thought. Moreover, for Rousseau, defending the rights of nature further 
entailed stressing the inalienability of man’s two God-given gifts of nature: his life and freedom. 
Where Hobbes had made self-preservation the principle of the right and laws of nature, 
Rousseau insisted on man’s freedom as being equally important, since it is only free will that 
renders man a moral and spiritual being in contradistinction to physical beings such as animals. 
In his political philosophy Rousseau thus employed a distinction between moral and physical 
force – premised on free will constituting man’s moral nature – that was unavailable to those 
who endorsed Hobbesian, materialist metaphysics. Where Hobbes’s political theory was 
concerned with preserving man’s life, Rousseau’s was concerned with both man’s life and 
freedom, and this difference is largely explained by their competing metaphysical commitments.  
The importance of free will in Rousseau’s political thought cannot be understated. His 
criticisms of illegitimate contracts rested on man having alienated his free will, and his own 
theory of the social pact was intended to preserve (and generalise) this freedom in the social 
body. If free will had not been an inalienable gift of nature, then the philosophical basis of 
Rousseau’s criticisms of Hobbesian accounts of the social pact would be undermined and his 
own rival theory rendered unnecessary. For better or worse, it is often now thought that political 
philosophers need not commit on such problems and that a coherent theory of justice as 
‘political not metaphysical’ may be expounded.
12
 Examination of Hobbes and Rousseau, 
however, serves to suggest how much is at stake in political philosophy regarding such 
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metaphysical questions. Where Hobbes scholars have recently stressed that his political thought 
cannot be detached from his materialism,
13
 the present interpretation similarly lends support to 
the argument that Rousseau’s metaphysics and belief in free will grounded much of his political 
philosophy.
14
  
In addition to highlighting the importance of nature and free will as themes central to 
Rousseau’s philosophy, this thesis has also sought to show how they interplay with one another 
and, in addition, how both are related to a third theme: the passions. Examination of how these 
three themes interweave throughout Rousseau’s thought is particularly important, given that 
otherwise his ideas on nature and free will are liable to be misunderstood. With respect to nature, 
it is important to emphasise that Rousseau did not consider there to be anything unnatural about 
the passions in themselves and did not think that the role of reason was to overcome the 
passions. Indeed Rousseau echoed the prevalent Augustinian criticism of the Stoics when he 
claimed that to want to destroy the passions would be ‘to control nature, it is to reform the work 
of God.’
15
 Much as it is problematical to read Rousseau as a Stoic in this sense,
16
 it is similarly 
so to read him as a forerunner of Kant in privileging reason over the passions in human 
understanding.
17
 Concomitantly, the Kantian idea that freedom entails acting from reason alone 
presupposes the permanence of a conflict between reason and the passions that is absent from 
Rousseau’s philosophy. 
Those who have taken the role of free will seriously in Rousseau’s thought have tended 
to read the concept through Kantian lenses and associate it with a strong sense of autonomy as 
self-mastery and self-legislation.
18
 However, this results in a number of tensions arsing once 
Rousseau’s ideas on of socialisation and education are taken into account,
19
 which cultivate the 
passions of men in order to influence their wills. By contrast, the interpretation of Rousseau’s 
conception of free will advanced throughout this thesis – based on the definition given in the 
Second Discourse – is that freedom comprises the consciousness of freely acquiescing in, 
resisting, or choosing between one’s inclinations, to which the passions give rise. In this sense 
freedom is not associated with acting from reason over the passions as much as it is with 
choosing between the inclinations occasioned by the passions; this choice, or judgement, 
renders man and active and moral being. The role of the legislator, republican institutions and 
education in cultivating the citizens’ passions could be quite compatible with the citizens’ 
freedom, providing that citizens retain the consciousness of freely acquiescing in their 
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inclinations. The freedom and virtue of the citizen, then, do not require a process of self-mastery 
that involves reason overcoming the passions. To be sure, this understanding of free will may 
not seem as robust as a Kantian conception, since it is compatible with a high level of socially 
determined will-formation. For Rousseau, however, it was simply a fact about social institutions 
that they always have an effect on shaping the will of men and, this being the case, the 
conception of free will that he sought to preserve was the only one that remained a possibility. 
The cultivation of the passions necessary to sustain a well-ordered republic was therefore quite 
consistent with Rousseau’s conception of free will, even if not with a more strongly autonomous 
understanding of the concept. 
 To finish, it is perhaps well to return to the quote from which this thesis takes its title; 
Rousseau’s claim that the problem of politics can only be resolved by either the most austere 
democracy or the most perfect Hobbism.
20
 For Rousseau, either the law had to be placed 
completely above man or man completely above the law, otherwise the contradiction between 
the two would lead to the eventual decay of the body politic. The only way to place the law 
above man was if the people as a whole directly retained the legislative power and if the 
sovereign could only be represented by itself with the people freely assembled. Any other form 
of representative sovereignty, such as Hobbes’s, would involve sovereignty being alienated or 
transferred, which, on Rousseau’s principles, was always illegitimate. This is perhaps the 
interpretation of the quote that comes closest to Rousseau’s intended meaning, but there is 
another way in which it might be read that speaks more generally to the relationship between 
Hobbes and Rousseau. If, as Rousseau suggested, Hobbes and Rousseau offer divergent answers 
to the problem of politics, then it should first be granted that they both understood the nature of 
the problem with which they were grappling in similar terms. This is an apt note on which to 
conclude, for Rousseau’s problems were, in many important respects, ones of a fundamentally 
Hobbesian nature. Both thinkers were in agreement that the problems of politics stem from the 
disorder of men’s individualistic passions and, consequently, that such problems cannot simply 
be remedied by appeals to abstract principles of political right discerned by reason alone. For 
both Hobbes and Rousseau, politics must appeal to the passions of men in order to show them 
their interest in being just. What is more, for both thinkers this could only be achieved if social 
institutions could educate citizens in such a way as to re-orientate their passions to secure the 
unity of the body politic. This at once proves to be the source of much of the perennial intrigue 
and disquiet that reading each thinker occasions.  
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